John Tietz
Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*
John Tietz

An Outline and Study Guide to Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*
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For the student, Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) stands as one of the most difficult texts in Western philosophy in large part because of its unusual and idiosyncratic language. This classic work of twentieth-century philosophy contains important and original theses, but for the student the primary question has long been: what *are* they? On the one hand, the task of reading Heidegger seems so forbidding that students often avoid struggling with the text entirely, seeking answers in the many commentaries now available. On the other hand, if one concentrates too much on Heidegger's language, little headway can be made with very many of the arguments. But if secondary sources are used too extensively, how can justice be done to the text?


There are many other new commentaries and collections of essays. I tend to stay with the references to older secondary sources because they are more likely to be available in libraries. Heidegger’s own *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, finally translated into English in 1982 (by Albert Hofstadter) and published by Indiana University Press, covers the same ground as *Being and Time*. It was a lecture course Heidegger gave while writing *Being and Time*. For the most part it is much clearer, although a bit diffusely organized—like a lec-
ture series. The trouble is that it adds several hundred more pages of reading. But selective use of this text would be a good idea.

Like Gelven’s, this book consists of a section by section account of *Being and Time*. Despite many valuable insights, however, Gelven tends to overgeneralize, sometimes leaving specific details behind, often relying too much on existentialist explanations in the Sartrean manner. Dreyfus and Guignon, in contrast, focus more intently on issues shared with the analytic rather than solely existential tradition: foundationalism, theories of truth, realism and idealism. They tend to emphasize the anti-individualism in Heidegger’s account of Dasein and das Man, for example, where Gelven concentrates on Dasein’s uniqueness in a moral and personal sense. My outline tends to sympathize with the approach of Dreyfus and Guignon, although both themes should be discussed. As a general guide to terminology, based on the dictionary form, Michael Inwood’s *A Heidegger Dictionary*, published by Blackwell in 1999, provides a thorough discussion of the various alternative interpretations.

I hope that my outline format will allow the student to quickly understand the structure of the sections and chapters of *Being and Time*. I occasionally recommend commentary relevant to particular passages in the primary text but I try to avoid much general commentary of my own, focusing instead on the text itself. Plenty of overview can be found in the four books mentioned above and elsewhere. I also think the outline format allows the student to visualize the structure of given chapters and the interrelation of Heidegger’s points. I try to outline the primary text in, I hope, fairly clear language (even at the price of occasional oversimplification). There are of course different views on what that structure might be and what follows should be seen as one possible reading. I would be grateful for responses from teachers and students—and for advice about how I can improve this work. It is after all primarily intended as a teaching tool. If I use your suggestions in future editions, I will happily acknowledge their source.

Page numbers in square brackets refer to the original German edition page numbers in the margins of the translation of *Being and Time* by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper and Row). I have not included an index because the edition already contains a good one and since this study-guide uses that edition, it also corresponds to the index. The newer translation by Joan Stambaugh (State University of N.Y., 1997) has many advantages over the older Marquarrie/Robinson, but the latter is still the more widely used and quoted. Stambaugh also includes the page numbers of the older and original edition so that Marquarrie and Robinson’s fine index will work for it as well. Concerning translation, I have followed Dreyfus in translating “vorhenden” as “occurrent” rather than as “present-at-hand” and “zuhanden” as “availability” or as “involvement context” rather than as “ready-to-hand.” Except for quotations, I have also followed Dreyfus in eliminating capital letters from most of the terminology in *Being and Time*. Occasionally I retain “Being” to indicate a difference from Heidegger’s view of being as activity when discussing other philosophers such as Aristotle or Hegel. I have avoided the hyphenated expressions Marquarrie and Robinson use as translations of German words when hyphens seem to add nothing. I do retain “being-in-the-world” and one or two others in order to indicate Heidegger’s specialized senses of these terms but I have found the general practice unnecessary and sometimes obfuscatory. At the ends of chapters I-4 and I-5 I have included summary outlines since these are long and complex discussions. I have included as a separate chapter a summary outline of I-6 and II-4, since these two chapters are philosophically related.

Special thanks to Gary Overvold who first got me interested in Heidegger, despite my initial resistance, when we were fellow graduate students many years ago. Comments from my students have also been helpful.

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I. Heidegger quotes from Plato’s Sophist: we thought we knew what we meant by the expression “Being” but now we are perplexed.

II. We must reawaken our understanding of the question: what is Being? “What is it for something to ‘be’?” is indeed an odd question nowadays. Has it always been so?

A. His point is that we must not think that this is a question about beings (i.e., particular things) or about what exists. Heidegger does not think that Being and existence are the same.

B. Heidegger takes Being not to be about particular things but about the general characterization of a particular view of the world. For Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle understood the Greek concept of Being as what has come to be called “substance/attribute” metaphysics. Along with what can be called “subject/object” metaphysics, these metaphysical theories dominated Western philosophy from Aristotle to Kant. Hegel was the first major philosopher to think of Being in developmental, organic imagery that undermined both types of metaphysics.

C. I will follow Dreyfus who suggests in his commentary that we not capitalize “being” except when it refers to an historical sense, such as Plato’s or Aristotle’s. Capitalization makes it appear too noun-like, as if it referred to a thing. One of Heidegger’s main points is that “being” should be understood as activity rather than as what is the case.

III. Thesis: time is the “horizon” for understanding being.

A. Horizon: see Marquarrie and Robinson’s footnote. An horizon is a transcendental limit, something that makes a view of the world, or an activity, possible. Horizons cannot be extended beyond the interpretation of the world they make possible.

B. One goal of Being and Time is to show how the Western philosophical tradition depends on a particular view of being established by Plato and Aristotle, i.e.:
1. The spectator theory of knowledge (as John Dewey called it): knowledge is based on “looking at” the world, on imagery of seeing, and hence the subject who observes. This characterization brings with it the familiar elements of philosophic inquiry:
   a. Dualisms between mind and matter, subject and object, experience and nature. The mind has observational powers and is a different kind of thing from mere objects.
   b. Problems about the nature of substance: what are the differences in identity conditions between mind and matter?
   c. Problems of truth and representation: how is the essence of nature known? What is consciousness, what is language, what is justification, what is evidence? How does experience represent the world?
   d. Problems of realism: what is a substance, an attribute, an essence? What differences are there between substance and attribute? What distinguishes reality from appearance? What is existence? E.g., is it simply substance taking up space and enduring for a time?
2. The history of philosophy is the unfolding of the “fate” (the implications) contained in these distinctions. Heidegger argues that understanding philosophy as an unfolding historical phenomenon, rather than a timeless “science of Being,” allows us to see that our own nature and that of the world in which we live are not what they have seemed to philosophers to be. Their true natures have been covered over by the interpretations of being established Plato and Aristotle.
3. Therefore, the nature of interpretation will be one of the major themes of Being and Time. Heidegger will try to reconstruct the initial insights of Plato and Aristotle and to show how they provided the structure of our understanding of truth, knowledge, and reality. The history of philosophy, for Heidegger, has been an exercise in ‘forgetting’, of covering over, these insights and how they arose. If we look at that history more ‘historically’, as a temporal phenomenon, we will understand it as a succession of interpretations.

**First Introduction**

1. “The question of being,” Sections 1-2. (Hereafter sections will be designated by ‘#’.)
A. #1: this question (the Seinsfrage) should not be thought of as a pure, historically static inquiry into the nature and constitution of reality. Heidegger sees the question as a search for the formative processes behind the predominant philosophical and scientific interpretation of being characterizing Western civilization.
   1. Heidegger first distinguishes between the being of an entity qua particular thing (static, structural: what he calls “ontic” questions) and the way something is “in-a-world” (the dynamic, “ontological” relations to other things in the world that cannot be understood as properties or attributes of independently existing things).
   2. By looking at the activities and processes of existing, living, inquiring, and so on, Heidegger will soon draw a connection between Dasein and being that cannot be described in terms of the traditional philosophic distinctions between subject/object, mind/matter, man/nature, universal/particular, and their variants. Seeing how these distinctions arose emphasizes the activity of interpretation—the transcendent aspect of Dasein that cannot be described ontically. Heidegger uses “transcendent” to distinguish Dasein via its activities. Dasein is not a thing or substance and is capable of standing outside of the world characterized through its activities of generalization, universalization, abstraction, inference, and so on. This “standing outside”—ec-stasis—is the key to Heidegger’s concept of Understanding in Division I Chapter 6. This sense of transcendance applies fundamentally to Dasein as an activity.
B. Three traditional characterizations of Being [3]. An excursion through the historical uses of “Being.”
   1. Being as the most universal concept, a characterization of all reality. The quotation from Aquinas suggests that Being unifies the apprehension or conception of reality.
a. Aristotle’s problem: how to unify reality through the multiplicity of categories. Aristotle thought he could work up to the concept of Being through his theory of substance and attribute, thereby explaining how things are similar or different. He contended that this kind of taxonomical explanation yielded a hierarchy of dependencies between levels of existing things. His theory of the four causes is part of this account of dependence.
b. But unifying the categories by appealing to Being in this general way is to make it into the darkest, most obscure concept of all. How does it unify? How does “substance” unify or hold together “attributes”? D.J. O’Connor’s article, “Substance and Attribute” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, gives a brief and useful historical review of these concepts, including a summary of Aristotle’s answers to the question of “unity.”

2. Being is indefinable.
a. Being is the broadest genus, and hence cannot be defined by appealing to another genus larger than it, as Aristotle would do through his hierarchy of individual (primary substance)/species/genus/family, etc., until Being in general, the most inclusive category, can be understood, thus revealing the entire range of dependencies in the universe.
b. But Being does have an ultimate meaning: we know that it does not “have the character of an entity” [4]. This characterization of Being is flatly contrary to that of modern logical theory: e.g., Quine’s “to be is to be the value of a variable” (see II.B.1 below). For Heidegger, the indefinability of Being is a result of “definition” having taken on a specific character as a result of Aristotle’s theory of substance and categories: to be an entity is to fall within the substance/attribute framework of analysis. But that analysis cannot be applied to Being itself because it is not “substance” in the most general sense. This produces a paradox: even for Aristotle Being is not the totality of things but rather their relations to each other. Relations are not easily accounted for in terms of attributes.

3. The meaning of Being is self-evident.

a. Self-evidence simply means what we are willing to take for granted (“an average kind of intelligibility”). We want to get beneath that, which is what Plato and Aristotle wanted too. If the question of Being has been so difficult to answer, perhaps it needs to be reformulated, and to this he now turns.

C. #2: the formal structure of the question of Being [5].
1. The activity of questioning.
a. Investigating involves categorizing and conceptualizing.
b. “Guided beforehand by what is sought”: investigation involves a preconception of what is to be looked for. What kinds of things are trees, rocks, birds, etc. In everyday forms of inquiry, according to Aristotle, we look for things with attributes of one kind or another. “Being” here means the existence of a thing belonging to a kind. X is a tree iff it possesses F (attribute(s)) and “is” connects an entity with an attribute. But when we ask “What is Being?” we seem to be looking for a thing, for something that can be identified and differentiated. Such an “average understanding” (common sense) comes down to explaining Being in terms of beings, of extensional equivalence. Being is simply the totality of things with attributes [5]: here “Being is still a fact.”

2. Questioning being when it is not itself an entity. Introduction of Dasein.
a. The vagueness of the question is itself a phenomenon: why is it vague, why is being thought of so vaguely?
b. The ‘question’ has become so infiltrated with traditional philosophic theory that we inevitably end up in obscurity thinking that “the Question of Being” must be very difficult to fathom because of its complexity and profundity.
c. There are many senses to the question [7]. Shall we take one of them as the most basic? Why is that one the most basic?
d. The ‘entity’ asking the question; the inquirer as the subject of inquiry. See Dreyfus Chapter 1 on Dasein.
i. Can this being, Dasein, be made transparent to itself? Can we understand its behavior?
ii. Marquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on “Dasein.”
1. Heidegger does not use “person” or “mankind” because these involve specific histories and interpretations. “Dasein” means “being-there” in the sense of an activity. Dasein is a living being, one that acts. Dasein does not exist as a thing, or even a thing of a certain kind. Its identity is a function of its activity.
2. Descartes gave one interpretation of that activity (it is the activity of thinking), persons are bodies plus minds, and this characterization is front and center in Heidegger’s account of subject/object metaphysics. But to distinguish Dasein from Descartes’ “conscious subject,” Heidegger wants a term that is as neutral as can be, uncommitted to any of the interpretations within the world-view he is deconstructing. The basic activity of Dasein is, then, inquiry into being—especially into the nature of its own being.

iii. As it applies to Dasein, being is not a genus, not a thing or attribute. Dasein is the activity of being-in-a-world (the first three chapters of Division I explain this connection as the “analytic of Dasein”). The expression “being-in-the-world” is hyphenated to convey the unity of activity and world, to distinguish Dasein’s kind of being from that of objects. (Reminder: when discussing ‘being’ in this sense of activity, it will be in lower case.)
iv. Ontological inquiry: Heidegger wants to make explicit what are the implicit assumptions behind the view that being is the being of entities, and how his conception of Dasein fits—or doesn’t fit—into this account.

3. Last 3 ¶s of #2: circularity and inquiry.
   a. All ontology is circular. The approach must be nondeductive because there is no prior validation of the inferential rules for producing conclusions except by assuming the conclusions to be true, or some true and others inferred from them.
   b. Hermeneutics requires a theory of the inquirer to determine what they can inquire about.

   c. Is it circular to define Dasein in terms of being?

   i. Dasein requires being-in-a-world. Inquiry into being means inquiry into Dasein. But being-in-a-world is Dasein’s kind of being. This begins to look rather uninformative and circular.
   ii. One point to emerge soon will be that Dasein is not an isolated, immaterial being (a Cartesian mind) but one related to other Daseins as well as to the things in its world through action. There is something special about these relationships connecting the being of Dasein to the activity of interpretation—specifically the interpretation of being.
   iii. Not a metaphysical inquiry into the kinds of things there are in the world but about how we came to think these are the kinds that go deepest into the structure of reality.
   iv. Heidegger does not think his form of inquiry is circular. He begins with what he calls “the essential understanding of being” as “the essential constitution of Dasein itself.” Dasein differs from everything else in the universe because it interprets not only what it encounters but itself as well.
   d. Interpretation begins from a “preontological” or “original” understanding of being that characterizes the world in which Dasein exists. This is the hermeneutic method and leads to Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology.”

   i. “Original” generally means prephilosophical, but it sometimes also means preconceptual: Dasein’s most primordial activities cannot be captured by the philosophical framework derived from Plato. Yet we can understand what these activities are and it is Heidegger’s goal to show not only what they are but how they are essential to Dasein.
   ii. Marquarrie and Robinson translate “ursprünglich” as “primordial,” in “[Descartes] has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein” [98]. But the German word means “origin,” and Heidegger sometimes speaks of something being “more ursprünglich” than something else: primordiality does not admit of degrees but originality does. See the opening discussion of
Division II [231 f.] for Heidegger’s discussion of this term.

iii. The “priority of Dasein” means that only one kind of being can ask the question of being because only it can ask about itself or Being.

iv. “Prephilosophical” does not mean unphilosophical. For Heidegger, our ordinary views of the world have been shaped by the history of philosophy. In part he wants to determine what that influence has been in order that we may see it to be an interpretation rather than a statement beyond interpretation.

II. #3: The ontological priority of the question of being. The main point in this and the next section is that the study of being (or even Being) cannot be separate from the study of Dasein.

A. “Ontological” inquiry is more original than ontical inquiry (the latter concerns itself with things and the former with the nature of things, i.e., with the characterization of the world in which things exist). “Ontology” therefore has a transcendental task.

B. Being is always the being of an entity [9].

1. Aristotle: Being as the categorization of beings through the substance/attribute distinction. Quine: “to be is to be the value of a variable.” Quine’s monumentally important essay, “On What There Is,” can be read in this context in contrast to Heidegger’s view of existence. Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger may entirely agree with Quine that the question of Being comes down to how the concept of Existence occurs in logic.

a. The system of categories, concepts, logic and grammar has evolved as the basis for our understanding of the world through the concept of Substance.

b. But how did it evolve? ¶ 4: the real movement of the sciences towards systemization is revolutionary (note the similarity to Kuhn’s distinction between revolutionary and normal science).

c. The periodic crises of the history of science indicate the considerable revisions that have taken place in science. These revisions produce radically different views of the world.

d. The search for permanent, ahistorical essences is in fact highly historical and revisionist. Aristotle, e.g., describes himself as simply taking what was true in the work of earlier thinkers and combining these truths, along with his analysis, into a coherent doctrine, articulated through his metaphysics. Yet Aristotle was highly inventive in the interpretation of his predecessors: did he invent the theory of Substance/Attribute, or did he discover it in the work of Thales and his successors? Such historical movement from obscurity towards clarity, mediated by great geniuses, has produced the illusion of the permanence of truth or at least its cumulative achievement. Science investigates the eternal verities of the world and philosophy describes the necessary conditions for those truths.

i. Some examples [9–10].

ii. The basic concepts of a discipline predetermine how things are going to be understood.

iii. Reference to Kant: the permanent categorial structure of the mind predetermines the nature of objective experience in terms of substance/attribute logic [11]. If we cannot have permanence in the world (the doctrine of substance and external realism having collapsed by the time of Kant), we must find it elsewhere: in the mind (Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. Kant reappears often in Heidegger’s discussion: he is half-right and half-wrong. The good part emphasizes constitutive activity, the bad part the Cartesian desire to find a “something” that does the constituting.

2. Science remains blind to its ontological presuppositions, those preordained ontological decisions going back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s view of Being as substance and knowledge as the representation of the structure of substance/attribute.

III. #4: The ontical priority of the question of being (reminder: no capital “B” to indicate Heidegger’s analysis of being as activity).

A. Special status of Dasein: not just an entity along with others in the world.

1. “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” [12].
2. Being is an issue for Dasein; Dasein wants to know what it means to be. It asks about itself; no other ‘entity’ does that.

B. “Existence”: the kind of being Dasein is concerned with involves what is possible for it.
   1. The question of existence for Dasein is answered by undertaking some project, some activity, engaging in or doing something or even nothing at all. The question of the existence of things, for example, has been ‘answered’ by undertaking the activity of scientific analysis. But Dasein is not like the things it analyzes.
   2. “Existentiell” questioning (as Marquarrie and Robinson translate “existenziell”) is the type of inquiry into the particular way of life and particular world in which one exists. To be existentiell is to be concerned about ontic possibilities, about what things there are or could be.
   3. “Existential” inquiry concerns the character and nature of the world. This is an inquiry into the presuppositions underlying our understanding of the world. For example, Heidegger characterizes philosophy through his analysis of subject/object metaphysics and the existence of entities through the logic of substance/attribute.

C. The essential characteristic of Dasein is being-in-a-world [13].
   1. Dasein has an ontical priority over all other entities: Dasein is the only one that “ex-sists,” the only one in the world differently from other beings.
      a. “Existence” for Dasein is derived from “ec-stasis,” the activity of transcending. Dasein’s “originality” and ontical primacy in the world is due to its ontological nature. (See Division II Chapter 3, # 65.)
      b. The ‘entities’ of the world to some extent depend on Dasein, as we see in Heidegger’s contrast between occurrencentness and availableness. What something is depends on whether it is occurring or available. This is a major theme of Being and Time.
   2. Dasein has an ontological priority since Dasein is itself ontological: Dasein’s existence, its activities, determines what it is through its activities.

D. “Existential analytic” [13] Dasein’s ontical character depends on activity (its ontological character). “Existentiality” is constitutive for Dasein in the sense that it characterizes itself in relation to what it does, what is possible for it, what it does not do, etc. Being-in-the-world belongs to Dasein essentially since it constantly interprets the world. Heidegger rejects intentionalist accounts of being-in-the-world as derivative from more basic activities. How is intentionality possible in the first place? It is not a fundamental term for Heidegger. (See Dreyfus on Heidegger’s critique of intentionality: p. 46 f.) Ontical questions (what kinds of things there are and what they are) presuppose Dasein. Ontological questions include Dasein as one of the conditions of the character of its world.
   1. The quotation from Aristotle (De Anima Book III) on [14] should be compared with more traditional translations, e.g., Ross: “The soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable…. Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects—the sensible and the knowable… Not the thing but the form—as the hand is the tool of tools, the soul is the form of forms.”
   2. Heidegger wants to show how central Dasein was to ontology even in the early days: how Aristotle connects the things of the world to the potentiality of the mind for grasping their forms—as a way of explaining Dasein’s activities. The soul grasps reality by apprehending its forms: we can already see the origin of the mind as representative of reality beginning to emerge.
   3. The soul characterized as the transcendence of entities (as Aquinas described it). Heidegger agrees but characterizes this
transcendence as an activity rather than as a state of an ontologically unique substance.

IV. The following chart from Gelven’s book (p. 24) summarizes the terminology introduced in this chapter (the factical/factual distinction comes in on [56], Division I Chapter 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object of Inquiry:</th>
<th>Being (Sein)</th>
<th>Entity (Das Seiende)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of inquiry:</td>
<td>ontological</td>
<td>ontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of inquiry:</td>
<td>existentials</td>
<td>categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of occurrence in inquiry:</td>
<td>factual</td>
<td>factual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of self-awareness in inquiry:</td>
<td>existential</td>
<td>existentiell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECOND INTRODUCTION

I. In the Second Introduction Heidegger directs his attention to methodology. His approach to the question of being cannot be traditional (with the usual concepts and distinctions) since he is attempting to ‘criticize’ the Western philosophical tradition in the sense of understanding its presuppositions. In so doing, he must show how they arose and that philosophy is an interpretative activity of being in its historical contexts rather than its exhaustive analysis. This leads him first to a statement of his thesis that being is connected to time. Ontology is not an investigation into a timeless, eternal realm (the Platonic forms, the Aristotelian categories, the Kantian pure concepts of the understanding, Descartes’ innate ideas, and so on). Rather, Heidegger characterizes ontological activity as fundamental questioning without univocal answers. He thus describes his own methodology as “hermeneutical.”

II. #5: Dasein lays bare the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of being in general.

A. Dasein is located in history. It must therefore understand the nature of time in order to understand being (and itself).

B. Dasein is closest to us and yet ontologically it is farthest because its being is largely concealed from itself [15]. Because Dasein remains hidden from itself, or takes itself for granted, it tends to look at the world of entities as given rather than at how it understands them or why it understands them in this way.

1. Stones are hidden to themselves but manifest to us. What would such awareness be? What would it be like to “be” a stone? The fundamental nature of Dasein is to inquire into something. But Dasein also inquires about itself in that it makes itself manifest to itself, and in so doing it discloses its being as the activity of inquiry. But Dasein is also concealed from itself, as Heidegger summarizes in the first ¶ of [16]. Translate the terminology in that ¶. What does he mean by “ontico-ontologically prior”?
2. As this Introduction proceeds, Heidegger gradually introduces a major distinction between “disclosure” (erschliessen: to unlock, to reveal, to open, to make accessible) and “discovery” (entdecken: to uncover). Discovery depends on a framework, relative to which discoveries are made. A disclosure is the revelation of the framework within which one lives and works, within which one understands the world. Large scale examples would be Ptolemy’s view of the solar system, or Galileo’s.

3. Heidegger’s existential analytic leads to the way Dasein is in-the-world in its special sense.
   a. Dasein’s existence has the character of Umwillen: existence for the sake of which. Dasein is always “ahead of itself.” It is teleological and thus directs its activities into the future. Being and Time describes how this works and what this account of Dasein implies about the question of being.
   b. For Dasein, being is existence as activity (including self-disclosure) in a world whose structure is interdependent with Dasein through its activities. Dasein is constituted by its activities.

C. We must do an existential analytic of the existentiell understanding of the world: what is the latter kind of understanding? It is to understand the world as things “present-at-hand,” vorhanden, entities usually understood as occurring in space and time with attributes. Dreyfus translates “Vorhandenheit” as occurrentness, a more faithful rendering of Heidegger’s intention to avoid subject/object dichotomies in his own account. “Presence-at-hand” implies some object present to me, a subject. “Occurrentness” refers to something’s spatio-temporal occurrence, but there is more to it.
   1. Since Plato, the goal of philosophy has been to understand and explain occurrentness: the occurrence of entities, their categories, and so on.
   2. The “scientific” interpretation of being as occurrentness has emphasized:

b. The concepts of Space, Time, and Causality are essential to the explanation of change in substances. Kant’s analysis of objective experience through the forms of time and space.

c. The primary/secondary quality distinction of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Descartes’ and Locke’s explanations of essences, appearances, and perceptual properties.

3. The problem for Heidegger is twofold:
   a. Dasein cannot be understood by the scientific interpretation of being understood as occurrence, which settles ontic questions, so how is it to be understood?
   b. Is scientific interpretation the deepest possible way to understand occurrence? What does science assume about the world, how does it interpret the world?

D. The expression “proximally and for the most part” [16–17] generally means pre-philosophical: how do we understand the world in natural everyday experience, before we get too reflective or theoretical about it. See Marquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on “average everydayness” [15–16].
   1. But “average everydayness” has presuppositions too. Some of these conceal Dasein’s activity and some involve presuppositions about the kind of world in which Dasein exists. The point is that Dasein can transcend its everydayness to understand these presuppositions.
   2. For Dasein, to exist is to disclose, to become ontological. “Only when the basic structures of Dasein have been adequately worked out with explicit orientation towards the problem itself, will what we have hitherto gained in interpreting Dasein gets its existential justification” [16.5].
   3. But Dasein is not equivalent to Man or mankind, or humanness or humanity. Humans possess Dasein but the term designates activities at least potentially beyond any particular instantiation in human civilization. Those historical instantiations are interpretations of being.
E. [17.5] to end of section: temporality is part of Dasein’s being.

1. The “original” relation of time to Dasein consists in Dasein’s living, acting, inquiring, etc. This will be connected to the discussion of death in Division II Chapter 1. Dasein’s realization of its temporality and finitude through its encounter with the meaning of death as the end of its activity is the occasion for Dasein’s reassessment of its nature and its self-transcendence.

2. The reference to Bergson [18 ¶ 1] appears to be to his thesis that qualitative or “lived time” extends into the world and is thus derived from it—from space, for Bergson. (Almost forgotten today, Bergson was one of the most important and widely read European philosophers at the beginning of the twentieth century and this probably explains why Heidegger brings him into his discussion.) This becomes clearer later on [333] where Heidegger claims that the extension of ‘qualitative’ (lived) time into space gives an inadequate analysis of time. His own conception of time is that it is indeed an objective feature of the world and that he can explain it through his theory of Dasein as activity. The point is very cryptically made at this early point and the reader certainly has every right to feel puzzled. The historical background of such questions about time goes back to Kant’s argument that time is a “form of intuition” and as such is “subjective.” Time functions as a structural, organizational characteristic of the mind. Kant’s problem, how to get objectivity out of subjectivity, is one Heidegger clearly sees and he will try to show how that is possible without the Kantian mechanism of transcendental subjectivity and the pure concepts of the understanding. It is not the “working” of the mind that must be explained, but the behavior of Dasein, its activities. As a result, the subject/object distinction will be seen not to be ontologically fundamental. The mind is not a substance for Heidegger but resembles Aristotle’s “moving principle” of behavior.

3. Time distinguishes realms of being: time has ontological significance in the way Dasein is distinguished from other temporal entities.

   a. The discussion at [19] concerns the relation between time and the world; how is the world characterized temporally?

   What difference does this make to Dasein’s awareness of its temporality?

b. Being is “made visible in its ‘temporal’ character” in the sense that time is part of the identity and character of things. Dasein is not “in” time like a log floating down a river, it changes through its existence. This will become part of Heidegger’s reversal of Aristotle’s metaphysical principle that essence precedes existence. For Heidegger, existence is a temporal phenomenon affecting the characterization of something’s essence.

c. Even the “supra-temporal” is in time. What philosophy had thought of as timeless entities—Plato’s universals, mathematical truths, the laws of logic and thought—are also temporal. Instead of universals, Heidegger discusses the activity of universalizing first made famous by Plato. Socrates, for example, in the early books of the Republic, wonders how all the various conceptions of justice are related. This leads him to talk about the form of Justice. How did that appeal to universality come to involve the ontology of permanence and timelessness? This is in part a question about how Plato and Aristotle established the traditional activity of philosophy as the search for timeless truths.

d. In the early platonic dialogues, the activities of universalizing, judging, etc. are associated with a timeless form that explains or informs them. Heidegger, in effect, says the activities exist independently. The don’t need a formal cause.

4. Heidegger’s own account of time will “define” it in terms of Dasein’s activities rather than subjective inner states or a priori capacities. How much of a role does the a priori play in Heidegger’s account of Dasein? Bear this question in mind as Being and Time proceeds.

III. #6: destroying the history of the ontology of permanence: Heidegger’s deconstruction of permanence into activity. (Gelven has a nice discussion of Heidegger’s uses/treatments of historical philosophers: pp. 35–37.)

A. Historicality prior to history [20]: the activity of connecting the
past to the present. What is significant about the past is a function of what we are interested in now (and what we are interested in now, for Heidegger, is a function of what we want to do—a futural orientation).

1. The connection between research and ontical possibility makes temporality the subject of investigation; time is part of Dasein’s being. Historicality is the temporality of Dasein as an historical being—one existing in time through its orientations towards the past and the future (this orientation makes the present meaningful).

2. The past does not “follow after” Dasein but goes ahead of it: this is a reference to what Heidegger will call “projection” (see Division I Chapter 5 [146]). Projection is linked to “care” (Sorge) as part of the explanation of how Dasein is temporally in a world. The point will be that the future is the most important temporal orientation for Dasein.

3. This temporal-historical aspect of Dasein may remain concealed from Dasein itself. But seeing oneself as part of a culture with its many traditions and institutions can lead one to see the significance of history for the identity of Dasein.
   a. Culture and “destiny” are large factors in Dasein’s temporality (see Division II Chapter 5).
   b. Heidegger’s association between history, culture, and identity resembles Hegel’s similar argument: Dasein forms itself out of traditional kinds of problems and inherited interests. No history, no identity. For Heidegger, Dasein can transcend these influences but not as “spirit knowing itself as spirit.” Heidegger’s account is far more like that of the pragmatists: ‘transcendence’ will be an activity and not a state of mind or a level of comprehension in a purely rational sense. In his account, tradition is predictive of Dasein’s horizons (covering everything from morality to science).

4. “When tradition becomes master,” the temporality of Dasein is concealed. Our philosophical tradition has essentially denied the importance of history. It is not simply the story of past attempts at discovering permanent truths. So conceived, Dasein cannot inquire into the origins of its traditions; they are simply handed down from one generation to the next as a fundamental discovery.

   a. From Plato’s forms to Hegel’s dialectic philosophers have attempted to find the permanent structures explaining change. Heidegger, clearly influenced by Hegel’s emphasis on history in the question of being and his developmental approach to philosophical concepts, does not think that being has a structure of universal permanence.
   b. Descartes’ ego is another such device for the discovery of permanence that Heidegger will subject to special scrutiny.

5. “Loosening up” the tradition [22.5]: getting behind the originating Greek ontological decisions that lie at the bottom of our intellectual tradition. This is Heidegger’s hermeneutical method: to show how the interpretation of some Greek words determined the destiny of the West.
   a. But his deconstruction is aimed at today, at what Heidegger sees as the “falleness” and the concealment of Dasein’s active nature in the present [23].
   b. Dasein must understand itself through its relations to its world. These reflect back on Dasein and provide it with its self-image. But Dasein, by interacting with objects in the world, is also the source of its views of the world. This reflexivity is Heidegger’s key to the concept of time and its connection to Dasein as an active being who constructs interpretations of its world and itself.

B. Kant [23.5]. “The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality....”

1. Kant tried to explain Descartes’ ego by means of the transcendental determination of time through a priori forms of intuition rather than the concept of substance, thus making substance a constitutive concept. But this explains one obscurity with another: how is time transcendently connected with the identity of the ego? (In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant, of course, has his own answer to this question, and one that also criticizes earlier accounts of the subject.)
   a. Descartes and Kant tended to look for an answer within the concept of time, or the “idea of the self,” rather than in the ac-
tivity of being-in-the-world. Kant was right to think of the transcendental idea of the soul as something “produced” by temporal experiences but since he also thought of time as a mental process, how did he explain mental identity in terms of temporal processes?

b. Kant does connect subjectivity to objectivity (they are mutually dependent on each other), but he also maintains that the entire distinction between the self experienced subjectively and the world experienced objectively is itself subjective. Instead of dividing off subjectivity (experience) from the world, he distinguished between subjective experience and objective experience on the one hand and the noumenon on the other as the mysterious source of stimuli that gets Kant’s transcendental idealism going. But Kant still retains the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity as fundamental, even if they are interconnected. Heidegger ultimately rejects the subjective/objective, subject/object dichotomies as ontologically derivative and not fundamental.

2. Descartes described the res cogitans as a kind of ens, a kind of thing with its unity built into its nature. For Heidegger, personal identity is something that is achieved or created, it is not a given essence of a given mind. We even conceive of God as a kind of thing, and then try to explain why God is not like other things. This is a “baleful prejudice” [25] that Descartes inherited from the metaphysical theology of the middle ages (and which he had supposedly rejected).

3. So what does Heidegger mean at [24.5] when he says that Kant’s fundamental omission lay in his failure to “give an ontology of Dasein”?

C. The Greeks [25.5] to end of section.

1. How did the metaphysics of substance get started?

2. Here begins Heidegger’s discussion of “presence” as the predominant characterization of the world.

   a. Two senses of “presence”:

      i. Anwesenheit: to be present here and now. Something is present now (a reference to the present tense). As Macquarrie and Robinson point out in their footnote on ousia and parousia [25], the Greek words became the basis for later Western conceptions of substance and essence (respectively, Aristotle’s and Plato’s readings).

      ii. Vorhandenheit: on [26] Heidegger introduces his technical term “present-at-hand” (or “occurrent”). As Macquarrie and Robinson point out, this term designates the presence of things other than Dasein—the things making up the world, i.e. spatio-temporal objects. Dasein has a kind of being different from the being of these kinds of entities.

b. The “problematic of Greek philosophy”: how does Man fit into the metaphysical scheme of substance/attribute?

   i. Rational animal: association of the essence of man with logos (and legein).

   ii. Logos and speech, discourse: Mankind addresses itself to the entities it encounters.

   iii. Heidegger uses the two German words, “ansprechen” and “besprechen”: the former means to address, to confront; the latter to discuss, to talk over.

   iv. The importance of logos is discussed in #7.

   v. Dialectic: the platonic path to knowledge through discussion.

      a. But the dialectic becomes an “embarrassment”: how can ‘talk’ grasp Being?

      b. The more “radical” grasp of the classical problem of Being is to think of logos as thought: the affinity between the mind and the universal.

      c. Aristotle draws the connection between logos and noesis (intellect). The base is noein: to perceive, to know. The importance of reason and intellect is thus established as the faculty of grasping the universal. This is what distinguishes humans from everything else [26].

      vi. Noein, or awareness, is connected to ousia as the awareness of what is present. Being is thus conceived as presence. The effect of Plato and Aristotle’s approach to Being trans-
forms absence into presence, to eliminate mystery by connecting the *logos* of the universe with a faculty in man: *logos* as discourse or reason as explanation. This connection will make the universe transparent, as opposed to the mysterious, opaque universe of the Greek tragedians, for example. That world is rejected by Plato and Aristotle in their attempt to focus the question of Being on occurrent reality (both physical and ideal).

vii. Even time is an entity in the world. Aristotle’s essay on time (in the *Physics*) was to have been discussed in the unpublished part of *Being and Time*. This theme is one of the many loose ends in the book. The connection between Kant and Aristotle is presumably that for Kant time is a given fixed form of intuition whereas Heidegger wants to see time as the character of Dasein’s existence.

3. “Destroying the ontological tradition” [26 last ¶]. The history of Western civilization is based on these developments in the Golden Age of Greece. Viewing philosophy historically places the question of being in a different “light” (to use one of Heidegger’s puns) because we will then be able to describe the search for truth as a particular interpretation of being rather than the discovery of an essence always there, however elusively. The entire tradition of characterizing the world through substance and essence was an invention, an interpretation of *ousia* and *aletheia*.

IV. #7: the phenomenological method. Heidegger refers to some of the major slogans of the movement: “to the things themselves!” (“Zuden Sachen selbst!”) meant, in effect, to give a “nonmetaphysical” description of the objects of experience (i.e., without using traditional philosophical distinctions). For Edmund Husserl, this would lead eventually to the essences of things as experienced in the anonymous transcendental ego unaffected by history, culture, and philosophy (the “eidetic reduction” or the essence of experience). It would make the hidden visible and retrieve the world from philosophical characterizations with their metaphysical commitments to the historical concepts of Substance, Mind, Matter, Space and Time. Heidegger, however, rejects much of what his teacher believed about essences. Husserl argued that he had finally discovered the structure of the transcendental ego as a field or foundation of pure perceptual essence that has been described as “intentionality.” Heidegger saw this as yet another attempt to make Dasein into a kind of thing—he saw Husserl as still working within the Cartesian framework, trying to correct its mistakes but still somehow “right.” One major tension in *Being and Time* concerns the relation between the phenomenological analysis of experience, with its goal of laying bare something in its purest essence, and hermeneutics or the interpretative activity that Heidegger describes as Dasein’s being (i.e., that Dasein has no essence in the traditional sense). How, as several commentators have asked, can there be an interpretive phenomenology? How can the facts speak for themselves if there are no uninterpreted facts? “Interpretation” seems to preclude such foundationalism.

A. Ontology: not a special philosophical discipline [27.5], in the way Aristotle and Aquinas thought but when it comes to being, we must know what we are talking about. “To the things themselves” (see Marquarie and Robinson’s footnote) in Dasein’s case are going to be activities rather than things as substances.

See Schmitt’s discussion of phenomenology in Chapter 4 of his book and his article “Phenomenology” in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Chapter 2 of Dreyfus’ book has a clear discussion of these matters. See also Guignon’s discussion (p. 209 f. and p. 222 f.). Guignon distinguishes first between a “transcendental” phase of *Being and Time* in which the essential structures of everyday Dasein are analyzed in the way they make possible the modes of Dasein’s being. But there is also a “dialectical” phase of the inquiry where Dasein’s temporality applies to the historicality of Dasein’s interpretive activities, the way in which Dasein’s involvement has evolved. The question of being can only be addressed by incorporating the history of the ontology of involvement. But Heidegger also argues that there are basic structures within this history (such as the temporal relations of past/present/future). These structures are not concepts, however, but activities—yes, past/
present/future are activities. Although the complexities of this argument take up the rest of Being and Time, it is important to bear in mind here that Heidegger’s approach tries to reconcile historicism with phenomenology.

A. The concept of Phenomenon [28.5].

1. The Greek phainomenon is associated with light.
   a. Bringing something into the light.
   b. Phenomenology = phainomenon + logos. The study of how things are brought into the light.

2. Appearance: how something can show itself as something it is not. The complexities of the rest of the section concern the relation between phenomena, appearance, representation. These are the complexities of epistemology and Heidegger shows how they arise from what is essentially Plato’s invention of the technical concepts of Semblance, Resemblance or Appearance (e.g. in the Theatetus and The Republic, the divided line and the myth of the cave).
   a. Two senses of “phenomenon” [29]:
      i. That which shows itself as what it is in the sense of being seen or understood as what it is. Thus I see the coin for what it is—a 25-cent piece.
      ii. Semblance: something looking like the thing that shows itself, but which isn’t. Perhaps an example would be counterfeit money. But Heidegger also talks about something’s making a pretension of showing itself but showing itself as something it is not. Here the “pretension of showing itself” has the result of merely looking like something else.
   b. Semblance and phenomenon have nothing to do with appearance. “Appearance” is a mentalistic term: phenomenon and semblance are not until Kant and Hume define objects as phenomena of experience.
   c. Kant: phenomena are not noumena (which can’t show themselves as they are), but Kant’s transcendental idealism conflates phenomena with appearances: the world of space-time phenomena is really a world that appears to be outside of the mind. But it can only be ‘outside’ of the mind in the sense that all phenomena are appearances of the noumenal world. Space and time, for Kant, can be “phenomena” (show themselves) in the sense of the forms of intuition (roughly, perceptual experience). The a priori “inside which” perceptual experience is ordered would, I think, be the analogies of experience—schematized categories. Heidegger wants to avoid Kant’s transcendental transposition of phenomena as experiential objects; he wants to speak of phenomena as the things in the world that Dasein uses, interprets, and so on.

3. Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote about the various senses of “showing,” “appearing,” and “announcing” should be studied carefully. Wittgenstein’s discussions of the relation between disease and symptom in the Blue Book, and his general discussion of criteria in the Philosophical Investigations, make related points.

4. The primary sense of “phenomenon” for Heidegger is Macquarrie and Robinson’s “1b”; y’s showing-itself, although “1a”: x’s announcing itself through y while x does not show itself, is the sense which Heidegger tends to use most often.

5. If “phenomenon” is defined through “appearance”:
   a. Three senses of “appearance” [30]: (a) the phenomenon announces itself (but does not show itself: lightning too far away to be heard as thunder), (b) the phenomenon as that which does the announcing (lightning as the cause of thunder), (c) the phenomenon as that which shows itself (lightning simultaneous with thunder, shows itself as thunder).
   b. But there is a fourth sense: the announcer emerges in what is not manifest. (This is the Kantian sense in which phenomena are appearances: phenomena for Kant hide noumena, but they are also the objects of empirical intuition). But there are also “mere appearances” that cannot be objects of empirical intuition in the sense that they are appearances necessarily contrasted with objects (senses 3a and 3b).

6. These complexities show that it is not clear what are the phenomena of experience.
   a. Phenomenon is the base. Appearance, semblance, etc. are all derived from actual seeing.
   b. The formal conception of phenomenon is “that which
shows itself” [31]. If this is taken as Kant’s empirical intuition, that is the ordinary sense of “phenomenon.”
c. But the phenomenological sense of “phenomenon” is different: space and time (in the Kantian analytic) show themselves through the empirical intuitions of ordinary phenomena. Phenomenologically space and time as the forms of intuition are what determine the structure of empirical intuitions.
   i. For Kant, space and time are “pure intuitions” and not empirical objects: they are announced by the appearances of objects. See the Critique of Pure Reason A49/B66. Space and time become ‘phenomena’ for Kant in sense 2.

B. The concept of Logos [32].
1. Logos as reason, not as judgment.
   a. Perhaps what Heidegger means here is that logos is not an a priori framework against which things are measured, a God’s eye view of Being. It is rather the discursive, analytical means by which something is made manifest or disclosed.
2. Aristotle and apophainesthai: making something seen, pointing it out.
   a. Logos as discourse is a synthesis (but not of representations or mental events such as sensations).
   b. Logos as discourse which discloses. Logos as activity shows phenomena as what they are.
   c. Logos not the primary locus of truth: truth as it pertains to judgment [33.5] is not the Greek conception of truth. Logos is more important than truth until Plato.
   d. “Apophantical signification”: letting something be seen under a certain description. “Apophantic” for Heidegger generally means an assertion of the form ‘x is F’ i.e., subject/predicate logic corresponding to substance/attribute metaphysics. See #33.
3. Aletheia: truth for the Greeks meant letting something be seen, uncovering it from its state of letheia or coveredness. The river Lethe in Greek myth was the river of the underworld and the dead drank from it becoming oblivious of their former lives.

4. Logos is the means of a-letheia, of uncovering the covered.
5. Aletheia and aesthesis: pure sensory awareness is true in the sense that it is the world itself. The epistemology of sensory intermediaries such as “ideas” in the seventeenth century, or sense data in nineteenth- and twentieth-century empiricism, is alien to the conception of knowledge in ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle had little to say about “experience.” This had little to do with knowledge (except as in “a man of much experience in battle”) until the Seventeenth Century, when Descartes and Locke connected experience to knowledge via the theory of Primary and Secondary Qualities.
   a. Aesthesis aims at “idea” in the sense of giving shape and form to sensation: ideas are thus attached to the essence of the thing that one is aware of, but it is not a mental entity in the Cartesian sense.
   b. Noesis: intellect, thought; noetos: perceptible to the intellect (be careful with the word “mind” when talking about the ancient Greeks!). Noesis based on seeing with the eyes, as Aristotle characterizes the human desire to know in the first paragraph of the Metaphysics. In that brilliant passage, sight plays the role as the prime source of knowledge because the world consists of occurrent things and sight is the primary access to them.
   c. Uncovering, bringing into the light, perceiving are all part of the conception of knowledge as it is formulated by Plato and Aristotle.

6. Three senses of logos (three senses of the Latin ratio) [34]:
   a. Letting something be perceived—logos as reason
   b. What is exhibited: logos as hypokeimenon, as the underlying ground or hyle. The reason for, explanation of, what is.
   c. That to which one addresses oneself: apophantical discourse. All discourse has a context, draws relations between things. Addressing oneself to these relationships lets the object be seen as it is identified through them.

C. Preliminary conception of phenomenology.
1. Phenomenology is a study of “that which shows itself…” [34] but Heidegger’s hermeneutical approach tells us that the maxim “to the things themselves” that the being of things is hidden. Why did it get covered up? How does it reveal itself? How is it revealed by something else? Plato and Aristotle changed the meaning of aletheia from Being revealing itself to humans uncovering Being. Humanity became the active agent in the discovery of the nature of independently existing things.

2. Phenomenology, the logos of phenomena, unlike psychology, anthropology or theology, has no object of inquiry. The latter subjects are given objects to describe, phenomenology goes after origins.

3. The task of inquiry is to provide us with the origins of our characterization of the world. For Heidegger, this takes the form of a discussion about uncovering and hiddeness.

4. What remains hidden is the being of entities: Plato and Aristotle have covered up being with an interpretation of being as presence or occurrentness (misleadingly implying that nothing remains hidden).

5. Ways phenomena can be covered up [36].
   a. In this discussion Heidegger diverts attention from the apparent completeness of phenomena to the question of what remains hidden: our conception of truth has been dominated by discovery, bringing things into the light, and so on. This metaphor implies that things are brought into the light out of darkness—what remains in darkness? Can everything be ‘brought into the light’?
   b. In Chapter 3 (#19), Heidegger discusses this in connection with the conception of the world as res extensa, and other characterizations of the world which leave out or cover-over the activity of Dasein.
   c. The discussion of “worldhood” in Chapter 3 links the character of the world to the kinds of involvement one has in it. Involvement, in turn, depends on interpretation and characterizes Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

6. Heidegger wants to disclose the activity of interpretation. Why is it fundamental to Dasein? His phenomenology of Dasein is “hermeneutic” in the general sense that the entities of the world are interpreted, their origins brought into the light, at least partially if not entirely. Three more specialized senses of “hermeneutic” [37–38]:
   a. How does Dasein interpret the world in which it exists? How is that world lived-in?
   b. The transcendental hermeneutic: what are the conditions that make that world possible?
      i. More generally, what are the conditions that make any ontological investigation possible?
   c. The hermeneutic of Dasein’s being: how is Dasein prior to the things in its world; in what sense is it a transcendental condition for that world’s character?
      i. [220]: “Uncovering is a way of being-in-the-world.”
      ii. But Dasein is “in the truth” and “in untruth” [222]. Dasein uncovers, but it also covers up.
      iii. [226]: “Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be.”
      iv. Dasein’s ontology (its activity) must be connected with its historicality [38].
      v. Dasein’s a prioriness is its ontological priority over other kinds of entities in that Dasein can ask about the nature of their (and its own) being.

7. Transcendence: Dasein’s interpretive activity can transcend the world of to uncover its origins. But isn’t this also an act of interpretation? If so, can Heidegger claim universality for his thesis that truth as uncovering had its historical origin in the interpretive activity of Plato and Aristotle?

8. Heidegger’s language: in his inquiry into being, Heidegger tries to avoid using traditional philosophic jargon and invents his own. The reason is obvious: he wants to talk about philosophy without prejudicing his discussion by casting it in the very language he is deconstructing.
Being and Time: Division I Chapter 1

I. #9: First, see the “Design of the Treatise” at the end of Introduction II. This and the Table of Contents bear a superficial resemblance to that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Both begin by analysing basic or seemingly given phenomena: for Kant, objective experience and how we understand the world (in contrast to the flights of pure reason unhindered by objective experience) and then the analysis of traditional problems of metaphysics (God, Freedom, and the Soul, but also a great many related issues); Heidegger begins by analysing Dasein and then uses that analysis to turn back to the history of philosophy, especially Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. That second part of Being and Time never appeared. All that exists of Being and Time are the first two divisions of Part I. Both Kant and Heidegger give a “transcendental” analysis in the sense of finding the necessary conditions for some phenomenon: in Kant’s case, objective experience, in Heidegger’s, Dasein.

Heidegger states in the first sentence of this, one of the shortest chapters in the work, that “we are ourselves the entities to be analyzed.” This chapter locates the unique feature of Dasein to be analyzed. In doing so, Heidegger differentiates his analysis from other accounts in Western philosophy trying to show (what he will argue for in detail later) that these accounts have been dominated by a specific image of personhood—the experiencing, conscious ‘subject’. Heidegger wants to uncover the origin of this image and to get at the feature of Dasein responsible for it.

A. Two characteristics of Dasein:
   1. It is the essence of Dasein “to be.” “The priority of existentia over essentia.”
      a. Dasein is not in the world as an occurrent entity: its essence is existence, i.e., involvements in the world, activity (including interpretation of itself).
         i. For example, two people are spatially located in the same
Dasein is activity, but as we have seen, it is a specific kind of activity for Dasein involving the ability to interpret, to stand outside of a phenomenon and to understand it. Dasein’s existence is a special kind of awareness, and of course the interesting wrinkle for Heidegger is that Dasein tries to stand outside of itself, to comprehend itself and its place in the world.

d. Existence as activity = *ecstasy* = Dasein’s transcendence of the occurrent.

2. “Mineness”: the special kind of awareness constituting Dasein is connected to the self-identity of Dasein. What is it for something to be mine?

a. In one sense the answer is easy: it is the use of the personal pronoun “I” to pick me out from everything else. But what allows or enables me to do that?

b. Heidegger introduces the terms “authentic” (eigentlich) and “inauthentic” (uneigentlich) [43]. It is important to see what these words mean in German because they lose their primary sense in English: “authentic” in German is “eigentlich” which also means “proper,” “real,” “true (of),” and even “odd.” “Eigenheit” means “peculiar” or “singular.”

c. “Inauthenticity” has the sense of something’s not being my own; I am inauthentic when I am not in control, when my values and beliefs are determined by others (or by “society” in the sense that Heidegger will claim in Division I Chapter 4).

d. “Authenticity” is connected to self-awareness: it is the activity unique to Dasein. “In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very being, it somehow understands” [43].

i. Dasein’s average everydayness is part of Heidegger’s analysis. Although Dasein is not a particular representation of human life, it is not an abstract conception of the self either—a philosopher’s conception of the self, as the quotation from Augustine indicates (you did look it up, didn’t you? All of Heidegger’s classical quotations are translated for you in the endnotes. They are all well chosen and significant to the argument).
ii. Dasein understands itself in terms of its possibilities. This connects Dasein to time in that possibilities take time to actualize. The primary focus for actualization is, of course, the future.

iii. “… interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence.” Dasein exists in part as its possibilities. Its “average everydayness” tends to gloss over this temporal aspect as the “undifferentiated” flow of life—one thing after another—but it too expresses Dasein’s temporal orientation to the world. In ‘average’ living, a question like “What is it to exist?” seems like pretentious nonsense; but we are not completely average once we can see that it does make sense as the question “What makes Dasein different from other things in the world?”


B. How to uncover Dasein’s nature?

1. The distinction between categories and existentials (existentialia).
   a. Categories comprise the system of ordering we impose on things other than ourselves in order to control them, to make them part of our interests in the world. See Gelven, p. 54–55 for a brief introductory discussion.
   b. Existentials apply to Dasein.
      i. Personhood-concepts almost always involve identifying persons through activities, through what they do: Who is responsible? Why did he do it? What do I want? Who does she think she is? But the answers to such questions do not rest on a uniformly causal analysis.
      ii. This distinction will become clearer in the discussion of understanding in Division I Chapters 5 and 6.
      iii. “Existentialia” [45.5] are the modes or kinds of existence available to Dasein.

II. #10: the analytic of Dasein distinguished from other forms of inquiry into humanity: the human sciences.

A. Here Heidegger claims that his inquiry is more fundamental than those of the Geisteswissenschaften because the latter presuppose that Dasein is, in one way or another, a thing, an object for study. Heidegger wants to discern the origin of that view of “humanity,” which itself contains a presupposed characterization. This is one reason Heidegger uses his expression “Dasein.” Its unusual status carries with it none of the philosophical presuppositions Heidegger wants to discuss. For background see the article: “Geisteswissenschaften” by H.P. Rickman in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See also Dreyfus’ discussions the human sciences (see his index).

B. Descartes [46 ¶s 1 and 2].

1. Beginning with Descartes, one of his most important on-going examples, Heidegger claims that in his *Cogito, ergo sum*, Descartes leaves *sum* (I am, I exist) unanalyzed. As we know, Descartes conceives of the ego as a substance. Existence is uniform across substances (except for God who exists necessarily). For Heidegger, on the other hand, existence as activity rather than state is the key to understanding how Dasein is different from occurrent things.

2. If we posit the I as a subject we are assuming a metaphysics of substance. We then have to worry about how mental substance differs from extended substance and so on. Kant asked: how can they exist in the same sense if the mind is not spatio-temporal? Is the mind an attribute of matter (Descartes’ worst nightmare)?
   a. Aristotle finds humans to be animals with the special attribute or differentia of rationality.
   b. Descartes, of course, criticizes Aristotle for this in the Second Meditation (rationality is not simple enough) and wants to find the unique feature of self-consciousness that distinguishes the mind. He looks for an essence or defining characteristic, which he describes generally as “thinking,” consciousness in general.
   c. For Heidegger, to inquire into the being of an entity means to see how it is involved in the world. Descartes’ method looks
to the uniqueness of thinking or consciousness in such a way that no connection to the material world is necessary (perhaps not even possible for Descartes). For Heidegger, there is nothing especially interesting about consciousness or thinking until it is connected with (or seen as) the special kind of involvement Dasein has with the world.

C. Life.

1. Near the end of [46] Heidegger refers to Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, and Edmund Husserl. They also emphasize activity over consciousness (although Husserl still considers consciousness “in itself” in exactly the way Heidegger rejects such accounts in Being and Time). Interestingly, Being and Time, although dedicated to Husserl, contains many indirect praises of Dilthey. Husserl attacked Dilthey’s view of the importance of history and thought of phenomenology as a special kind of science investigating the structure of consciousness independently of history. Like Descartes, he searched for an essence. In Being and Time, Heidegger sometimes resembles Dilthey in his emphasis on the importance of history to the activity of being-in-the-world than he is to Husserl’s ahistorical analysis. Nevertheless, he does take from Husserl the idea of a structure of consciousness as a determination of the significance of Dasein relative to the rest of the world. Is that structure historically constituted? Heidegger wanted to modify Husserl’s search for the transcendental conditions of significance to take account of history, and by the same token he wanted to see philosophy as the attempt to understand the relation between life, time, and the world. In his later work, the history of the forgetfulness of being, is far more explicitly historicist in its approach. Being and Time remains suspended between history (Dilthey) and structure (Husserl).

2. “Lived experiences” (Erlebnisse) characterize life as a whole. “Everyday life” might come close in English. Dilthey argued that the natural sciences could not describe life and Heidegger agrees: the natural sciences describe only one sense of Dasein’s involvement in the world.

3. Scheler is right to concentrate on action because that is how Dasein is involved in the world. Heidegger will even analyze “understanding” as a complex of activities.

4. But both Dilthey and Scheler still tend to think in traditional metaphysical distinctions: for Dilthey, the ontology of culture is the object of study: expression (language), cultural systems, and the mental processes (beliefs) constituting meaning is founded make up the three aspects of Dilthey’s concept of Das Verstehen.

a. Heidegger agrees with much of this but he criticizes Dilthey for thinking of humanity as a special kind of substance that we can investigate through Das Verstehen, a special kind of intuition. He still thinks this is doing something like science, the “Geisteswissenschaften,” while he thinks of this appeal to science as misleading. The question is whether Dasein is scientifically graspable at all.


5. For Scheler, persons are not things, substances, or objects; nor are they psychical objects [48].

a. Action is indeed the key: actions are not objects. How do we explicate the ontology of actions? Life = the ability to act. Like activity, life is a dispositional concept.

b. For Scheler, knowledge is pragmatic and instrumental. See Peter Kostenbaum’s article on Scheler in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

c. But do actions = bodily movements + mental states?

i. Scheler’s model fails to explain the unity of agency: in what sense is it ‘me’ who does A, B, and C?

ii. “[S]ome idea of the being of the whole must be presupposed” [48 end ¶ 1]. What is an action? How does a person perform an action? These questions can’t be answered without some prior conception of an agent or person. This is what Heidegger wants to provide with his analytic of Dasein. What “binds together” the bodily movements? How do the intention, the performance, the context in which the action occurs, and anything else necessary to un-
derstand an action account for the being performing the action? Any “substance” account will be deficient for Heidegger.

d. For Heidegger, Scheler’s functionalism was an important advance, but he continues to work with traditional metaphysical distinctions thus compromising the effectiveness of his methodology. He doesn’t question his presuppositions sufficiently.

D. The inadequate ontological foundation.
1. Two elements of anthropology:
   a. Man as rational animal: the relation between rationality and logos remains obscure. If logos is not a thing, how does it combine with humans to make them special?
   b. Theology has traditionally conceived of humans as transcending beings but it has also typically thought of this transcendence through spatial analogies, as the quotations on [49] indicate. God “stamps” humans with qualities analogous to His own being. But what does this mean?
2. The problem is that the attempt to determine the essence of humanity has been dominated by the metaphysics of substance. This has led to the view that being means presence-at-hand, thus leaving out the unique qualities of Dasein, its existentialia.
3. Last ¶ of the section: the various sciences of humanity have all failed to grasp their ontological presuppositions, and are incapable of doing so. They necessarily view the world through preconditions that establish but limit their modes of inquiry. We need some way of stepping back from them to talk about their ontological preconceptions and to criticize them.

III. #11: primitive Dasein.
A. The Geisteswissenschaften presuppose the primitiveness of life as an ontological category, they do not analyze it. They do not ask questions about what it means to be, about worldhood and Dasein’s relation to the world.

B. Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness.
1. The basic features of Dasein are not identical with ordinary life; they make ordinary life possible.
2. “Primitive” seems to indicate a transcendental limit, an horizon that establishes Dasein’s nature that includes the everyday ways in which Dasein is-in-the-world.

C. “Absorbtion in ‘phenomena’” [51.5].
2. When we use a tool, that thing is no longer an object; it is virtually an extension of oneself and is part of Dasein’s teleological orientation towards the world: getting a job done.
3. The complexities of this kind of activity are primitive to Dasein’s nature.
4. But we see immediately that it is possible to explain these primitive structures. They are part of Dasein’s involvement in the world and “constitutive of Dasein” [52 ¶ 1]. So not only is the relation between Dasein and the world necessary to understand Dasein, but the world itself will depend for its character on Dasein’s involvements in it.
I. In this short but crucial chapter Heidegger outlines the ontological significance of being-in-the-world. Again, he hyphenates this expression to show that it is an activity. This discussion of being-in-the-world in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein in the sense that it makes Dasein’s activities (its existentia) prior to categories. Categories organize the world through the activities of Dasein; existentia are the activities themselves but they cannot be separated from Dasein as attributes of independently identifiable substances (in the manner of Cartesian thinking substance). Heidegger argues that being-in-the-world is different ontologically from the spatial location of one thing to another (although spatiality will be part of Dasein’s being-in relation too). Spatiality is part of the categorial analysis of the world. Heidegger wants to inquire into the origins of those categories.

II. #12: outline of being-in.
A. Dasein’s ontology.
   1. Mineness: as we saw in the previous chapter, authenticity and inauthenticity are part of the identity of Dasein. But this feature is grounded on the way Dasein is in the world through its involvements with it.
   2. Dasein is in the world primarily through the activity of understanding.

B. Being-in takes up a major portion of the discussion in Division I.
   1. Chapter 3: what is a world?
   2. Chapter 4: who is the being identified by the unique relation of being-in-the-world?
   3. Chapter 5: how is Dasein in the world? This chapter discusses moods (Stimmungen), understanding, and interpretation as fundamental to the being-in relation. See Dreyfus Chapter 3.

III. What makes being-in so special?
A. [54]: things that are in the world in an occurrent way, like matches in a box or logs in a river, possess a ‘categorial’ kind of being-in.

B. Dasein’s being-in, however, is an existentiale—an ontological feature of Dasein itself. The matches in the box are the same whether they are in the box or outside of it. Dasein, on the other hand, is dependent on the way it is in the world.

1. Dasein “dwells in” the world, it is “familiar to” Dasein. Dasein is “absorbed in” its world (Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnotes discuss the etymologies of Heidegger’s terminology).
   a. Compare your room at home, with its associations and memories, to a room at the Holiday Inn (where, according to a TV add some years ago, there are “no surprises”). You are “in” your room in a way quite different from the way you are “in” the room at the Holiday. How would you describe the differences? How would you put them in Heidegger’s terms? Gelven, p. 59 f., has a good discussion of being-in and dwelling.

2. “Being alongside” [54–5]: a misleading translation of “Sein-bei.” See Dreyfus, p. 44. Not a property belonging to a thing (like the whiteness of a piece of chalk), nor can Sein-bei be understood as one thing spatially related to another (like the tires on a car). Dasein should not be thought of as an occurrent thing in its world (being along side is not side-by-side).

3. Dasein does not encounter the world by bumping into things. Indeed, in Heidegger’s example of the chair touching the wall on [55.5], “touching,” as opposed to bumping into, is an intentional concept (“bumping into” is not). In the example, “touching the wall” simply means being spatially juxtaposed with it. The chair does not encounter the wall. If x ‘encounters’ y, y is revealed to x in some way. y, e.g., may be represented as a place to sit.

4. Dasein can be occurrent in the world too but this can be understood only in contrast the primary sense of being-in for Dasein: Dasein is not in the world in a purely factual way (it is not like the “factual occurrence of some kind of mineral”) [56].
   a. Factuality: something’s being an occurrent thing, a state of affairs.

b. Facticity: Dasein’s being is bound up with the objects it encounters through its concern or care [57]. See [135]: facticity is connected with the mood of being-in-the-world (this mood is primarily Angst (Chapter 5, #29, 30)). Facticity is not a state of affairs but a characterization of Dasein in the world. Dasein’s “being” is being-in-the-world, activity not substance.
   i. Dasein’s facticity is “bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the being of those entities that it encounters within its own world.”
   ii. Not an ontical description of things.
   iii. Dasein and the world are interdependent. Hegel’s master/slave relationship may provide background to this passage about how apparently independent things is defined by its relations to another. This would be a good point to review Hegel’s analogy (The Phenomenology of Spirit, B.IV.b.).

C. The ontological nature of being-in-a-world [56.5].

1. Discussion of Descartes: how is the mind related to the extended world? The being-present-at-hand, occurrentness, of a corporeal thing with another spiritual (nonextended) thing. Persons consist of two separate kinds of substance for Descartes: the ‘I’ of self-consciousness plus the spatial, material location of the body. Does the ‘I’ really need the second part? Descartes argues that it does not.
   a. This metaphysical dualism presupposes that minds are kinds of things, as is indicated by Descartes’ search for the defining features of conscious substances which differentiate them from purely extended ones. See #19–20 in Chapter 3 for Heidegger’s discussion of substance. See also the discussion of Descartes in Chapters 1 and 4 of Guignon’s book.

2. Dasein is in the world spatially in a way that depends on its being-in relations. In order to understand this, we must not think of Dasein as a substance with attributes.

D. Dasein’s facticity [57]. The ontological uniqueness of Dasein’s being-in.
1. Concern: Besorgen. (This is a variety of the general concept of Care: Sorge, which receives its major account in Chapter 5.) We concern ourselves with activities, with the future, with our jobs, etc.
   a. Being-in is not a property but an activity.
   b. Heidegger’s examples all employ action-verbs. Dasein is a functional concept dependent on its “Zuhandenheit,” its encounter with the world through the availability of tools (this is the main thesis of Chapter 3).

2. Being-in is not a property since Dasein can never be free of the world. It is always in the world through its activities. Dasein is not independently identifiable: it must be understood in relation to its world as both are brought to interdependence of identity through Dasein’s care, through its activities.
   a. In anticipation of the next three chapters, this places use-contexts at the center of Dasein’s existentiale.
   b. Care (Sorge) is the ontological a priori condition of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
   c. Dasein is a field of care rather than an object related to other objects.
   d. Care establishes the interdependencies of being-in for Dasein.

3. “Meeting up with” Dasein: perhaps the sort of thing Heidegger is getting at in this obscure remark is something like the following: I cannot meet up with, or encounter, the president of the university unless we are both within the context of the practices and activities (what Dreyfus calls “an involvement context”) that go into identifying me and the president. The president of Harvard University couldn’t have that identity if there were no such university, and it would also be impossible to meet up with him (or her) as the president of Harvard.

4. Heidegger’s remarks about the environment [58] indicate the ontological problem: what is a world? How are the conditions of worldhood established? The activities of Dasein are central to these questions and we turn to these larger issues in the next chapter.

E. Knowledge [59].
1. Knowing is the primary mode of Dasein’s being-in.
2. The Cartesian conception of knowledge: a relationship between two occurrent things—minds and entities in the world.
   a. The nature of Dasein becomes invisible in this picture. Recall Descartes’ description of himself as a thinking subject in the Second Meditation. (Significantly, he cannot identify himself except through his activities: a thing that thinks.) ‘Bodies’, on the other hand, cannot be things that think since thinking, consciousness, is not a defining or essential feature of the identity of material bodies.
   b. How did this dualistic way of understanding the world arise? The origin of epistemology, the job of philosophy is to find an explanation for the relations between mind and matter, and between subject and object.
3. Heidegger wants to make praxis the center of knowledge rather than theoria (a methodological reversal of Husserl and Descartes). He wants to argue that theoretical knowledge is founded on practical activity (care) but, as Dreyfus points out (pp. 48–49), this reversal should not be seen as an ontological reprioritization.
   a. The tendency has been to see praxis as non-theoretical in the sense that the abstract or the universal can be the only real
knowledge. Everything else must be compared to or contrasted with it. But every praxis has a theory built into it, a particular disclosure of the world.

b. But if being-in is activity, then praxis is the foundation of episteme. A World, in its coherence, for Heidegger, also depends on practice: the kind of world in which we dwell depends on the kinds of interests we have.

c. Knowing is the fundamental activity of Dasein, but knowledge involves interpretation. No mechanistic or even biological explanation of knowledge is possible for Heidegger.

F. To sum up: being-in involves concepts such as Dwelling (rather than side-by-sideness). Dasein's encounter with the world is based on dwelling and this is characterized by care, which is in turn a complex of practical activities: knowledge is based on care.

IV. #13: Knowing and founded modes: the transcendental conditions of being-in-the-world.

A. Macquarrie and Robinson: “a founded mode of being-in is simply a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else.”

1. This makes sense when knowing is understood as an activity rather than as a state such as a justified true belief.

2. What are the conditions under which a subject is related to an object: the subject is-in-the-world where objects can be encountered. The relation in question is care and it connects subjects and objects. But the ontology of subjects and objects is itself grounded in a deeper phenomenon for Heidegger, the phenomenon of Dasein as activity.

B. Knowing as a human activity: a functional interactive relation between Dasein and its world. The identities of things in that world are founded on interpretations arising from Dasein's care-relations.

1. Not an ontology of consciousness, or of the inner, and how it connects the outer world. The various faculty theories of the mind that appeared from Descartes and Hobbes to Kant exemplify this view of the mind as a kind of thing or substance.

2. Knowing as a kind of doing: Heidegger, in effect, takes the conception of knowing how (as activity) to be more basic than knowing that (a proposition) (to use Ryle's distinction).

C. If knowing is the way Dasein is in-the-world (the hyphenated expression indicates activity rather than mere presence), then what is the nature of this activity? Dasein and world are not the same as subject and object. The latter is an interpretation of the former concealing the real relationship, i.e., that Dasein and world are mutually interdependent.

1. There are some important similarities here between Kant and Heidegger. For Kant, objectivity is a function of the organizing activity of conceptualizing implicit in experiencing, judging, etc. The structure of the subject's mental activity effects the object (constitutes it as the object we experience) through its characterization of the world, through the categories it uses to categorize and identify things. Heidegger agrees with Kant about activity but rejects the mental source or essence of activity as a remnant of Cartesianism. Even though he attacks Descartes' isolated subjectivity, Kant still wants to retain the transcendental ego by generalizing its constitutive activity. Kant is too idealistic for Heidegger: the world is not completely constituted by our mental activities but has a certain brute presence. As he puts it later, we are “thrown into” the world, we don't create it. The world is, perhaps, infinitely dense and does not have a single correct interpretation. But the main point concerns the constitutive nature of activity for Heidegger resting on practical interactions with the world characterizing both it and Dasein.

2. What is the sense in which knowing “belongs solely to those entities which know” [60.5]?

   a. Knowledge is thought to reside solely in the subject. How is it related to the object of knowledge (Descartes’ problem again)?

   b. The inner/outer dichotomy is criticized in a way similar to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the same dichotomy. A tradition of problems and possible accounts of knowledge has evolved
around this distinction, but is it metaphysically fundamental? Or did this dichotomy have its origin in a particular interpretation of the world?
c. How can knowing be explained in this context without “transcending the subject”? The egocentric predicament: how can I know what the world is like independent of my experience if, in order to check any claim about what the world is like, I must do so through experience? Can there be an experience of experience?

3. Knowing as activity: The problem of knowledge is nullified [61 ¶ 1]. And a good thing too! Like Wittgenstein’s fly and flybottle analogy.
   a. Knowing is constitutive of Dasein’s being. Knowing is a mode of being-in: “knowing is grounded beforehand in a being-already-alongside-the-world, essentially constitutive of Dasein’s being.” The kind of world Dasein is in effects Dasein, but Dasein’s activities are also constitutive of its world in the sense that it is characterized by its concerns and interests. For Heidegger, as well as Wittgenstein, we do not need the metaphysics of the mental to explain either the uniqueness of the subject or the nature of knowledge.
   b. Attacking “the spectator theory of knowledge” (to use Dewey’s phrase) [61 ¶ 2].
      i. When Dasein is characterized as a pure observer, when “concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like,” we then have the beginnings of a dualistic conception of knowledge (as an inner representation or the outer world). The activity of knowing is concealed by thinking of subject and object related to each other as occurrent objects.
      ii. Knowledge is characterized as “looking at” something occurrent. Subjects gain access to objects by looking at them.
      iii. [62] to end of section: how the inner and the mental becomes metaphysically important as the locus of representations.

iv. But even the representational theory of knowledge (representations in a mind) still involves the sense of knowing as an activity: perceiving, thinking, judging as mental or cognitive inner activities simply reproduce in the inner world the very relation Dasein has to its world in the most fundamental pre-philosophical sense, not involving distinctions like “subject/object” or “inner representation/outer world” (what that sense is (availability of tools) is introduced in the next chapter). See Guignon Chapter 1 for an important discussion of Heidegger’s analysis of Descartes and the representational account of knowledge.
There are three major sections to this chapter with #14 as an introduction: I: (#15–18) environmentality and worldhood; II: (#19–20) Heidegger’s analysis of worldhood contrasted with Descartes; III: (#22–24) how the world is “around” us as an environment. Chapters 3–5 of Part I constitute the main account of the analytic of Dasein.

I. The environmental aspect of worldhood. See Schmitt Chapter 2 and Murray’s essay “Ryle and Heidegger” in Murray for background. See also Dreyfus Chapters 4 and 5.

   A. #14–16: the existential (ontological) character of the world.

   B. The primary relationship between Dasein and the world is readiness-to-hand or the availability of tools. The world is used. Vorhandenheit, on the other hand, which constitutes the world as a collection of occurrent things, is not metaphysically fundamental, characterized by the breakage of tools. The usefulness that characterizes tools and the available vanishes or founders. Science understands the world as objects independent of function or use, but prior to this achievement stands the functionality of availableness. Science views the world in a certain way (as occurrent) through its tool-oriented technology. Heidegger discusses science in detail in #43, 44, 69.

   C. World does not mean “environment,” what surrounds us, or the universe presented by science. Heidegger rejects the conception of the world as objectively “out there” prior to our understanding, as a different kind of thing from “the subject.” He wants to discover the origins of this very distinction and so does not presuppose it. This is the point of the examples involving tools later in this chapter: our “world” is a function of our interaction with it. A world includes things identified through Dasein’s tool-guided interactions. “World” is defined by and identified through those activities. This is even true of language: “meaning” can be related to activities independent of a given language—e.g., running for the cover of a tree when you see lightning.
in the distance. “Originality” (Marquarrie and Robinson’s “primordiality”) for Heidegger often means nonlinguistic too in the sense of understanding the contingencies of vocabularies. The primary theme for science is the being of things in nature. We have many categories by means of which to sort out the things we encounter: things of nature, things of value, and so on. How do mere objects become ‘valuable’? “Their thinghood becomes a problem” when we try to connect them to these categories. But where do these categories come from in the first place?

1. #14: Worldhood: 4 functions of “world.”
   b. “World” functions as an ontological term: the being of the entities of the world (in “the world of the mathematician,” “world” signifies the possible objects of mathematical inquiry).
   c. “World” as a preontological signification of those things that are distinct from Dasein: the public world, what can be encountered in the world by Dasein. In general this is the main sense of “world” used by Heidegger: the distinction between Dasein and the entities occurrent in the world.
   d. “World” understood as worldhood (an existential/ontological concept). The a priori conditions any world may have at a given time. The concept of the Self in Western civilization, e.g., rests on the world being understood as scientifically analyzable objects, including the self.
      i. The forest as a source of timber: nature as a storehouse of resources (as opposed to poetic inspiration, for example). Heidegger’s later essay “The Question Concerning Technology” carries on this theme (translated and edited by William Lovitt in a collection of Heidegger’s essays with that title (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977)).

2. #15: the being of entities in the world [68]. The world is not only occurrent entities. The attitude of objectivity is an interpretation of the world, one of many possible.
   a. See the last paragraph on [71] for an especially clear summary of Zuhandenheit.
   b. Gelven points out, and Dreyfus argues for this in several places, that Heidegger should not be thought to give an instrumentalist theory of meaning. Totally detached entities are just as ‘real’ as equipmental entities (see Gelven, p. 63). Heidegger wants to explain how we have revealed or uncovered the category of objective entities. See Guignon’s discussion of constitutive and instrumentalist theories of language (p. 115 ff.).

3. #16: how the worldly character of the world (its unity) announces itself in the entities of the world—but the world is not itself an entity. Introduction of Vorhandenheit.
   a. Equipment, tools (or Schmitt’s “gear”) [73]. The role played by equipment is not that of a property [see #18]. The primary way Dasein is in the world is through “involvement contexts,” teleological orientations characterized by the expressions “in order to” and, later, “for the sake of which” [68.5]. “There is no such thing as an equipment” since, e.g., a hammer is not a mere thing but must be understood in relation to its functions, what it can be used to do. See Dreyfus Chapter 4, Schmitt Chapter 2.
   b. Involvement or use contexts often require tools, such as building a house requires a hammer. But a hammer has many uses in building a house: roofing, framing, flooring all require different techniques, different kinds of nails, etc.
   c. Conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, obstinacy. Reasons why tools are not occurrent entities.
      i. A tool becomes unusable and changes its nature without changing its properties. If I run out of nails, my hammer hasn’t changed. It has become (if only temporarily) useless.
      ii. Is nature simply the sum total of occurrent things? [70–1].
      iii. When it works properly a tool, such as a hammer, “withdraws” [69 ¶ 3], becomes part of one’s hand rather than a separate thing. A bridge, for example, may not be noticed as a bridge to the intent driver but as a part of the road. If the transition from road to bridge is uneven, one suddenly notices the bridge as something different.
   d. Disclosure [75]. Not knowledge by inference. A realization
of the ontological character of the world in the sense that it is made up of categories and kinds of things. Carefully read the last ¶ of [75] and perhaps write an analysis of what it means. What does “[w]ith this totality...the world announces itself” mean? The footnote on the related German words should be read carefully.

e. Definition of “being-in-the-world” [76.5]. The second sentence of that ¶ is the key. The world is characterized by the possible relations that can occur within it, but those relations are possible only within the world, as the world of house building implies all the activities and tools involved in construction. Being in a world makes possible the kinds of things encountered in the world. Schmitt (p. 50 f.) discusses [75–76]. So the questions: “what kinds of beings are we?” and “what is possible for us?” depend on the prior question: “what kind of world are we in?”

f. Note Dreyfus’ discussion of intentionality in his Chapter 3, Section A. He says: “Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primative: he wants to show (pace Husserl) that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between self-sufficient mind and an independent world” (p. 49).

C. #17: reference and signs.

1. Referring to, knowing how, equipment intended for a purpose [78.5].
2. Reference based on tools [78]. A manner of dealing with the world. Reference is grounded in praxis, in the activities open to Dasein and its possible modes of encounter. The motor car/arrow example.
3. The weather as a system of signs in relation to the world of farming. Within the world of farming, the weather plays specific roles which are seen through the signs observed by farmers and on which their actions depend.
   a. “A sign is not a thing which stands to another thing in the relationship of indicating” but is “an item of equipment” [80].
4. Fetishism, magic and primitive Man [82]. The sign is a substitute for what it signifies. The left-turn roadsign is not a left turn. It signifies what can be done or not done.

5. Important summary at end of [82]. Signs are pieces of equipment defining involvement contexts in relation to Dasein’s care and concern. You have to describe the involvement context in order to identify signs. But meaning is not simply “given” to objects by Dasein. Meaning evolves from the matrix of relations that identify objects for Dasein through their availability. The world actually gives meaning to Dasein, but the world is understood through involvement. In part, this is the public world: Heidegger’s anti-individualism puts involvement in a shared world of activities (rather than in operations located “in” individual minds or between minds and things).

D. #18: “Involvement” [84]. Significance. “The character of being which belongs to the available is...involvement” [84]. See Marquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on bewenden and Bewandtnis. See Dreyfus Chapter 5, p. 91f.

1. “Understanding” the world as purposive, “in order to” rather than representation [86]. Heidegger also things of representation as an “in order to” as well. Representations are created to fulfill functions, for purposes of scientific investigation, for legal reasons, and so on.
   a. “Towards-which,” “for-the-sake-of-which,” “in-order-to” as the ways in which Dasein is involved in the world [83–4]. These activities are constitutive of the world, they are its characterization. These pages are crucial!
   b. [85], first ¶: “ontically, ‘letting something be involved’.” Connect with “entities being ‘freed’” on [83].
   c. Things are available for use when we are concerned. We discover the availability of tool-contexts by looking at our involvements with the world. Entities are freed for a totality of involvements, can be used for a purpose, when we have disclosed the system of availability that supplies their uses (their towards-which relations). But that for which things have been freed is not itself an entity. It is not discoverable. “Discovery” is
a term reserved for the being of an entity without the character of Dasein.

2. The “as-structure” of understanding [86].
   a. “In-order-to,” “for-the-sake-of-which,” etc. as the various ways of being involved in the world, of being-in.
   b. Action not thought (thinking is a kind of action for Heidegger, and not necessarily inner) is the primary characterization of the world. What we think about the world depends on how we act. Perhaps more accurately, for Heidegger thinking becomes a kind of acting.
   c. Understanding in #31 is about being-in through the as-structure: Heidegger wants to conceive of understanding as activity: praxis rather than theoria. (This distinction is misleading, however: Heidegger does not merely reverse Aristotle. See #69 [357 f.].)

4. Summary [88]: reference and signs are available, tool-like aspects of our characterization of the world. The world characterized through our use of signs, equipment, etc.
   a. Presence-at-hand, occurrence, pure objectivity, depends on involvement with the world in tool-contexts. This major thesis will be expanded in Chapters 5 and 6.
   b. See Dreyfus pp. 60–66 on Equipment and pp. 100–102 on signs.

II. Worldhood: contrast with Descartes.
A. #19: World as res extensa. Can we understand the world as the substances that make it up? How did we come to see the world as divided into different kinds of stuff? What was Descartes trying to do? In trying to make the world safe for Galilean science, it was conceived as a system of independent occurrence, law-governed substances. One set of laws covering the entire universe (as opposed to the medieval view that physics applied only to sublunar phenomena). “Conceiving” is a misleading way to describe understanding, however, since it seems not only to be a mental act but at least relatively conscious as well. Since Heidegger does not accept Cartesian dualism, what do words like “conceiving” and “understanding” mean for him?

B. #20–1: foundations of the ontological definition of “World.”
1. Beholding (experiential awareness, not a source of knowledge about being) and thinking (fully achieved understanding of the ontology of the world as lying behind experience) [96].
   a. Beholding as a kind of grasping. Descartes tries to explain this in his example of the lump of wax in the Second Meditation (discussed shortly). Also, Anschauung: Kantian intuition, to have the experience of; to view. But Descartes’ and Kant’s conception of knowledge differs radically from the everyday practices of knowing [96].
   i. Sensation as opposed to intellectio as perceptual beholding: sensing as opposed to comprehending. Traditional philosophy has tried to explain how the mind gets from sensation to knowledge.
   ii. Heidegger changes the description of the problem to avoid the appeal to “concepts” as intermediaries between sensory stimulation and the universal, general and conceptual character of knowledge.
   b. Thinking as fully achieved noesis: intellectual beholding—“seeing” (intellectually comprehending) the wax as hardness, extension. Resistance is not phenomenal here but part of the scientific concept of Body for Descartes. As Descartes argues in the Second Meditation, the mind knows bodies more clearly than the senses because of its ability to grasp (intellectio) essences and concepts.
   c. Taking the world as res extensa is to see it as fundamentally occurring. Values are founded on occurrence reality, they are properties of things: what properties make something good or bad? Value is something like the promotion or enhancement of life. (But values tell us nothing about the world conceived as occurrence nature [99]). The origin of subjectivity lies in the “rounding off” of nature to include simply occurrence reality: the fact/value distinction.
   d. Subjectivity depends on the metaphor of knowledge as a kind of looking or seeing: what is seen is to occur, even thinking, requires a witness.
2. Descartes’ Second Meditation: the nature of the wax is understood through intellection not perception. Be sure to read the translations of the Latin quotations from Descartes. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is an example of Heidegger’s characterization of res extensa as occurrent reality. We are supposed to think of the wax through its primary qualities (as essential to its material nature), known by the intellect alone and not by the senses, preoccupied as they are with secondary qualities. Which is the ‘real’ wax? What does “real” mean in this context?

3. The idea of being as occurrent reality [98] to the end of section B is very important and contains a comparatively clear summary.
   a. Dasein’s ‘behavior’ is not disclosed in seeing Being as res extensa, a permanent realm of spatio-temporal, extended things. The tendency in so doing will be to see Dasein as a substance too.
   b. Extension “narrows down” the question of the world to that of things in nature [100]. In so doing the availability aspect, involvement through the as-structure, of Dasein’s encounters with objects in its world is suppressed. “In order to” is replaced with “that which is F.”
   c. The “founded character of all sensory and intellective awareness…” refers to the dependency of Cartesian dualism on being-in-the-world and everydayness. Descartes’ “theoretical attitude” is not basic or a priori, as he claims it to be, implicitly, when he describes himself as a thinking thing—a thing capable of abstract theoretical contemplation. Heidegger argues that this attitude is the result of a prior conception of what the world is like (substances with attributes). “Descartes has narrowed down the question of the world to that of things in nature as those entities within-the-world which are proximally accessible” [100]. See Guignon, p. 150 f.

4. Four questions.
   a. Mention of Kant’s treatment of substance as an a priori condition of experience. But this too avoids the question of the being of extended entities. Why?
   b. See Chapter 6 for a lengthier discussion of idealism and realism.
   c. Just because it seems obvious that the world consists of extended things doesn’t indicate anything ontologically about the origin of that world. All that has been covered up by the present world-view.

III. The “aroundness” of the environment and Dasein’s spatiality. How is Dasein in the world? Perception does not work in accordance with the dualistic model.

A. #22: the spatiality of use contexts.
   1. Familiarity and closeness: calculative manipulating and using. What he seems to be getting at here is that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is primarily through familiarity with objects in involvement contexts, not through representations of objects near or far away. Indeed, through an involvement context, something spatially far away (a friend) can be near (in one’s thoughts). Once again, care determines distance in its primitive sense.
   2. A world is already presupposed by spatial relations, whether subjective or objective. This Kantian point is accepted by Heidegger but he makes being-in-a-world rather than constitutive psychology primitive. Being-in-a-world, however, cannot be analyzed in terms of the objects that make up the world. Zuhandenheit cannot be reduced to Vorhandenheit (or vice versa). Both are aspects of being-in-the-world.
   3. Regions are contexts for involvement. See [111]. They are not collections of occurrent things. These include the possible goals, purposes, and uses relative to tool-contexts—that for the sake of which something exists or has a use. These contexts are constitutive of the world. The context of manipulation is fundamental, not objective spatial location.

B. #23: the spatiality of being-in-the-world. Dasein is “de-severence” [108].
   1. De-severance: the abolishing of distance; creating a world within involvement contexts [105]. See [106]: distance and temporality conceived in terms of human action, such as a good walk, a boring seminar (two hours that seem like four).
   2. Seeing and hearing not simply occurrent. Bringing things closer
(a letter from a friend, a telephone call): intellectually grasping in Aristotle’s sense. The metaphor of sight initiates the advent of representational realism.

3. Left and right not subjective but an orientation towards the world. Discussion of Kant on directionality [109]. For Kant the world is formed a priori; for Heidegger it is constituted by being-in relations, involvement, care, etc., not by Kantian concepts, but by actions. But the possibility of acting in a certain way also has a priori conditions: they too are discussed by Heidegger as forms of being-in.

C. #24: space and Dasein’s spatiality. “Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather ‘in’ the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein.” “And because Dasein is spatial in the way we have described, space shows it self as a priori” [111, last ¶].

1. Dasein as spatial, but space is not in the subject as a form of intuition. Spatiality is a feature of the world and of Dasein’s activities. Once again there is a certain Kantian flavor to the argument about the a prioriness of space, but Heidegger is not a Kantian in believing that space is a conceptual form of all possible objective experience. Spatiality is connected with practice, activity, and involvement. Heidegger sees spatiality connected with action rather than substance. For Kant, substance and extension depend on the a priori possibility of spatial intuitions. For Heidegger, space is a priori to the world through Dasein’s possible ways of acting, through the world as disclosed to it. For Kant, spatiality is a priori to any possible objective experience. Heidegger argues that experiences depend on how Dasein is in the world. Experiences do not put Dasein in the world (implying that Dasein is already something before it is in the world).

2. Space as pure dimensionality (a condition for the “presence” of objects). Nature is deprived of its worldhood: space is absolute rather than lived-in. It becomes res extensa.

3. Pure dimensionality deprives things of their potential for involvement, tool-like uses [112].
Being and Time: Division I Chapter 4

Summary Outline of I-4

Being-in analyzed through Dasein and society: being-in and being-with. “Dasein” and “Das Man”.

#25: Dasein and the “subject.”
A. The isolated “I” [116].
B. Dasein’s essence grounded in existence, activity, being-with.
C. Existence not a property but a process.

#26: being-with is essential to Dasein. The social world is essential to Dasein.
A. Personal pronouns [119].
B. Care, Concern, Solicitude [121 f.].
C. “In Being-with Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of others” [123.5].
   1. No problem of other minds.
   2. Being-with irreducible [125].
   3. If Dasein is at all it has being-with-one-another as its kind of being.

#27: “They” and everyday being.
A. Distance.
B. Dictatorship of the They (the one).
C. Constancy of Dasein (self-identity) [128].
D. They not a universal subject or genus.
E. Authentic self contrasted with They-self.
I. Being-in-the-world as being-with. Being-with other people. Inauthentic Dasein. What sort of being is Dasein? The relation of Dasein to society. Being-with as a primordial structure of Dasein. The subject of everyday awareness is “the one,” Das Man. What is Dasein? Heidegger’s answer to this question brings us to the analysis of “being-with.” The anti-individualism of his account of the Cartesian subject rests on the thesis that the self is defined by its relationships to the world and to other subjects, not ‘internally’ in the way that Descartes tried to discover his conscious essence in the First Meditation. We cannot close ourselves off from the world for Heidegger. Where Dilthey and Scheler lay the basis for Heidegger’s account of authentic being-with, Kierkegaard inspires his account of the inauthentic they-self. Descartes’ metaphysical individualism bears the brunt of both of these aspects of the analytic of Dasein.

II. #25: approach to the existential question of the who of Dasein.
A. Who is the subject of everyday activity and discourse?
   1. The ontic or substantive I is determined by the ontological possibilities open to one: cares, interests, social spatiality, etc.
B. What is one’s identity in the social world? What determines what one is there? What modes of being there circumscribe the possibilities (the transcendental limit)?
   1. Ultimately Dasein’s being-towards-death in Division II creates the awareness of the possibilities of existence. In order to be aware of these, one must be aware of the possibility of nonexistence.
   2. The Big Point [115, first ¶]: “the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein just is not the ‘I myself’.” The individual is part of a society and its identity lies essentially there. See also [123.5]: being-with is “essentially for the sake of others.”
   3. Identity not discovered by Cartesian introspection [114, 116.5]. No given I, such as the self in Descartes’ Second Meditation, a being purely accessible to itself independent of the world. See also the discussion of the self in Division II Chapter 3.
C. What are the basic phenomena of social existence?
   1. [116] “I” as a formal indicator, a place holder. But what exists as the I? How is the reference of “I” determined?
   2. The Cartesian “I” cannot be in a world. It exists in isolation. From what does its identity derive?
   3. The “I” goes along with “others.” Compare again with Strawson’s “Persons,” in his book Individuals. I cannot ascribe states to myself unless I can ascribe them to others. The pronoun “I” is correlated with “‘he,” “she,” “they” as these terms pick out referents from among persons—there is no difference between them as persons, “I” does not have a special, Cartesian self-awareness, missing for “he,” “she,” or “they.” Dasein is not an occurrent entity.
   4. Don’t be misled by the ontical being of entities. Being-in remains concealed. Dasein is not an occurrent thing of which only itself can be aware. Heidegger’s anti-individualism includes an account of this kind of self awareness and its derivativeness. The discussion on [115–116] raises questions about the substance-theory of the Cartesian subject.
   5. Dasein’s essence is grounded in its existence [117]. The fundamental nature of that existence involves others.
      a. Existence in the public world is a process based on ec-stasis. Only Dasein exists in the world that way, capable of understanding what it is doing and what it is.
      b. Existence is not a property but a process. Dasein’s being is existence, the process of being-with others. The social world is essential to Dasein.

III. #26: The Dasein-with of others; everyday being-with.
A. Equipmental encountering involves others for whom the work is destined. Those others are encountered in that involvement context [117]. See Guignon Chapter 3 for a discussion of tool-contexts, involvement, and being-in. Dreyfus Chapter 4 discusses both availability and occurrence.
B. Dasein is in the world with others. They are not normally either available or occurrent [118.5]. The world is shared with others [118, last ¶]. Being-in = being-with others.
1. The location of the self (“I am here”) is not a privileged point of view but the placing of Dasein in a word that is available to me for involvements [119]. These places can be occupied by anyone.
   a. Concern: Dasein finds itself, establishes its identity, through what it does, expects, avoids, etc.
   b. Location markers, personal pronouns: not ways of locating entities on an objective spatial grid but relative to concern.
2. Dasein understands itself proximally in terms of its world [120]. I.e., as closely attached to it, not distinct from it.
   a. Others are not seen as things but participants in various modes of involvement.
   b. Discussion of the various modes [120–121].
   c. There is no absolutely objective view of the world from outside all involvements.
3. Care distinguished from solicitude. Both are forms of being-with. See footnote 4 [121].
   a. Care applies to the world both as occurrence and available. Solicitude applies to the world of other persons, other beings that are also Dasein [121]. See also beginning of Chapter 6.
   b. Two extremes of solicitude [122]. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “solicitude” and “solicitous,” as a state of anxiety and apprehensiveness; attentive care and protectiveness; a cause of care or concern. (By the way, this particular dictionary is particularly good for philosophers in the way that it lists derivations and synonyms. E.g., for “solicitude” it says “see: care.”)
   i. Leaping in: putting oneself in another’s place.
   ii. Leaping ahead: to give care back authentically. Helping another to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it. This would seem to be a characteristic of Socratic teaching: know thyself.
   c. The significance of worldhood is bound up with being-with others.
   d. No philosophical problem of other minds [124.5].
   i. The argument of analogy: others as a projected duplicate of oneself based on the observation of one’s physical state correlated with one’s mental states.
   e. Being-towards others is irreducible. Similarity to Strawson’s P-predicates (applicable to oneself only if they are applicable to others) [125].
   f. Empathy follows being-with. Presupposition of likeness of feeling between persons: this is one of Dilthey’s major presuppositions and one for which Heidegger claims to have a philosophical argument.
4. The last ¶ of #26 is a preface to the next section: why is Dasein not itself when it is absorbed in its being-towards-others of that is the basis of its identity?

IV. #27: everyday being-oneself and Das Man. Dreyfus translates “Das Man” as “the one” and I will generally follow him. His point is that Das Man is “anyone,” the society in which one dwells. However, Frederick Olafson argues against some aspects of this interpretation in “Heidegger à la Wittgenstein or ‘Coping’ with Professor Dreyfus,” Inquiry, Vol. 37 #1, March, 1994. Olafson argues that Dreyfus makes Dasein too dependent on Das Man and overlooks the individual responsiveness against the influence of Das Man in achieving authenticity. Note that Dreyfus disagrees with a related point of Olafson’s on pp. 142–143.
A. Distance between oneself and others. The dictatorship of the one [127]. Das Man: the personification of the society, the authority of its beliefs over the life of the individual, but Dasein is always a part of this dictatorship.
   1. Subjection: Dasein’s dependence on others: “what will they say if I do that?”
   2. But this interdependence stands as an original part of our being: we are part of a crowd, society depersonalized, we are leveled down and made public [127.5]. We are disburdened of independence (not metaphysical but social, moral, and political) by the
they [128]. The averaging down of our beliefs and the resultant impossibility for authenticity in a purely public context of inquiry.

B. The constancy of Dasein lies in its modes of being-with, not in its relation to something occurent [128.5].

C. The one is not a universal subject, not a genus to which the individual belongs, but the relations that exist between Daseins [129]. Das Man “belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution.” Nor is Das Man alienated Dasein. Dreyfus Chapter 8 has a discussion of the relation between Dasein and the one. Contrast Olafson’s account with Dreyfus’.

D. Everyday Dasein = anyone; not authentic.
   1. The public aspect Dasein determines the basis (“articulates the referential context”) for interpreting the world and being-in-the-world. [129.5].
   2. It is not I, my own self, but the others, the whole social context that constitutes being-in-the-world. But the one should not be considered a universal subject.

E. The one becomes visible: the relations between the self and others. The social context constitutes being-in-the-world.
   1. The kind of being belonging to the one is the ontological foundation for individual Dasein’s possibilities [130].
   2. The relation of being-with-another is different from occurrentness.
      a. One should not distinguish oneself from the one by seeing the later as an object external to oneself, as occurrent.
      b. Absorption in the world leads to understanding (and treating) others as occurrent objects. But they are not.

V. Some general points about the Authenticity/Inauthenticity distinction: See Gelven’s discussion of this section and the difference between “they” and “others.” Das Man is a characteristic of Dasein (its interconnectedness with other selves ontologically determining Dasein’s modes of encountering the world). Others are specific persons with whom one can be related in authentic and inauthentic modes. (The “self-mode” relation is authentic or eigentlich (ownmost, singular), the “non-self-mode” is inauthentic or uneigentlich.) His major points:

A. Authentic existence = awareness of the possibilities of being-relations, and the awareness of the metaphysical significance of death. Inauthentic existence is grounded in preoccupation with actuality. It does not see the importance of possibility.

B. The discussion of Verstehen (understanding) that begins in Chapter 5 will emphasize the metaphysical significance of authenticity.

C. Inauthentic existence is “characterized by a loss of self-awareness and an abandonment to the impersonal prattle of the one.” Dasein’s unawareness persists even to the point of not wanting to know about the various ontological presuppositions implicit in the phenomenology of being-in and being-with relations.
   1. Inauthenticity lies in the failure to see the constitutive relation holding between Dasein, Das Man, and the world. Understanding of the world depends on Dasein and Das Man. Inauthenticity is the absorption of Dasein by that triad without seeing its ontologically constitutive force in Dasein’s being within the one. Authentic Dasein sees that force.
   2. Inauthentic Dasein sees the world as a collection of occurrent objects: the everyday world covers up being-with-another [130]. Authentic Dasein is not a state of mind such as self-consciousness. It is a philosophical insight into the nature of being-in-the-world as being-with-others.

D. If Heidegger does not envisage authenticity as an ideal mode of existence, what does the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity imply and presuppose about Dasein’s existence and the nature of its world?
E. Authentic existence can be “actual” in the sense that it is action based on awareness. Inauthentic existence is action characterized by unawares. But Heidegger denies that this is in any way a “moral” distinction.

F. Guignon discusses the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction (pp. 132–144) and so do Dreyfus and Jane Rubin in the appendix to Dreyfus’s book. Gelven’s various discussions are also valuable because, like Olafson, he tends to take an individualistic approach that contrasts with that of Dreyfus. How does Dreyfus characterize Das Man (the one)?

**Being and Time: Division I Chapter 5**

**Summary Outline of I-5**

Being-in fundamentally connected to Care. Understanding and Care (in which understanding is not simply an “intellectual” activity).


The Three Existentialia:

A. #29: State of Mind and being-there.
   2. Thrownness and Possibility introduced.
   3. Three characteristics of states of mind [137].
   4. Theoria [138].
   5. #30: Fear as a state of mind.
      a. Intentionality and being-in.
      b. Forms of fear.

B. #31: Understanding and being-there.
   1. Understanding as awareness of possibility [144].
   2. Projection [145].
      a. Projection and authenticity [146].
      b. Projection and “sight.”
   3. Mood and possibility.
   4. #32: Understanding and interpretation.
      a. Existence preceeds knowing.
      b. Understanding and “in-order-to.”
         i. Understanding “as” [149].
         ii. Fore-having [150].
         iii. Understanding and Meaning [151].
   5. Hermeneutic circle [152].
   6. #33: Assertion and judgment dependent on interpretation.
      a. Truth not identical to all true propositions.
      b. Three Features of Assertion.
Division I Chapter 5

I. Introduction #28: being-in as such: care (Sorge) as the fundamental way Dasein is in the world. This is one of the most important chapters in Being and Time. Its primary focus is on the activity of understanding. How is authenticity, awareness of possibility and presupposition, possible? The three basic traits of Dasein: Mood (Stimmung) [134–139], Understanding (Verstehen) [142–148], and Speech/Language [153–173]. Falleness as essential to all three of these traits. Heidegger starts off with a review:
A. Being-in is not occurrencentness. The self is not an object but a projection into possibility.

B. The relation between Dasein and world is not the difference between subject and object. Where did that distinction come from in the first place? Equi-originality of constitutive items: Dasein brings its world, its interpretive framework, along with it.
   1. Care as the original or originating being of Dasein [131].
   2. Find out what care is by analysing what is possible for Dasein. Understanding and state of mind (mood) as two equi-originally constitutive ways of being-in-the-world through possibility (see Heidegger’s summary, end [133]). What is possible for Dasein is constituted by understanding and state of mind. Possibility precedes actuality; understanding is prior to actuality; inauthenticity is the avoidance of possibility.

C. Being-in-the-world is analyzed into state-of-mind (#29), understanding (#32), and discourse (#34) as the fundamental nature of Dasein, of being-in a world. Mood, understanding, and discourse are the three existentialia of Dasein. Being-in is also analyzed by the “falling of Dasein” in Section B of Chapter 5 (heading III below).

II. Section A: the existential character of “there,” of place and location.
A. #29: being-there as a state-of-mind. See also #40.
1. The state of mind in which one is found (“How are you feeling today?”) is ontically the most familiar [134].
   a. Disclosure is not knowledge about things but understanding, as in understanding the purpose of something.
   b. Being-there is temporal, Dasein’s projections involve possibilities that determine the nature of Dasein’s world, Dasein’s authenticity, and so on.

2. For Heidegger, possibility is more significant than actuality (just the reverse of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Bk. 9, 1051).
   a. Possibility as a transcendental perspective. The limits of the world are determined by what is possible within it.
   b. Inauthenticity as unawareness of possibility.
   c. Possibility is necessary to explain dread, fear, and other world-determining moods. Conceiving of Dasein as a process rather than as a thing connects up with the distinction between the occurring and the available and then with possibility.

3. State of mind as mood characterizes the world. But Dasein often evades the kind of being implicit in its moods [135] because it is thrown into a situation determined by conditions beyond its control (see #38 for more on thrownness).

4. Disclosure (erschließen: to open, to make accessible) of the fact that one is in the world, without the why or purpose. Compare disclosure with the later discussion of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) in #62.
   a. There is always something unknown about one’s actual state in the world. “The whence’ and ‘wither’ remain in darkness.”
   b. Disclosure not by seeking but in fleeing: can’t be discovered by looking at what one is acquainted with in the world of occurring things.
   c. Moods emphasize the unchangeable—ignoring possibility [136] moods point to the inevitable, to brute inescapability.
   d. Authentic existence is not moodless.
   e. Moods disclose Dasein in its thrownness.
   f. See the note on “Stimmung” on [134]. Also, the note on “falling” (Verfallen) is important for a concept that Heidegger discusses in more detail later on.

5. 3 Characteristics of states of mind:
   a. World, existence and ways of being-in/with/towards are disclosed as thrown. The world as disclosed determines what can be encountered within it.
   b. State of mind is the basic existential character of their disclosedness (“this disclosedness itself is essentially being-in-the-world” [137]).
      i. Here being-in = what matters as it depends on state of mind.
      ii. State-of-mind is the a priori existential manifested by moods [134].
   c. What Dasein encounters in the world matters to it. Encountering is primarily circumspective: see [138]. See also the footnote on [57] about Besorgen. Concern, as a form of care, is grounded in state of mind.

6. Theoretical understanding “dims down” the world to uniformity. Care contexts vanish. Only occurring things are real under this form of understanding. We don’t see it as broken up into the unsteady world of everyday life and moods. But even theory implies a mood. The well-ordered world of science has a mood associated with it: tranquillity, the mood of pure, detached theoria.

7. Moods not psychical phenomena but originally ontological: a state of mind is the way Dasein is in the world [139].

B. #30: Fear as a state-of-mind. An example of how a state of mind effects the world, how it reveals the actual mode of Dasein’s being-in-the world. Fear reveals how Dasein is concerned about the world. Fear reveals inauthenticity; dread (Angst) reveals authenticity. Where fear is directed at something specific, dread is about the world as a whole. State-of-mind is the mode of the actual in the sense that one is in the world through an understanding of what it is. Here “understanding” does not mean (just) detached theoretical contemplation but primarily practice and behavior. See Guignon’s discussion of constitutive versus instrumental views of language (pp. 115–132). He emphasizes the tension in Being and Time between our prior conception of the world,
which shapes how we deal with it, and the view (most clearly exemplified in the later Wittgenstein) that language is not a tool or instrument for understanding the world. Although the world is seen through our linguistic activities these have a deeper connection to being-in-the-world (which cannot be separated from language). Heidegger holds the latter view in *Being and Time*, but there remains the pull of the instrumental and its Husserlian influence. The passage from Guignon can be read in connection with Schmitt’s account of language (pp. 73–94). The discussion of language becomes more explicit later in this chapter, especially from #32 on. See Dreyfus, p. 175 f. for a discussion of fear and anxiety and the earlier half of Chapter 10 for his discussion of moods.

1. Fear explained by what matters to Dasein, by a concern for what is.
2. Fear is constitutive: it shapes the world’s character. Here is an example of how the activities of being-in are constitutive of Dasein. In this case, they are not present but futural. An example of projection. As Dreyfus puts it, “Dasein is…already in, ahead of itself, and amidst,” p. 244.
3. What do we encounter in fearing that shapes the world?
   a. Intentionality: we do not first discover a future evil and then fear it. That which fear is about is what one fears: i.e., one fears for others, a concernful way of being-alongside others [141], “being in their shoes” as it were. See the footnotes about translation of “Sein bei.”
   b. The object of fear is not material but formal. One cannot fear x unless one has certain beliefs about x essential to its perception as an object of fear. The lion must be perceived as threatening (whether or not it really is).
5. Fearing is “about” rather than “of”: it is really being afraid-for-oneself [142]. The ‘being-with’ relation is threatened. So if I am afraid about (for) the welfare of my family, e.g., I believe my relations with the members of my family are threatened by poverty, sickness, etc. This discussion, and the ensuing examples, are meant to show that the intentionality of fear can be understood through the fundamental ontological concepts Heidegger has introduced: care, being-in, being-with, all disclose the different possibilities for Dasein that emerge in specific cases of fearing.
6. Moods, in contrast, are not directed at specific objects, nor are they really about oneself as an isolated being. They are a characterization of the world as the possibilities for Dasein in that world.
7. Moods are “nonintentional,” therefore. They are not directed at anything in particular. With his theory of moods, Heidegger again maintains something directly contrary to Husserl and his characteristic intentionalist conception of consciousness.

C. #31: being-there as understanding. In this mode, Dasein’s existence is revealed through its awareness of possibilities for itself (hence possibility preceeds actuality). Understanding is the mode of the possible, of what is open to one in the world. Awareness of possibilities characterizes the world and oneself.

1. Understanding makes Dasein “able-to-be” (hyphenated to emphasize that Dasein is nothing without its possibilities).
2. Seinkönnen: to be able to be, translated as potentiality for being. Understanding attaches to possibilities rather than actualities, but they are possibilities for some particular Dasein.
   a. The distinction between “verstehen” and “erkennen” (and Erkenntniss). The former Heidegger takes over as a technical term from Dilthey: understanding as the comprehension of the whole. Erkenntniss, on the other hand, is knowledge in the form of particular cognitive acts such as perceptions.
3. Projection (Entwurf): compare with thrownness (Geworfenheit). Projecting as throwing forward [145.5]. “Der Entwurf” means a design or plan, “entwerfen” to design, to plan, to make a plan. “Dasein is always ‘thrown’ into a world of cultural and historical meanings which makes up the horizon in which anything is intelligible, but which cannot itself be grounded by something beyond that horizon,” Guignon, p. 160. Thrownness = being thrown into (for no reason).
   a. Initially, we see the world as for Dasein’s own sake (the door
handle is a means for leaving the room). Projecting is the system of means-ends relations that relate possible action to state of mind. Projecting projects possibilities. The discussion from [144] to the end of the section brings together possibility, authenticity, disclosure, and projection.  

b. This discussion connects with Division II Chapter 4, #68: temporality and understanding.  
c. All forms of cognition depends on the awareness of possibility in this action-oriented sense [146].  
i. Authenticity/inauthenticity.  
ii. The metaphores of sight, Dasein’s transparency, opaqueness, clearedness: all grounded in understanding [147]. Note the discussion of “seeing.”  
iii. Intuition and thinking derivatives of understanding: but why are they “remote”? What does Heidegger mean? See the last two sentences of that ¶.  
iv. Transparency designates self-knowledge through being-in-the-world [146.5]. Dasein’s identity established through recognition of possible and available activities of being-in and being-with. This involves recognition of thrownness and Dasein’s “not-yetness,” its projection into the future. The temporality of the as-structure is futural. This is why Dasein cannot be occurrent: it is not “now,” not present. Dasein is strung out into the future: what I am now depends on my projects, my desires about what I will be.  
d. Dasein is more than what factually exists but no more than what factically is.  
i. Factual: Dasein’s ontological existence. What is significant to Dasein is its projects. This attaches to possibilities in time. See #68 for more and how Dasein is not an occurrent thing because its being rests on possibility and future projection.  
ii. Factual: occurrent existence. How little of Dasein this captures. Descartes’ conception of the subject depends entirely on this kind of account. To use Dreyfus’ analogy (p. 24), a factual account of x would be that x is either masculine or feminine, e.g. A factual account would be that x behaves in a masculine manner. That behavior would then be part of x’s identity.  
e. Dasein oriented to the world via possibilities (possibilities are not the result of thinking, but its condition). See [147] on seeing as access to entities.  
f. Through moods, Dasein sees its possibilities. Projection involves the disclosure of Dasein’s potentiality for being-in the world. It involves the question: what is available to Dasein?  

4. Once again, activity creates as well as depends on possibility. Dasein is in-the-world by acting; possibilities stretch out in front of one relative to Dasein’s understanding, care, and involvement. Dasein’s existence depends on its understanding of its ability to exist, and this requires seeing the world in terms of its possibilities.  
a. Projection as futural: thrown forward into possibility (this becomes thrown projection: see [144], [188], [262] and connects with the discussion of death: for that see [251], [256], [308], [329], [348].  
b. Projection is not a searchlight shining on a field of distinct entities, it shapes the flow and direction of life and its activities by opening up possibilities. Not factual but factical.  
c. The one is the source of Dasein’s possibilities (see [383]). Once again, Heidegger is an anti-individualist. What is possible for Dasein rests on Das Man. Yet individual Dasein can uniquely interpret these influences.  

5. Understanding is not knowledge, not propositional.  
a. “Knowledge” in the traditional sense depends on evidence and represents objects, states of affairs, etc.  
b. Understanding is not about anything in particular, there is no object of understanding independent of Dasein’s disclosure.  
c. Understanding works within the disclosure of how Dasein is in its world through its involvement’s.  
d. Understanding is constitutive through state-of-mind as essential to being-in.
e. Yet Dasein can “transcend” by understanding all of this: see #69 for Heidegger’s discussion of transcendence.

6. The ontological grounds for these two modes of being-in-the-world (state of mind and understanding) are discussed in Division II. So far we have an outline of how they operate without seeing how they got there.

D. #32: understanding and interpretation.
1. Interpretation is not an additional activity over and above perception, experience, sensation. It is involved in them intrinsically, not added to them.
2. Existence (understanding) preceeds knowing (the discovery of essences or attributes).
3. Interpretation as making explicit how we encounter the world through the projection of possibilities. As Heidegger says, the “projecting of the understanding has its own possibility—that of developing itself” [148]. So interpretation is part of the development of understanding—the primary characteristic of Dasein.
4. Three aspects of interpretation: the as-structure. Dasein understands the world through the activity of interpretation, which has three aspects:
   a. The as-structure: interpreting = understanding as:
      i. Understanding as in-order-to [149]. A means/ends relation.
      ii. Experiencing something as simply occurrent: is this the same as experiencing it uninterpreted? No, even those entities are part of a larger system of interpretation [150]. For Heidegger, there are no bare experiences, no given prior to interpretation.
      iii. Pointing out the function and use of something: seeing the world as involvement, as tool-oriented. Making clear what is implicit. Seeing implies understanding, not just staring at something.
   b. The fore-structure: what we have implicit in any interpretation. Prior understanding of a totality of involvements. (The German word here is “Das Vorhaben”: design, intention, or purpose. This is somewhat artificially captured in the neologistic “fore-” prefixes.) The structure of projection:
      i. Fore-having: context of natural use and assumption of function. Gelven’s example of the car: when it runs properly one takes it for granted.
      ii. Fore-sight: my car won’t start. Knowing how to go about isolating the problem from prior knowledge of mechanics, etc., knowing what to look for.
      iii. Fore-conception: how one interprets. Understanding the systems of the car: electrical, fuel, cooling, braking, etc. is the background for making explicit specific as-structures. (See also #63.)
   c. Meaning [151]: becoming aware of the significance, use, etc. of an as-structure. The intelligibility of something in relation to its use.
      i. The world already has meaning to Dasein, it is not an independent realm of entities with meanings, functions, purposes superimposed on it. Dasein exists within a meaningful world in relation to what is available to it, established in part by the fore-structure. Dasein may often think of this meaning as obscure to itself.
      ii. The absence of meaning, the absurd [152]. Being is meaning, as content, the actual structure of what is.
      iii. Being not contrasted with entities (a kind of substratum that gives entities support), being as meaning determining activity (structure is dependent upon interpretation).

5. Hermeneutical circle unavoidable [153].
   a. Interpretation presupposes understanding (the fore-structure) but understanding rests on prior interpretations of the world.
   b. Can our understanding of history rest on as independent a standpoint as our knowledge of nature? But our knowledge of nature is not as detached as it seems either.

E. #33: assertion (judgment) as a derivative mode of interpretation. Interpretation as constitutive of Dasein’s being-in. Criticism of Kant
and Husserl: interpretation is not a judgmental or *a priori* structure; interpretation can be tacit and unconscious, implicit and behavioral. But Heidegger has not yet clarified how he differs from the traditional conception of ontology with its problem of the relation between essence and existence. If he is not after essences or transcendental structures in his analysis of everyday life (if the everyday is always an interpretation, a construct), then Heidegger’s account of Dasein must be anti-essentialist even if he ascribes fundamental aspects to Dasein. Heidegger’s approach is holistic rather than reductionistic. Dasein is not made up of parts, like the human body, but its characterization emerges out of a complex of activities. Up to this point we have seen the basic form of the answer: Dasein is activity in relation to things understood through availability. We have already seen that for Dasein existence depends on action and action involves tools, and action is intrinsically interpretive. It also has a fore-structure, and so on.

1. Meaning prior to propositions. (See Schmitt, pp. 95–102 on the question of the priority of rules.) Disclosure, context, establishes meaning. This section establishes Heidegger’s holistic theory of meaning, which connects to his hermeneutical view of interpretation in the previous section. See Dreyfus, pp. 218–223 and Gignon’s account of two views of language, pp. 115–132.

2. Truth not equivalent to all true propositions.

3. Three features of assertion:
   a. Pointing out: letting an entity be understood as available in a certain way (“the hammer is too heavy”). Applies to the hammer, not to a representation. The assertion is not a representation either.
   b. Predication: giving something a definite character. Not a representation [153].
      i. Apophantical: attaching a predicate to a subject—true statements in the form of subject-predicate assertability. Primarily an occurrent-object sense. Science is primarily apophantical.
      ii. Communication as a being-toward relation. The as-structure determines the being-toward relation. Assertion is one form of communication.
   c. “Assertion” and communication [155]. Communication is the larger, ontological activity through which assertion, propositions, the correspondence theory of truth can come into being.
      i. Meaning is a condition of Dasein, not of words. Dasein’s activities are the context of meaning.
      ii. Meaning is the result of projection (as-structure).
      iii. Meaning is grounded in involvement, not in occurrent reality.
      iv. Verbal meaning is derivative from existential meaning: mood, state of mind, understanding.

   a. Assertion requires a fore-having (a contextual precondition) [157].
   b. Assertion requires fore-sight: an articulation of pointing out, identifying the range of applicable predicates.
   c. Assertion requires a fore-conception, a definite way of conceiving of something’s possibilities.

5. Hermeneutical-existential communication versus apophantical assertion [158]. What kind of being goes with language in general [166]?
   a. Apophantical-as = analysis as occurrence. The given, the occurrent, as the basis of meaning. Meaning as reference.
      i. To see-as or interpret as an object with attributes.
ii. The analysis of language treating language as about occurrent things.

iii. How does this differ from the hammer/availability examples? The hammer qua tool does not have an analysis in terms of properties because it depends on use contexts (in-order-to, etc.). Depending on use-contexts, many different things can be hammers. Other things could never be a hammer—light bulbs, e.g., because they can’t be used in the right way.

b. Hermeneutical = existential as availability for involvement.
   i. The grounding of the apophantical is in the hermeneutical.
   ii. The world consisting of entities with properties is already an interpretation: being = substance + attributes.
   iii. In stressing hermeneutal aspects of Dasein’s activities, in the next section of this chapter Heidegger says the question of the being or nature of language is related to “the Everyday Being of the ‘there’, and the Falling of Dasein.” To lead up to this section, he outlines the structures of discourse and communication.

6. Discussion of logos [159] (see Guignon, pp. 112–116).
   a. Binding and separating—essentially identity and difference. The foundation of affirmation/negation on the activities of binding and separating—Heidegger’s deconstruction of truth and falsity as propositional modes into activities.
   b. *Theoria* as the view of the world as occurrent things.
   c. The copula: “x is F” and the subject/predicate model of logos as apophansis.
   d. Logic grounded in the existential analytic of Dasein, the emphasis on apophansis obscures that dependence.
   e. As Heidegger puts it on [166]: “The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic *a priori* structure of discourse in general as an ‘existential.’” Translate that sentence: what does he mean by “liberate”?

7 #34: being-there, discourse, and language. Talk and idle talk.

a. The existential foundation of language is discourse or talk. Again, the point is that some activity is prior to propositions as bearers of truth, falsity, and meaning. Use-contexts underlie these more abstract views of truth and meaning.

b. Discourse is equi-original with state-of-mind and understanding [161].

c. The intelligibility of being-in-the-world expresses itself as discourse.
   i. Discourse is existential rather than factual.
   ii. Language can be broken up into relations between occurrent things referred to by assertions.

d. Hearing and keeping silent are aspects of discourse.
   i. Speech acts prior to language (in the more developed sense). Talking is always talk about something. Compare with Derrida: ‘writing’ is prior to speech. For a comparison of Heidegger and Derrida, see Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Pragmatism” (Univ. of Indiana Press, 1982).
   ii. Hearkening [163–4] as involvement with. Hearing is not a sensation. It is part of the activity of discourse.
   iii. Keeping silent is possible only in genuine discourse [165].
   iv. The analogy is that discourse is a practical activity consisting of sub-activities such as hearkening and keeping silent. These practical activities lie at the basis of language.
   v. Similarity to Wittgenstein’s attack on universals and his view of the link between language and forms of life.

e. Communication [162–163].
   i. A state of mind gets shared. This is not a conveying of information from one subject to another. Heidegger’s account similar to Wittgenstein’s here too.
   ii. Talking is not the conveying of something inner, for one is already outside in the world. Being in a state-of-mind directly indicated by intonations, the way of speaking, etc. (Dilthey on expression is an influence here, but Heidegger breaks with Dilthey’s Cartesianism (that mental states, con-
sciousness, experience, are ontologically distinct as the content of expression.)

iii. “Expression” in, e.g. poetry, does not convey a “state of mind.” States of mind are shared because of common social practices, or perhaps they are shared social practices. Language does not connect the ‘inner’ with the ‘outer’ world but is an aspect of being with others.

f. Truth does not reside in the formal characteristics of discourse [163]. This view of truth is based on the more primitive activity of discourse: saying, hearing, etc. The ‘essence’ of language is use and involvement with the world.

g. Discourse as discursive being-in [165].

i. With the subject/predicate grammar invented by Aristotle (to correspond to his substance/attribute metaphysics), the Greeks began to treat language as the ontology of the occurring (substance and attribute) and thus lost sight of humanity as the entities that talk (perhaps the insight of the Presocratics as Heidegger sees them). See Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics Chapter 2 for this view of grammar and metaphysics (the Introduction was written during the same period as Being and Time).

ii. But following rules is not essential to discourse. See Schmitt, p. 95 f. The “rules” of language are not all known in advance. It is an open-ended set.

iii. Rejection of Husserl’s search for the rules of consciousness as a parallel to the Aristotelian project.

iv. Rules get formulated, language gets stabilized, but what is the fundamental process that keeps language evolving: is it rule-guided too? Heidegger argues that it is not. Being-in the world is logically prior to language, although language is part of how Dasein is in the world. See [169.5]: discourse “belongs to the essential state of Dasein’s Being…” but can be distorted in idle talk. See the last ¶ of [169] for an example of the constitutive sense of language described by Guignon (p. 120).

h. Language as a kind of equipment: some questions [166].

III. Section B: the everyday being of the “there,” and the falling of Dasein. This final section deals with the analytic of inauthentic being. It is not intended as an existentialist criticism of the failings of Western civilization (although one can read it that way, as Gelven and Sartre do). Rather, inauthenticity is seen to be part of Dasein too. How does Dasein exist socially (reminder: always see existence as ec-stasis: a process involving the various modes of understanding mentioned above—authentic existence is to seek that understanding.) What is the public world, what does it mean to being-in-the-world? 3 forms of inauthenticity:

A. #35: Idle Talk.

1. The “average intelligibility” of public life, perverting or closing off the activity of disclosing.

2. The dominance of the public: the one prescribes one’s state-of-mind and determines what one can see and do [170]. See Schmitt, pp. 96–100.

3. Everyday existence is a detachment from Dasein’s original ontological understanding. We become occurrent things to ourselves. An essential part of Dasein: to become aware of authenticity, one must be capable of being inauthentic.

B. #36: Curiosity.

1. Detachment, but based on the ability of Dasein to disclose. Dasein creates a ‘clearing’ in which vision becomes the primary source and characteristic of knowledge. Sight as disclosure: how does Dasein comport itself with its possibilities of being (involvement)?

2. With Aristotle, knowing begins to be characterized by a family of sight-metaphors radically narrowing the sense of “disclosure” Heidegger claims to have existed before the Golden Age of Greece.

3. The reference to the opening pages of Aristotle’s Metaphysics at [171] and the analysis of Augustine on sight points to Aristotle’s interpretation of aletheia as seeing and vision: the primary source of information about the world. “Seeing,” an activity, requires things to be seen. This relationship gives rise to “the Problem of
Knowledge,” the problematic relationship between seeing and the seen that we see in Descartes’ and Locke’s dualism.

4. Concern distinguished from curiosity [172]. Just in order to see. Seeing implies a detachment that begins to characterize knowledge—instead of involvement.
   a. Concern as de-severing (bringing close, disclosing) and based on use and involvement.
   b. But this can be set free in the sense that an interest in the world has no particular goal, it loses its orientation to availability.
   c. Curiosity: pure interest, “never dwelling anywhere.”
   d. Idle talk controls curiosity [173]. Curiosity and idle talk characterize knowledge as detached contemplation.

C. #37: Ambiguity.
   1. When everyday being is accessible to everyone, every aspect of life is accessible. What is disclosed in such a context?
      a. Limitations on seeing and talking within the public world determined by being-with-others.
   2. Under the mask of “for-one-another,” an “against-one-another” is in play [175]. Not explicit dissimulation but simply part of the averaging effect of public life. The attempt to discover its ontology will conflict with the average interest of maintaining its control.

D. #38: Falling and Thrownness. Concluding general remarks about the ontological activity of Dasein in the public world.
   1. Falleness (verfallen = decay, decline, to expire. Der Verfall = decay, decline, ruin, forfeiture, sometimes decadence; “in Verfall geraten” = to fall to decay, to go to ruin). The existential-ontological structure of idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity as falleness.
      a. Unawareness of the ability of Dasein to search for its ontological roots.
      b. Not a negative evaluation. For the most part we are lost in the public world, falleness as absorption in being-with-another insofar as this relation is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity [175–6].

E. Fascination with the world and its public format.
   1. Not-being-its-self: a positive possibility, complete absorption in the world. Not-being in this way is very close to Dasein!

F. Fallenness not from a higher or purer state: religion won’t help. Implicit criticism of Rousseau and Marx: utopia is impossible, there is no “best” society.

G. Dasein is that which one falls away from: falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein.

H. The modes of authenticity applied:
   1. Idle talk: a form of groundless, directionless being.
   2. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, but is a form of being-in that is everywhere and nowhere.
   3. Ambiguity: nothing is hidden, but Dasein’s being-in-the-world is suppressed.

I. Falling brings the tranquillity of public success.
   1. Not inactivity, but Dasein is tranquilized and alienated. Dasein is closed off from authenticity in its realization of possibility not inhibited by the rules of the public world (Das Man).
   2. Inauthenticity as tranquillity, passivity. The dispassionate observer. Temptation, tranquilization, inauthenticity, self-entanglement are all connected. See [178.5].

J. The “downward plunge” reinterpreted as ascending and living concretely. Critical directionality rather than unthinking determinateness.

K. Falling as thrownness: being controlled by the one [179]. But falling into the world conflicts with the existentiality of Dasein only if the self is regarded as an isolated subject. The subject/object metaphysics of falling into the world makes the self an occurrent thing.

L. But if we keep in mind that Dasein’s being is also being-in a public
world, that interpretation need not follow. But authentic existence is not something “which floats above falling everydayness.” It is to see everyday existence as fundamental—and to see that is to ec-sist—to transcend it by seeing it for what it is. This is something one cannot not do as inauthentic Dasein. It is not a question of the corruption of human nature, but of realizing that the public world is part of that nature in a way that can dominate it and control it.

M. Near the end of this chapter Heidegger writes: “Dasein can fall only because being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.” See Guignon’s discussion of authenticity and Das Man, pp. 108–10.

Being and Time: Division I Chapter 6

I. The ontological structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world depends on the relation between care, reality, and truth. Dread is the temporally unifying existential of Dasein. Time is the ultimate—original—ground for Dasein’s existence. Heidegger’s answer to the question: what does it mean to be-in-a-world?

II. #39: introduction and summary.
A. Thrownness: belongs to Dasein as its possibilities, which are thrust onto Dasein, it rarely creates its own. Dasein projects itself, establishes its identity, partly through its understanding of these possibilities.

B. Average everydayness: “being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality for being is an issue, both in its being alongside the ‘world’ and in its being-with others.” One of the main points in this chapter is that being-in-the-world and being-with others are constitutively interrelated. They are the origin Dasein’s identity.

C. Experience: individual experiences (Erfahrung) and experience as living through something significant (Erlebnis). Look again at the footnote on [46]. What is the character of experience? Is it essentially representational? Heidegger’s account of experience is very unlike those of the rationalists and empiricists or Kantians. We must understand the being (involvements) of Dasein in order to talk about the character of its experience. In order to answer questions about representational experience, e.g., we must first ask: How does Dasein function in its world? What are its possibilities of disclosure in that world? Heidegger’s critique of dualism is directly tied to his holistic account of Dasein and worldhood.

D. Angst (anxiety or dread but the implication is that it is not intentional in the traditional sense of being directed at an object). Angst is directly connected with the way Dasein is in its world, relative to its
possibilities. Its being is always ahead of where it is now. So Dasein is never present-at-hand, never just an occurrent thing. Gelven’s Chapter 5 is about Division I Chapter 6 and has an especially good discussion of Care and Dread.

1. Connection with care: see #41.
2. Recall the discussion of moods in Ch. 5 [134 f.] and the footnote on [134] about mood as Stimmung, as the tuning of a musical instrument. Mood is a general outlook or state of mind.

E. The last three ¶s of #39 are a fairly clear summary.
   1. Look beyond a description of Dasein anthropologically, as a kind of occurrent thing, to its ontological structure. What makes it different from occurrent thing?
   2. Entities are independent of experience, but being involves the understanding of the entities in the world. The discussions of epistemology, realism and idealism, and truth will depend on the ontology of Dasein and the activity of understanding.
   3. Being can be unconceptualized, it can be the way one acts, it can be one’s state of mind; but there is always an element of understanding in Dasein’s being. I.e., Dasein always interprets, it is the hermeneutical being.

III. #40: Dasein is disclosed, its identity determined, by its state of mind (Angst). Gelven is especially good on this section. He points out that Heidegger’s strategy is, first, to examine the phenomenological phenomenon of dread and its connection to care. This takes him to the ontological relation between time and Dasein’s worldliness (through care). Then he shows how the concepts of Reality and Truth are connected to time.

A. In “turning away” from the world and the self, Dasein confronts both [184.5]. “Absorption in the ‘world’ of its concern”: isolating oneself, being determined by the world rather than by interaction with it. Ironically, “fleeing” from the world means to be totally controlled by it. A general attack on Cartesianism. For Descartes, self-knowledge is completely separate from knowledge of the external world.
   1. We learn from Dasein’s falling away from the world.

   a. See Gelven’s example (p. 13) of refusing an obligation to a friend.

2. Dasein falls into the one.
   a. Heidegger’s use of “falling” is not supposed to carry the sense of falling from a state of grace (like Adam and Eve) but of losing direction in the sense of a connection to the world and others (being-in and being-with relations). The one supplies the context of directionality for Dasein, but if Dasein is dominated by the interests and desires of others, it has lost its sense of direction, it has no possibilities of its own.
   b. Falleness and dread are connected: the objectless sense of the latter concept in Heidegger concerns the loss of identity and direction, the realization that one is nothing without those but that they cannot be attained in the absence of the social, public world.
      i. If falleness is not Biblical, is it perhaps platonic? Falleness concerns the hiddeness of truth to Dasein, as it is hidden from the residents at the bottom of Plato’s cave. But to be closed off, isolated from truth is Dasein’s destiny: a-letheia is a negative concept of Truth, it is not optimistically platonic. No matter how hard one tries to find it, the truth will always be hidden, never fully available or apparent.
   3. Dread is not a fear of entities. Falling away is grounded on dread, this makes fear possible [186].
      a. Dasein does not fear something in particular.
      b. But this lack of object does not signify ‘nothing’. In his obscure, frustrating, but strangely engaging essay, “What is Metaphysics?”, “the Nothing” is not nothing. (Heidegger here seems to give in to metaphysics after all. He looks for a constitutive, determining role for Nothingness (which of course implies that Nothingness is not nothing after all)! Richard Rorty, who praises much of Being and Time, parts company with Heidegger at this point. See Rorty’s “Heidegger, Categories, and Pragmatism” and “Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language” in his Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4. What oppresses us is the possibility of involvement in general [187].
5. Involvement is “not yet.” It is futural and the object of Angst. “Nothingness” is the object of Angst: Dasein is nothing except what it does. The insignificance of the objects of the world in the face of Dasein’s question of being: what to do now?

B. It is being-in-the-world that we are anxious about.
1. Being free: see italics on [188]. We are concerned about what is possible for us, about potentiality for being. We interpret in an indefinite world, as indefinite beings, on the basis of this Angst.
2. Uncanniness, the unheimlich, as not-being-at-home.
   a. Being-in-the-world: what is familiar, what we are comfortable with.
   b. Falling as being out of place, not at home. Withdrawing from absorption in the world [189].
   c. We flee into the world, into the one, and into the entities of the world. This is how Dasein understands uncanniness in its everyday manner—it flees and turns away from itself in falling.
   d. But this falling/fleeing/dread state of mind is essential to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. We are at home in the one, in Das Man. We are not at home when we follow our dread through to its ontological significance. We understand the nature of being and its constitutive contingency.
   e. See footnote iv: reference to Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard on dread. Dreyfus and Rubin’s essay (the last chapter of Dreyfus’ book is relevant to this background).
   f. The English word “uncanny”: seeming to have a supernatural character or origin, mysterious, eerie; beyond what is normal or expected; of supernatural power. “Unheimlich” is used by Heidegger in its literal sense: what is familiar suddenly seems unfamiliar and alien. There seems to be some parallel with the breaking of a tool and its sudden obtrusiveness.
3. Dread shows us what is possible for us through our attempt to flee from those possibilities. Dread brings us face to face with our thrownness.

IV. # 41: Dasein’s being as care.
A. Three-fold characterization of Dasein: the three existentials of Dasein (remember that on the ontological side “existential” corresponds to “category” on the ontical side).
1. Understanding: the possible. What one can be. See ¶ two.
   a. Being free for possibilities: Dasein is ahead of itself.
   b. This is the sense in which being is an issue for Dasein.
   c. Possibility preceeds actuality. Heidegger’s sympathy with idealism. In An Introduction to Metaphysics he claimed that it was not idealism that failed but rather it was the failure of Western civilization to live up to the demands of idealism (what were those demands?). This failure led to Nietzsche’s nihilism and to the more serious problems of the twentieth century, which seems to Heidegger to be preoccupied with falling, uncanniness, and alienation.
2. State of mind: what one is as a result of being-in-the-world. See ¶ three.
   a. Dasein’s possibilities are limited by its actual world.
   b. Existing is always factual: always involves a state of mind. Remember that “facticity” is the ontological correlate of ontic facticity.
   c. If the world not a collection of entities, what ties it together? The state of mind of Dasein (individually and collectively) characterizes (is the interpretive format of the world).
3. Fallenness: how one hides from ontological dread in the social world. See ¶ four.
   B. ¶ five: the existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole rests on the nature of Dasein to be ahead of itself. This state of mind is, again, care.
      1. Concern (Sorge): care for entities.
      2. Solicitude (Fürsorge): care for other persons, social concern.
   C. Care (again, see this as Dasein’s being ahead of itself, directed at the future) as potentiality for being, for acting. These are connected with the possibilities open to one in the social world—being free for exis-
tentiell possibilities (i.e., possibilities relative to the entities of the world).

1. For the most part Dasein is inauthentic: projection of potentiality has been abandoned to the disposal and influence of the one [193.5].

D. The *a priori* nature of care is relative to the attitudes and disposal of entities in the world. Thus the ontological originality (the transcendental limit) of care in dread.

1. Theory and practice are possibilities of care (in the sense, perhaps, that one tries to organize care through theories of action and value such as utilitarianism) [193].
2. Seeing the world as a collection of occurrent things is just as much a result of care and dread as is conscious political action.

E. Discussion of willing [195.5].

1. Willing depends on disclosing the for-the-sake-of-which relation in Dasein’s world.
2. But the possibilities for acting are also predetermined by the one. This is tranquilized willing, theoretical uniformity. Possibilities are limited by inauthenticity; Dasein is uncreative in its inauthentic existence, it cannot envisage possibility.
3. Discussion of modifications of willing: the urge to live, wishing, addiction.

F. Is Care ontologically rich enough to account for being-in-the-world? Is there an ontological origin for care as well [196.5].

V. #42: an historical root for care. See also the reference to *Faust* Part II wherein care plays a major role in the determination of Faust’s character. The emptiness of Angst has an ontological definiteness that characterizes Dasein and its world [200]. Heidegger’s use of Goethe’s personification of care is an nonphilosophical way of indicating the pervasive, unifying function of the concept. This poetic story is, for Heidegger, more original than traditional philosophical accounts of willing, of action, or of truth. It describes a larger, pervasive phenomenon out of which the others have developed.

VI. #43: Dasein, worldhood, and reality: turning to the ontological foundations of care. What is wrong with thinking of the world as a collection of occurrent entities? ¶ two and three are a summary of what Heidegger has shown so far. How the being of the available gets passed over by concentrating on the occurrent. “Being” thus comes to mean substance in accordance with Descartes’ treatment, analyzed in Chapter 5. The main task of philosophy has been to prove the existence of the external world and the nature of substance. Heidegger’s discussion breaks down into three sections:

A. Reality as a problem of Being (as substance): can the external world be proved?

1. To have to prove the existence of the external world is to deny the priority of being-in-the-world [203].
2. For metaphysical realism, knowledge of the world must have a foundation.
   a. The world is conceived as occurrent things (“‘Being’ acquires the meaning of ‘reality’” [201]), for example substances to which one has access.
   b. This kind of being-in-the-world also has care as its original state of being (the particular “scientific” way Dasein is ahead of itself and alongside entities within the world.
   c. The representational medium of knowledge, consciousness and thinking, thus falls away from the world, to be separate from things ontologically (as with Descartes).
   d. “What is...permanent is the condition which makes it possible for the changes ‘in me’ to be [occurrent states].” See also the italics at the bottom of the next ¶: being-in-the-world is not the ontical occurrence of the physical and the psychical in some kind of relation to one another.
3. Kant’s “refutation of idealism” and the “scandal of philosophy.” The problem of realism: the scandal has been that the reality of the world should have to be proven at all. Why not take it as given? The history of philosophy, the debate between realism and idealism, has stood in the way of our doing that but Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world is an attempt at eliminating the dominance of traditional epistemology and metaphysics.
Kant’s “proof,” Heidegger points out on [203], is not a causal proof of the kind attempted by Locke and Descartes—and refuted by Hume. Kant argues that in order to account for knowing subjects existing over time, retaining their identities, we must assume that something exists permanently “outside” of subjects. The unity of world and self are impossible without this assumption. This “positing” of the external world, that the transcendental source of what we experience as ‘the external world’, makes it possible for subjects to be self-aware only if there is something that explains the continuity of objects. The self gets its continuity through comparison and contrast between “subjective” and “objective” experience. Objective experiences take their source from the external world (something unlike the knowing subject).

a. Kant’s account conceives of the external world as occurrence in space and time. How is the existence of the occurrence world provable? For Kant, by making space and time dependent on the subject, transcendental subjectivity.

b. “Beholding” is a sensation of the proximal: can consciousness transcend to the real entities of the external world? See [204] penultimate ¶.

c. Beholding is differentiated from thinking (as in Ch. 5). But this way of conceiving of Dasein, declaring the necessity of proof, of having faith in the existence of the external world, transforms Dasein into a “worldless subject” [206].

d. Dasein is already in the world through care, it is not an occurrence entity in the world. If we have to prove the existence of the world, or even if faith is the best we can do, failing proofs, we presuppose that Dasein is essentially a worldless subject, and Heidegger denies this in his rejection of Cartesianism. Dasein’s thrownness obviates the need for either proof or faith.

e. See the last ¶ of [206]: Heidegger connects the understanding of being as occurrence reality with falling. See also Schmitt’s discussion of this passage, p. 220.

4. Idealism: being cannot be explained through entities, but how is it to be understood? Being is completely empty (Hegel’s criticism of Schelling’s idealism as “the night when all cows are black”) [207.5]. This curious remark, from the Preface of The Phenomenology of Spirit, implies that if everything is the same, then nothing can be different.

a. Idealism is right in claiming that reality is possible only in the understanding of being. ‘Reality’ is the interpretive framework, the system of categories and the possibilities for acting that make up Dasein’s involvements in the world.

b. Metaphysical theories, such as idealism and realism, are reductionistic. Everything is constituted by consciousness or Mind for the idealist, e.g. Heidegger has no such ontological commitments. Being-in-the-world is not a thing, nor is it material or mental. If reality is identical with consciousness, then both consciousness and entities are simply occurrence things and we lose the special feature of Dasein (care and interpretation).

c. Realism ‘proves’ the existence of the external world not by an inference but by defending the assumption that the world causes representations in the mind. The idealist sees that this assumption is itself determined by the ‘natural order’ of consciousness: consciousness always supplies relations that can be understood—the real is the rational. Only because of this assumption is it possible to encounter entities within the world. Causality is a rational relationship. We can only understand what is rational. This assumption precedes any claim about what is real. Being presented with objects in space, therefore, is conceptually dependent upon having objectivity concepts such as Substance, Causality, Space, Time, and Substance. The real depends on these concepts. For Kant, the real = what can be determined objectively. Objectivity is determined by the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. These are objectivity conditions forming the basis for Kant’s transcendental idealism.

d. The discovery of the transcendental conditions for knowledge: understanding being cannot be explained by describing entities. Aristotle was as much an idealist in this as Kant, he just thought that we get our descriptive framework of categories directly from the world where Kant argued that they are supplied
by the structure of the mind [208]. In both cases, the categorial structure is logically prior to the identities of things. The activity of descriptive universality underlies both views. Aristotle, the realist, accepts Plato’s point that there are truths about the category of Substance that are not true of individual substances. What is the status of these truths? They determine what the world is like i.e., they establish the conditions of true or false claims about the world.

e. But if idealism traces every entity back to consciousness, it fails at explanation. What is so special about consciousness? What makes it better than Aristotle’s categories (as reflections of natural kinds)? The idealists merely exchange one sort of thing for another (consciousness for matter) where Heidegger wants to use his action-theory not to determine what is real metaphysically but as an access practice (as Dreyfus describes it). Heidegger wants to discuss the world as encountered by Dasein, not as it is apart from Dasein’s existence (activity). This part of Heidegger’s theory resembles Dewey’s pragmatism. See “[r]eality is referred back to the phenomenon of care” later on [212]. See Richard Rorty’s essay on Dewey and Heidegger in Murray (also appearing in Rorty’s The Consequences of Pragmatism).

f. There is no epistemological solution to the problem. Even Kant thought of reality as occurring things constituted by the conceptual, thus placing entities and mind on two different ontological planes [204, last ¶].

i. The changing world relative to the permanent (i.e., conceptually fixed) self.

ii. This misses the ontological significance of being-in-the-world: this is an activity of Dasein as part of the world, not the union of two metaphysically distinct substances.

iii. Even in the world conceived as entities, care indicates that one is not isolated from the world, that Dasein is not an occurrence thing.

5. See Gelven on this point: the existence of the external world is not dependent on Dasein, but its reality is—reality is the totality of modes of existing and being-in-the world. Trees don’t depend on me for their existence, but any interpretation, analysis, understanding, and use of them does. See also Dreyfus Chapter 15.

B. Reality as an ontological problem [209].

1. The connection between being and care.

2. Dilthey: the real as experienced, distinct from ontological issues about what must be real in a world, a priori conditions for entities, knowledge, etc.

a. What kind of being is involved in willing, in resistance, etc.? Dilthey does not get beyond the phenomenology of these to their ontology.

b. What does the experience of resistance disclose about the world ontologically?

i. Two points about the phenomenology of resistance [211]:

1. How inclusive is ‘resistance’, or any other phenomenological? How can we be sure we have got them all? How can a mere feeling of resistance be the basis of a concept of Substance? How idiosyncratic can one be in describing encounters with the world? The world cannot be whatever one wants it to be.

2. Doesn’t the character of resistance already presuppose a world with a certain character? But why is resistance a feature of the world independent of all interpretation? Isn’t resistance a dispositional property (a reciprocal relation between world and Dasein)? Are there not conceptual conditions that allow resistance to be inferentially generalized to form a concept like substance, or is it ‘preconceptual’?

ii. The point is that consciousness of reality, in the form of the distinction between subject and object, is itself a way of being-in-the-world.

C. Reality and care [211.5]. The distinction between Reality and the Real.

1. Nature is not an occurrent thing or an available tool context, but nature is “an entity in the world”: it is an idea, an interpretation of the world as something to be analyzed, “put on the rack” to use Francis Bacon’s instructive, revealing phrase. Under this interpretation, nature is not original but derived.

2. Reality is referred back to care.
   a. Reality, but not the real, is dependent on care.
      i. Reality = constituted through care.
      ii. The real = that which is independent of Dasein’s care. The world characterized by metaphysical realism? Or is “the real” simply the permanent possibility of involvements? Does “the real” have a structure independent of Dasein’s involvements with it? If so, isn’t Heidegger inconsistent? I.e., if all structure depends on disclosure, on care-and-as-contexts, then Heidegger cannot attribute independent ‘characteristics’ to the Real except as a projection. Wouldn’t this just reiterate Hume’s criticism of empiricism and rationalism?
      iii. Notice that in the previous ¶ Heidegger says that “independence” and the “in itself” don’t exist if Dasein doesn’t exist. The last sentence of that ¶: as long as we understand being as occurrent things, entities will be independent of Dasein—that is how we understand the world as metaphysical realists. But what is “independence”? Where do we get this concept? Is it Kantian a priori, or built into being-in-the-world?
   b. Entities are not dependent on understanding, but being, “reality,” is. Entities are ‘extant’ in the world, but we must interpret them.

3. Dasein’s being cannot be conceived in terms of reality understood as substantiality: Dasein is care about the world in the manner discussed above (concern and solicitude, activity and not “consciousness”).

4. In this phenomenological account lies Heidegger’s “solution” to the problems of realism. I.e., like Wittgenstein, he believes these are problems implicit in an interpretation rather than in sorting out the metaphysical problems of substance/attribute.

VII. #44: Dasein, disclosure, and truth. Discussion of classical theories of truth (correspondence: judgments or propositions are true when they accurately represent the facts; coherence: judgments or propositions are true when they are consistent with each other and together make up an adequate system of knowledge) and a continuation of the discussion of the Greek conception of truth as aleteia. For Parmenides, for Heidegger, one of the originators of Western civilization, philosophy as episteme was the science of the truth, the science of disclosing Being as permanent and unchanging. For Aristotle, who sums up and extends Greek philosophy, the science of truth “contemplates entities as entities.”

But Heidegger asks what he thinks is a deeper question: why are Being and truth through to be so intimately connected? By analysing the traditional conception of truth as correspondence, Heidegger hopes to uncover its ontological presuppositions (section (a) of #44), then he argues that truth as correspondence is derivative from the activity of disclosure (section (b)). Finally, he describes truth as a presup-
position of our view of the world as independent, occurrent entities. In his critique of correspondence, he shows how existence precedes essence and that possibility precedes actuality. The connection between truth and Dasein is that truth or falsity exists only as long as Dasein exists relative to its care-activities. Each subsection of #44 gets its own major heading:

VII–I. Subsection (a): truth as correspondence, and its ontological foundation.
A. Correspondence: the locus of truth lies in assertion or judgment. The essence of truth depends on the agreement of these with their object.

B. For Aristotle, the soul’s experiences, its representations (noemata) are likenesses of things (the German word here is “Angleichung,” based on “Gleichheit”: equality, likeness, identity). But during the Middle Ages, this direct realism eventually gave way to representational conceptions of knowledge culminating in the Enlightenment conception of science, which rejected its medieval, Aristotelian sources.

C. For Kant and the Neokantians truth depends on the investigation of the structure of thought and experience and the \textit{a priori} concepts without which objective experience is impossible.
1. The distinction between truth and illusion for Kant resides in judgment, in something mental and “critical” (involving the concepts of the understanding) and not in the object as it is experienced. Both truth and illusion depend on a conceptual operation of the mind and exist only there.
2. What is presupposed by this relation between judgment and object? With regard to what do judgment and object (\textit{intellectus} and \textit{res}) agree [216]? Such questions presuppose independently existing entities, on the one hand, and spontaneous conceptual distinctions, on the other.
3. The subject/object relation.
   a. The Kantian distinction between the mechanics of psychol-
ogy and the ideal content of judgment (\textit{a priori} concepts, logic, etc.). How is something ideal related to something occurrent (the thing represented)?
   i. How does something inner and subjective correspond to outer objects? The problem of epistemology: how is knowledge possible if subject and object are really independent? Transcendental idealism is supposed to ‘solve’ this problem by internalizing the subjective/objective distinction.
   ii. For Heidegger correspondence is possible because both knower and known are part of the same world [219]. This implies that truth is a relation between two occurrent things.

b. Correspondence rests on the idea that through judgment something is shown to be what it is apart from what that judgment represents.
c. The fundamental principle of the correspondence theory is discovery (“being-true as Being-uncovering”). Assertion or judgment lets entities be ‘seen’ for what they really are, with knowledge as the result [218 f.].
d. Heidegger transposes the transcendental idealist account into his theory of being-in-the-world. He drops the idealism: action can be just as transcendently presuppositional as consciousness. Indeed, he thinks it is more basic, fundamental, than consciousness. The subjective/objective experience distinction is not ontologically primitive either for Kant or Heidegger; it is produced by something more basic: being-in-the-world.

D. Heidegger’s example of the man standing with his back to a picture on the wall and truly asserting that the picture is askew. Is the man’s “representation” of the picture’s being askew a psychical process? How can that correspond to the fact that the picture is askew? (Heidegger later argues that this view of truth reduces it to a relation between two occurrent things: objects and representations.)
1. What the man believes is confirmed to be true: this is a form of showing something as it is. Do dualism seems basic in this account.
2. For Heidegger, how something shows itself is the more important (original) characteristic of truth. Truth as discovery “is onto-
logically possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world,” i.e.,
discovery is an activity resting on a certain interpretation of truth,
on certain established activities. “Uncovering is a way of being for
being-in-the-world” [220]. “Representation” need not be a state of
consciousness, it can be completely overt (e.g., a physical model of
the solar system, or the atom, or the gene).

3. What is the role of the representation with respect to truth?
How does a mental state represent the picture being crooked?
There is a similarity between this line of argument and Wittgen-
stein’s in the Blue Book: is knowing a color like having a color
patch in the mind which is compared with the world? What does
“compare” mean here? For Heidegger “Representations do not get
compared, either among themselves [coherence] or in relation to
the real thing [correspondence]” [218]. Confirmation depends on
the assumption that the world shows itself (our representations
agree with what is the case): knowing is a being-towards the world
that uncovers. Being-true is therefore being-uncovering or discov-
ery in the sense of an activity representing the structure of an oc-
current thing [219]. But this depends on the assumption that the
world ‘shows’ its essential structure to the objectively representing
mind and that truth is “apophantic,” that it is a property of assertions
that correctly “describe” reality. We must, of course, have a
language capable of such descriptions: i.e., the world must be “dis-
closed” in a certain way by that language. What is the language/
world connection that validates representations? Heidegger holds
a Davidson-like view that “no thing” makes sensations true and
that no intervening structures such as conceptual frameworks,
ideas, images, etc. are necessary to the account of truth, or even to
correspondence. This theme becomes explicit in the next subsec-
tion. See Dreyfus’ several discussions of Davidson.

VII–II. Subsection (b): the origin of the phenomenon of truth and the
derivative character of the traditional view of truth as correspondence.

A. More Greek philosophy: truth means Being-uncovered in the
sense of entdecken, discovery. This is the sense of the Greek aletheia
established by Plato and Aristotle, their interpretation of that word to
mean truth. Aletheia is thereby connected with logos as the structure
of how things are, how the things themselves (phenomena) are in
themselves. Aletheia consists of the prefix meaning “not,” so it means
“not covered.” Truth was thus a bringing into the light of something
hidden.

1. See the end of the first ¶ of this sub-section: translating “truth”
as discovery involves theory: it is to cover up what was self-evident
to the Greeks. The Greeks had no such word as our word “truth.”
2. The implication is that Being is originally hidden.

B. So, again, uncovering is a way of Being for being-in-the-world
[220.5]. Schmitt, p. 217, has a discussion of the nature of uncovering on
[220].

C. In contrast to the Cartesian theory, truth refers not to things but to
Dasein, it is the activity of uncovering the way things are in the world.
Read carefully the important summary ¶ at [221]. Heidegger has been
describing the structure of Cartesianism but now begins his own anal-
ysis.

D. Dasein is in the truth. Heidegger brings together several earlier
points about Dasein:

1. Disclosure is essentially a feature of Dasein. Being through care.
   No Dasein, no truth (but Heidegger is not a relativist).
2. State of mind: Dasein is thrown into the world: Dasein is in a
definite world, alongside a definite range of definite entities. What
does he mean by “disclosedness is essentially factual” (rather than
factual)?
3. Understanding: Dasein projects: disclosure is potentiality for
   being. The world disclosed as occurrent things holds the potential
for Dasein’s discovery of the structure of those things, of that par-
ticular way of being-in-the-world.
4. Fallenness: Dasein is closed off from possibilities by the one.
   “Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of being is such that
it is in ‘untruth’” [222]. Hence, moving from a state of untruth to
one of truth becomes Dasein’s goal.
E. Dasein is also in untruth. What does Heidegger mean by saying that Dasein is in the truth but also that it is in untruth? This is the essence of his criticism of Cartesianism and its contention that we can know everything about the world.

1. Being in the truth is the disclosure of its existential constitution. It is not a correspondence between representation in the mind and reality.

2. Being in untruth is to be dominated by the one (to be uncritical of its metaphysical realism in the present discussion) and not to see the fundamental character of Dasein’s being-in-the-world through care.

3. Thus the truth that Dasein “is in” is that it is part of the one, that the tension between disclosure and hiddeness is the being of Dasein because Dasein does not see the source of its being in care (see the end of ¶ one on [222]).

F. Truth (uncoveredness) must be “wrested from entities.” Truth is uncovered as a major function of the public, social world. Discovery, putting nature on the rack, rests on a picture of Dasein as the active discoverer through the potential of objective, scientific representation. But Dasein is in untruth when it takes this picture to be absolute and underived from other, more original activities.

1. This state of fallenness, of being both in truth and untruth, is essential to Dasein’s condition of being-in-the-world as “thrown projection.”

2. Dasein is never complete, it is always transcending, always reinterpreting and redescribing.

G. Truth as agreement (correspondence) originates from this state of Dasein [224–225]. Heidegger does not destroy or reject correspondence but analyses its role. It was created to do a job, and science emerged historically as the culmination of that job.

1. The nature of truth as disclosure (Erschlossenheit) is covered up by its invention of truth as correspondence—by the theory of knowledge as discovery (see end of [225]).

2. Concern uncovers. Discourse is a being-towards entities through a being-with-others (in language), a being-towards that uncovers by constructing propositions as truth bearers.

3. What is expressed becomes a tool for encountering the world: a proposition that can be used again.

4. Discourse is part of the public world.

5. See [225] italics and ¶ two: we have uncovered (discovered) something, which then becomes understood as an occurrent phenomenon. This relationship between proposition and entity is also an occurrent phenomenon: a name, a universal, a truth accessible to all.

6. The active subject uncovers being, rather than being disclosing itself to the passive subject (who is no longer an independent subject in the Cartesian sense).

7. The “apophantical as” takes truth to be a property of assertions that correctly represent the world [223 end]. Truth as agreement is derivative once we see that it rests on the transference of truth from being in a disclosure to proposition and assertion as modes of discovery. The propositions don’t pre-exist disclosure.

H. The source of truth as discovery has been covered over by the understanding of reality as occurrent phenomena. We fail to see its derivativeness, its creativeness might be a more positive way to describe it. Heidegger tries to explain how it came to be that we thus understand knowledge of the world.

I. Aristotle on logos: that way of being which Dasein can either cover up or uncover [226]. Assertion is not the primary locus of truth, discourse is only one aspect of the care-structure.

1. It is because, for the Greek philosophers, noesis uncovers logos as thinking rather than as being, as conceptual rather than practical, that truth became essentially ideational.

2. Where thinking uncovers, assertion is possible. The world is distanced from us by propositional knowledge and we lose Dasein’s original involvement with the world. Truth becomes something detached from the world and even from Dasein, something to be uncovered.
VII–III. Subsection (c): the kind of being which truth possess, and the presupposition of truth.

A. Truth depends on Dasein. This includes the laws of science and “eternal truths” such as the law of noncontradiction.

B. But this relativity does not entail subjectivism.
   1. Dasein does not determine the truth in that truth is not arbitrary. Truth as correspondence is the result of a global characteristic of Western society. It is not “up to me” what is true or false.
   2. But if truth resides in propositions, then, if there are no propositions, there can be no truth. Since humans make propositions—truth is a mode of Dasein’s being (one of its ontological activities).
      a. Heidegger’s point is that the activities of covering and uncovering are prior to the conception of truth as propositional.
      b. These activities are fated, predetermined, by the characterization of the world as occurrent objects, inherited from Plato and Aristotle, and which is the Vorhaben of science.
   3. We presuppose ourselves as having the attribute of disclosedness: we make propositions (Dasein “wrests” truth from the world).
   4. Eternal truths therefore require eternal Dasein. This, of course begs the question.

C. We thus presuppose that there is truth to be uncovered: we are “in the truth” when we uncover (discover) truths about the world.
   1. Presupposition: we must understand truth as that for the sake of which Dasein is [228]. The primary, defining, activity for Dasein is the search for truth. This is the sense in which we presuppose ourselves as having the attribute of disclosedness, as searchers for the truth. We characterize ourselves and the world reciprocally. Thus truth must be seen in relation to care, involvement, projection: in relation to activities rather than as a static picture (as in the correspondence theory).
   2. Dasein itself is disclosed under a certain description. This disclosure makes discovery possible and creates the correspondence theory of truth wherein truth is a property of propositions that agree with the structure of the world.

3. All of this is ‘disclosed’ to us through this analysis of knowledge as discovery. In so doing, we have disclosed the nature of Western being-in-the-world through the discovery of objects as occurrent entities with the structure exhibited to us by physics.

D. Husserl’s and Descartes’ pure “I,” or Kant’s consciousness in general, or Hegel’s spirit knowing itself as spirit do not account for but assume the essential nature of Dasein. Searching for truth is an activity that takes place in the world, but the philosophical tradition has thought of consciousness and representation in such a way that the nature of the search is lost. Dasein forgets that it is interpreting the world, that representation is interpretation, that Dasein’s disclosure of the world is through its involvement, through the content of its care structure. This includes representation.

E. There are a priori conditions for truth, and they involve the structure of Dasein’s activity: care, projection, falleness, etc.

F. Thinking of truth as propositional, or as representation resting on a priori conceptual conditions, covers up and obscures the primary (originating) activity of being-in-the-world. Traditionally, propositions and representations are special kinds of things related to facts or objects in the world. But what makes truth look like the correspondence between two kinds of things? Dasein is presupposed as the creator of propositions, but also as covering up its own significance in that process.
   1. The concept of Truth (as correspondence) is therefore a creation. The primary metaphor is that of uncovering, laying bare, discovering the structure of the world. This has been theoretically described as a relation of correspondence. We even think of ourselves this way: discovering the truth about ourselves as kinds of objects in biology, psychology, medicine, psychiatry, sociology, political science, and so on.
   2. Truth as assertion depends on our taking the world to be a certain kind of place where discovery can take place. But look again at Heidegger’s conclusions in Section (b): the primary phenomenon
of truth has been covered up by Dasein’s very understanding of being as occurrent phenomena.

3. Truth may look like a relation between a proposition or representation and a thing, but the primary relation is a tool-like involvement with the world: it is the way the theory of truth as correspondence allows us to see the world as simply occurrent phenomena.

4. Although he does not say anything explicitly about the coherence theory of truth, do you think Heidegger would be more sympathetic to it? Do you think being-in-the-world is by nature coherent?

G. Heidegger’s points as just summarized in F. 1–3 disclose the derivative nature of the correspondence theory of truth.

H. The sceptic [229]: Heidegger’s remarks here are once again strikingly resemble Wittgenstein’s. The sceptic is a character in the epistemological drama originally conceived by Plato and Aristotle but definitively formulated by Descartes and Locke. Scepticism cannot “ultimately” be refuted if we cannot establish an unimpeachable foundation for our knowledge claims about the world. But subject/object metaphysics will always preclude the establishment of that foundation. Eliminating this particular kind of scepticism means getting rid of the metaphysical context that supplies its possibility.

I. Has the investigation so far brought Dasein into view as a whole in its central and a priori role in the connection between being and truth? No; the phenomenon of worldhood is still not understood. This is why Heidegger turns to the concept of Time in Division II. The term “existence” indicates that Dasein is that being which understands potentiality-for-being. Existence makes being an issue for Dasein (this would include the critique of correspondence). But potentiality involves the future, so projection is part of Dasein’s nature, and so is time. See the Introduction to Division II [231].

XI. # 44 should be reviewed before reading # 69, where Heidegger argues that the world as objective phenomenon depends on the primordiality of the tool-oriented activities through which we characterize it (and Dasein). Science is not inquiry into the world in the most basic sense—that kind of inquiry must be uniquely philosophical (in Heidegger’s sense of critical hermeneutics) and not wedded to a particular picture of the world.
Division I Chapter 6 Summary Outline
Division II Chapter 4, #69 Summary Outline

Division I Chapter 6

Understanding, Care, and Truth. Heidegger’s account of Realism.

A. Introduction and Summary: #39–#42.
1. #39: Thrownness, “experience,” care.”
2. #40: Dasein disclosed by its Angst: it is being-in-the-world that we are anxious about.
3. #41: Reappraisal of the three existentials of Dasein:
   a. Understanding: possibility and what Dasein can be.
   c. Fallenness: how one hides from Angst.
   d. Ontological nature of care.
4. #42: Historical root of Care: Faust.

B. Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality: #43.
   a. Foundationalism.
   b. Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.
   c. Idealism right: Reality is a function of understanding but wrong to ground everything in consciousness (resemblance to Dewey).
   d. No epistemological solution to the problem of the external world.
2. Subsection B: Reality as an ontological problem.
   b. “Experience” an open-ended concept, not defined by traditional philosophy, consciousness not essential.

Division I Chapter 6 Summary Outline

Division I Chapter 6

Understanding, Care, and Truth. Heidegger’s account of Realism.

A. Introduction and Summary: #39–#42.
1. #39: Thrownness, “experience,” care.”
2. #40: Dasein disclosed by its Angst: it is being-in-the-world that we are anxious about.
3. #41: Reappraisal of the three existentials of Dasein:
   a. Understanding: possibility and what Dasein can be.
   c. Fallenness: how one hides from Angst.
   d. Ontological nature of care.
4. #42: Historical root of Care: Faust.

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   a. Foundationalism.
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   b. “Experience” an open-ended concept, not defined by traditional philosophy, consciousness not essential.

b. Dasein cannot be conceived in terms of reality and substantiality.

C. Dasein, Disclosure, and Truth: #44.
1. Subsection A: Truth as correspondence. How did this theory originate?
   a. Kant and the subject/object distinction.
   b. Correspondence as a disclosure of the world.
   c. Heidegger’s example: Is representation essentially a mental process?
2. Subsection B: The derivative character of the traditional conception of Truth.
   a. Uncovering as a way of being for being-in-the-world.
   b. Dasein is “in the truth” but is also “in untruth.”
   c. The traditional conception: truth is wrested away from entities.
      i. Truth as correspondence.
      ii. Correspondence obscures the primary nature of truth as uncovering, as an action and not a state.
      iii. Correspondence is the interpretation of the world as occurrent.
3. Subsection C: The kind of Being which Truth possesses and the presupposition of truth.
   a. Truth depends on Dasein: Dasein makes propositions. “There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is.”
      i. Are there eternal truths?
      ii. No Dasein, no truth.
   b. We presuppose that there is truth to be uncovered: we are “in the truth.”
   c. The pure “I” as the mechanism of representation. Correspondence between two different kinds of things.
   d. “Being (not entities) is something which ‘there is’ only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.”
   e. Dasein has still not been brought into view as a whole.
Division II Chapter 4, #69

This section continues some of the foregoing and comprises Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The introduction indicates: (1) that the “light” which discovers or “clears” an entity cannot be ontically oc- current (it is a form of Care and a transcendental limit of interpretation); (2) the temporal character of being-in-the-world that transcends its objects. #69 falls into three parts:

A. Subsection A: The temporality of circumspective concern.
   1. Availableness and involvement as contexts of use.
      a. “In-order-to” relations.
      b. “Letting something be involved” and Care.
   2. The temporality of availability.

B. Subsection B: The temporality of Concern and the Theoretical Discovery of the occurrent within-the-world.
   1. Praxis and Theory: if praxis is “theoretical,” then theories involve a praxis of their own. Science is a way of being-in-the-world.
      a. The ascendance of “pure science” and the disappearance of praxis.
      b. Kant tries to eliminate scepticism about the connection between experience and reality but is still preoccupied with the metaphores of sight that gave rise to the problem in the first place.
   2. The “As-structure” and science: the temporality of deliberation and interpretation.
   3. The genesis of the theoretical stance.
      a. Extension is derived from activities of involvement, not a “primary quality” of an ontologically independent world.
      b. The available, tools, can become an object of science.
      c. “The aggregate of the occurrent becomes the theme.”
      d. Rise of mathematical physics: quantifying the occurrent.
   4. “In principle there are no bare facts.”
   5. “Thematizing” the world: a distinctive kind of making-present.
      a. “Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-being-in the ‘truth’.”

C. Subsection C: the temporal problem of transcending the world.
   1. Dasein’s self understanding.
      a. Care and the three ecstases.
      b. The world is presupposed; but if no Dasein exists, “no world is there either.”
      c. “The world is transcendent” because it has its origin or ground in “ecstatical temporality,” i.e., in the ecstases of care.
      d. The world, therefore, is “further outside” than any object in the classical philosophical account of the structure of reality. The World is a transcendental limit for understanding (the activities—any activities—of Dasein). The world is not a thing.
   2. Being-in cannot be accounted for by substance: substance presupposes being-in, which presupposes care.
      a. The world is not an occurrent thing or collection of things in space-time (#70 [369]).
      b. Compare with [212] on the relation between reality and care.

b. Dasein must transcend the entities thematized.
c. If Dasein does or thinks anything at all, a world must have been disclosed to it. How Dasein thinks about the world depends on how it was disclosed.
I. #45: Introduction to Division II. Heidegger now turns from phenomenology to ontology: what are the presuppositions behind the world-view of science, behind the world-view of ordinary Dasein? His analysis turns from the structure of being (being-in, worldhood, occurrence/availability, as-structures, etc.) to the more classical metaphysical question of “being in general.” But he claims that Division II is still “existential” (about the structure of ways of being-in/with/for, etc.) in its analysis the significance of death and the transformation of life engendered by the recognition of that significance. In any case, Division II is more traditionally philosophical and familiar in its discussion of conditions, personal identity, science, and history. He says that in Division I he has not been able to claim that his analysis disclose the origin of Dasein’s being-in-the-world [233, bottom] because he has so far concentrated on inauthenticity. The “fore-having” (i.e., the *a priori* constitutive conditions) of Dasein’s being-in relations has to be enlarged to include authenticity in order to make any claim of completeness. As a result of this attempt at completeness, three new concepts emerge as the center of the ontological question: Death, Authentic Existence, and Time with the latter standing at the center of the question of the nature of existence and the primary ontological concept in Dasein’s being.

The discussion can be summarized as follows: Dasein’s existence indicates Dasein’s potentiality for being. We have seen that, with care, Dasein exists “ahead of itself.” Care is related to the unity of Dasein. Over time, Dasein is characterized through its involvements and this is related to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Authenticity is determined by the stand Dasein takes towards death. If inauthentic being is Dasein’s lack of totality, it is because Dasein is not unified, does not have freedom. Dasein’s “ahead of itself” is indeterminate and inauthentically determined by the one. The encounter with death and with Dasein’s ultimate nothingness outside of its activities constitutes Dasein’s transformation towards authenticity (this is
what Heidegger means when he says in #49 that “death is a part of life”). Death is the limit of Dasein’s being-in the world and the value of this encounter is determined by “conscience” and “guilt”: will Dasein accept responsibility for itself, will it ‘get a life’ or not? Guilt is an aspect of dread, through the characterization of life as thrown (as having no transcendent justification or foundation), so guilt determines the question of responsibility and “conscience”: will Dasein accept a unifying role or not? Finally, the point of the entire book is that all of this takes place in time, which characterizes Dasein’s existence. Death thus forms the transcendental limit (horizon) for the temporality of life (“the end”). The relation between death and time is detailed as follows:

A. Death and conscience [234].
   1. The nature of Dasein and the potentiality for being (encountering the world) includes the end of being, of existence. Everydayness is that kind of being lying between birth and death.
   2. How does Dasein’s coming to an end effect the conception of Dasein’s being-a-whole, the unity of Dasein?
      a. The problem of being towards death, the recognition that possibility entails finitude, one’s own finitude.
      b. The end of life is part of the fore-structure of life. How can one live authentically, be unified, through being towards death? (This question is dealt with in the discussion of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) beginning in Chapter 2 #60.)
   3. Conscience is the desire for authentic potentiality for being.
      a. Conscience determines the potentiality for being as the unity of Dasein’s existence, and the desire for action is part of Dasein’s constitution.
      b. Death cannot be experienced yet it determines the nature of life.

B. Time. The ontological basis for all existence is time. Does existence have a unique temporal structure that is part of the being of Dasein? (Yes of course it does, but what is it?)
   1. Life = the time during which entities are encountered.

2. The shift from questions about the ways of existence to what existence is: the awareness of life ending limit’s possibility in time. The encounter with death is interpretive. One’s attitude about life changes once the significance of death becomes clear to Dasein. Dasein understands itself and the world differently. Time, i.e., its limitation, takes on new importance for Dasein through the significance of death.

3. Everydayness is inauthentic in the avoidance of this significance. It never does grasp the importance of its own finitude.

The outline of the argument of Division II: Being-towards-death reveals Dasein’s possibility for being (Ch. 1). This yields authentic Dasein (resoluteness towards death leads to resoluteness and unity in life). The origin of conscience (and guilt) as authenticity (Ch. 2). Authentic being thus grasps the centrality of time to being, and therefore the center of care (since care is way Dasein is in the world) (Ch. 3).

How does the realization of the ontological significance of time transform our understanding of everydayness (Ch. 4)? What is history (what is it about) and how is Dasein in the world historically (Ch. 5)? Time and ordinary conceptions of temporality (Ch. 6).

II. Chapter 1 #46: Dasein’s unity and the ontological significance of death. Death is interpretive: the nature of life and Dasein’s being-in the world depend on how death is understood.

A. Dasein always ahead of itself, never completely occurrent.

B. Care ensures that there is always something still to be settled in life. “As long as Dasein is an entity it has never reached its ‘wholeness’” or completeness” [236]. Life is never complete as long as it goes on. But from this virtual tautology Heidegger draws many important points.

III. #47: death and others. Can we get Dasein totally into our grasp?

A. Impossibility of understanding death through the death of others.
   1. When someone else dies, he or she is still a being. They are occurrent things: “the deceased.” Evelyn Waugh’s The Loved One is a parody, funny but all too true, of how we deal with the dead in our society as occurrent entities.
2. The deceased is no longer a Dasein, no longer in the process of existing. Dasein is simply the process of existing in time, ahead of itself, and the balancing of authenticity and inauthenticity.

3. The deceased is torn away from those still alive.

4. One Dasein cannot be represented by another except in its being-towards death (see [239] ¶ four). What does this mean? He doesn’t just mean, trivially, that we cannot experience another’s death. Indeed, one cannot experience one’s own death (in the sense of experiencing what it is to be dead). But there is a deeper point. Heidegger is not searching for an essence, the “meaning” of what it is to be dead. He contends that the significance of death lies in its relation to life, the realization that not all possibilities can be achieved (finitude).

a. One is what one does. This is similar to Aristotle’s account of virtue in the *Nichomachean Ethics* (“happiness is activity in accordance with virtue”), and to Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as creative activity (both of these are strong positive influences on Heidegger’s conception of Dasein).

b. This conception of identity through action breaks down when we consider that possibility of being that is Dasein’s coming to an end. Yet even though unrepresentable, this particular possibility can give Dasein its wholeness (depending on the way in which death is understood).

c. What can’t be represented here? There is no representing death because one’s own death has ramifications in one’s life unique to that person’s being-in-the-world.

d. No one can experience another’s dying just as no one can be another person. For Heidegger, the nonrepresentability of death is connected to the difference between the medical description of death (ontic) and the dramatic, personal sense of perishing (ontological). The German word “Verenden,” to reach the end, is normally used for the death of animals, it is sometimes a colloquialism like “kicking the bucket” in North America (what is the origin of that colloquialism?). “Sterben” means death roughly in the sense of mortality and should be distinguished from the former.

e. There is more to this than the simple (virtually analytic) truth that no one can die another’s death. The real issue is about the role that death can play in the creation of authentic life.

f. The concept of Guilt, for Heidegger, is connected to being-towards-death. Guilt in this context involves the recognition of Dasein’s incompleteness along with the desire to do something, to gain an identity (to “be somebody”). Guilt involves the recognition that Dasein’s possibilities are finite and that those chosen possibilities are responsible for identity. The question of taking responsibility for the choices they make enters in too, but we will wait for Heidegger’s discussion of freedom to go into that.

B. Anti-Epicureanism: see Gelven’s discussion of #47. If death is there, you aren’t; if you are there death is not. So we can’t know what death is. This is similar to Socrates’ rather silly argument that death is not to be feared because one can only fear what one knows to be evil (*Crito* and *Phaedo*). So we should not fear the unknown because we don’t know it.

1. But Heidegger is not speaking of what lies beyond life, he is discussing the meaning of death for life, the role that it plays while living. Contrary to Epicurus and Socrates, we do fear the unknown and this is not because we are confused.

2. Being ahead of itself, Dasein anticipates the end of life and so changes its life. It transforms the nature of care. See #63 [249] for the definition of “care” as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world).”

3. We never (authentically) confront death collectively, only individually. No general philosophical stance (such as that of Epicurus or Socrates) can be taken towards one’s own death.

IV. #48: what is still outstanding. The end and its relation to totality or completeness. Heidegger’s eschatology: Dasein has not come to its end as long as it exists. Dasein knows the meaning of being: because it is finite, being is finite. Death is the limit of life in establishing its fin-

A. Summary of argument to this point [242] “Three Theses”:
1. As long as Dasein is, it is not-yet. There is always something still outstanding for it.
2. The coming to its end of what is not yet at an end is the perishing of Dasein.
3. Coming to an end implies a kind of being that cannot be represented by someone else.

B. Inauthentic conceptions of the End and Totality.
1. “Still outstanding”: not to be understood by metaphores of completion. The “not-yet” is not a kind of involvement context (as in paying off a debt). Nor is it a kind of occurrence thing or state of affairs (the last quarter of the moon, the last week of the semester).
   a. Note the distinction between Dasein’s not-yetness and the lack of identity characteristic of inauthentic Dasein [243]. Authentic Dasein realizes the not-yet of life.
   b. Dasein has fulfilled its course in death, but not by exhausting all of its possibilities. It can never do that.
   c. “Not-yet” = still outstanding, something still missing? But “not yet” implies for Heidegger something not actual at all. It can’t be feared, yet it is the object of Angst.
2. Dasein does not ripen like a fruit: rejection of Aristotelian developmental, teleological essence and of Hegel’s use of this kind of organic metaphor. Death is not an experience in the future. It is not even an event, at least of any ordinary kind.
end. There is a positive aspect: being-towards-the-end. The end, in this sense, is “outstanding,” never fully included in being.

3. The meaning of being in general [241] is simply to live. But this breaks down into the complexities of the fore-structure, the not-yetness of Dasein, and finally being-towards-death as the ultimate unrepresentability of that not-yetness.

V. #49: the existential analysis of death versus other less ontological interpretations.

A. Biology, psychology, theology all miss the point [248]. Even theology asks the wrong question: is there any kind of life after death? This misses the point about the meaning of death for life right now. Only after we have understood that will it make sense to ask what may be after death. Even if there is an afterlife, why, e.g., should it be connected to present life—why should it be a reward or punishment for good or bad living?

B. These approaches are peculiarly formal and empty because they miss the existential nature of death, which is that death is a phenomenon of life even though it is not in life. It is a transcendental limit that, once recognized as such, is the basis for identity and completeness in life. Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein’s being even in everydayness.

VI. #50: the positive account of the ontology of death as being-towards-the-end and how this is connected to Dasein’s being even in the inauthenticity of everydayness. Gelven’s analysis of the rest of this chapter on the ontological meaning of death is particularly insightful.

A. The three modes of Dasein’s disclosure: how the meaning of death is grounded in care.

1. Existentiality: Dasein’s not-yetness is influenced by its being-towards-death.
   a. By grasping the significance of death, Dasein stands before its own potential, not those of society or another person.
   b. My death cannot be avoided: not just an empirical generalization, but something transforming the whole of my life. It changes my understanding of my potentialities.

   c. Death is at least partly non-relational, it uniquely applies only to me in the context of my possibilities, care, not-yetness, etc., and cannot be “outstripped” (unüberholbar). I.e., it is an absolute transcendental limit of life.

   d. Death is not a fulfillment or the finish of something. It is the realization of the finitude of Dasein. This is the sense of “being-towards” that applies in Sein-zum-Tod.

   e. Sein-zum-Tod is not an “attitude” or something propositional like knowledge. The last ¶ of [251] summarizes this discussion of being-towards-death.

2. Facticity and thrownness. Not fear, what Socrates rejected, but the more general, objectless Angst. Not a fear of death as an event but the disclosure of the openness of possibility for me. Only by seeing the significance of death is wholeness achieved.

3. Fallenness: the evasion of death-awareness by the one [252], and all of #51. Everydayness prevents Dasein from realizing the significance of death.
   a. By passing death off as something actual (representable), the character of death as a possibility gets concealed.
   b. The one and the tranquilization of death.
      i. Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyitch. This is absolutely required reading! The inconvenience of Ivan’s death for others—and for himself. “All men are moral/Ivan is a man/therefore....” Is the deductive certainty of death the point? Heidegger argues that death is not an event in life, it is the absolute limit of life. This comes through strongly in Tolstoy’s story and adds poignancy and richness to Heidegger’s account.
      ii. The public, social world does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death. This theme comes out strongly in Tolstoy’s story.
   c. Temptation, tranquilization, and alienation as characteristics of fallenness. Fleeing from identity and guilt in the face of death. One is always tempted to avoid the question of the meaning of death as essential to the meaning of being.
VII. #52: authentic understanding of death. The full existential conception.

A. The certainty of death.
   1. Death as the absolute impossibility of existence. How does one grasp this possibility since Dasein is by definition alive only in possibility? Everydayness confines itself to death as a phenomenon. But authentic Dasein sees death as reflecting back on itself (on Dasein) and changing its conception of life.
   2. The empirical certainty of death is not the ontological certainty of death. The latter occurs only when death is seen nonrelationally: that it cannot be outstripped, that it is the transcendental limit of life. Life takes place within that limit. Does Ivan Ilyitch achieve this kind of certainty about his death? How does Tolstoy describe this moment? What is it that Ivan realizes about death?
   3. Conviction. One does not just have views or thoughts about death in authentic understanding, but life changes.
   4. The certainty of death from the standpoint of the one. All men die, but the meaning of one’s death is quite different when it reflects the life one has, or regretfully has not, lived (the point of Tolstoy’s story).

B. Anticipation of death (Vorlaufen): Dasein is ahead of itself, not-yet, a kind of care leading to being-towards-the-end. See ¶ two [259]. ¶ one describes the way in which Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself makes being-towards-the-end possible. Note the italicized passage. Because Dasein is in the world through its projections (temporality), Vorlaufen must eventually encounter death.
   1. Authenticity requires the possibility, indeed the actuality, of inauthenticity. It must be possible for me to divert myself from the ontological significance of death as part of realizing that it cannot be outstripped. This seems to be part of the redemptive quality of authenticity in Heidegger: in order to be truly philosophical in his sense, one must be pulled out of the one and the inability to be-towards death. But one cannot be truly philosophical for Heidegger without first being part of that world—one cannot be redeemed except from something undesirable.

VIII. #53: authentic being-towards-death: existential projection.

A. Taking the origin in Dasein itself: being-towards a possibility: Projection. The model of annihilating the possibility by making it actual.
   1. The model of using equipment to complete a task, producing results, trying to get closure [261]. Our inauthentic tendency, however, is to downplay possibility in favor of actuality. Inauthenticity covers up Dasein’s being-in-the-world, its possibilities and its projection into the future. We annihilate the “possibility of the possible” by overlooking its role in Dasein.
   2. What has been actualized is still characterized through our activities in bringing it about. This is part of the characterization of its being: “This is my house” in the possessive sense that my actions in building it and living in it are integral to its being mine.

B. But being-towards-death cannot be like that. “Death as possible is not something possible which is available [something I can be involved with like a hammer or a university education] or occurrent [a phenomenon to be described by biology, e.g.] but a possibility of Dasein’s being.” Death is never actual. It is the purest kind of possibility. Being-towards-death is therefore the most authentic kind of being-towards.
   1. Anticipation (Vorlaufen) distinguished from expectation (Erwartung).
      a. Expectation is directed at the actual [262]. It expresses the passive waiting for something to happen.
      b. Anticipation leaps ahead of the actual to the possible. It is not the possibility of the actual but the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.
         i. There is nothing to “picture” or imagine here.
         ii. This is the understanding of one’s ownmost and deepest potentiality for being [263].
      c. “Vorlaufen” means “to run ahead,” so Dasein runs ahead of itself through projection, care, and possibility.
         i. See also the discussion of the temporality of Erwarten and Vorlaufen in #68.
      d. “What does it mean to be?” and “What does it mean not to
be?” are thus two parts of the same question. (Gelven can be confusing when he claims that if these two questions are about actuality, then “What does it mean not to be?” must be meaningless because, if I don’t exist, how it is to not-be can’t be “understood” in the sense that one has no characteristics if one does nothing. But does it follow that we can’t understand what it is not to be without somehow being there? This is Edward’s point in “My Death.” But perhaps Edwards wrongly attacks Heidegger for claiming that understanding one’s death is different than understanding it as it involves other people. Just because we can’t imagine our own death doesn’t change the meaning of “death” from the first person to the third person. Heidegger’s point, however, doesn’t concern the imagination—he explicitly rejects this model for understanding death. He is making a point about the open-endedness of life. As he puts it in “What is Metaphysics?”: “there is an essential difference between comprehending the totality of what-is and finding ourselves in the midst of what-is-in-totality.” What he is getting at is that possibility can never be identical with actuality. This is the philosophical role of nothingness in “What is Metaphysics?” And he connects it with Angst: Dread reveals nothingness. Does Edwards miss this point in his essay? Doesn’t Angst reveal open-endedness rather than nothingness? Are they the same?

2. Arnold Schoenberg’s early expressionist song Erwartung, op. 2 No. 1 suggests a musical example of expectation as dangerously neurotic, self-destructive passivity and captures something of Heidegger’s point about the transforming power of dread and open-endedness, perhaps transformed inauthentically into fear. There is nothing definite identified as the object of this waiting in the song which is filled with the lurid imagery of Richard Dehmel: “From the sea-green pond/Hear the red villa/Beneath the dead oak/Shines the moon,” but the sense of emotional unbalance and intensity suggests an emotionally charged climate, like that of Edward Munch’s The Scream. Perhaps this is falleness in its most disturbing sense: life is filled with fear of the world in which possibility becomes purely negative. But if living in the realm of negative possibilities is a horrible experience, it can also lead to the realization that the one covers up being. The works of Camus, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, and Sartre’s No Exit provide other dramatic examples of inauthentic expectation.

3. The meaning of death cannot be exhausted in becoming actual. There is no future event that can settle the question of death for oneself. It is not simply that the meaning of the word differs from the third to the first person but that the impact of the realization of the finality of death can change my life in unique ways.

4. If the question “What does it mean not to be?” has as its answer “Nothing, it means nothing,” is the question “What does it mean to be?” also meaningless? It must be if it is of the same logical order as the first. But if both questions are about the significance of Dasein’s finitude, and about the effect the realization of that finitude has on Dasein’s being-in-the-world, then they are meaningful. For Heidegger these two questions are about possibility, about the way we deal with them can affect the way Dasein is. If Dasein is in the world through action, these questions can be the basis for a transformation of the being-in relation from inauthentic (where the one decides for me) to authentic (where I decide). By anticipating death, I act.

5. The transformation of Dasein through the encounter with death is a transformation of the way Dasein understands itself and its world. The discussion on [262] connects anticipation with possibility (and the forgetting of possibility) concluding at [263] that anticipation is the possibility of Dasein’s understanding of its utter (ownmost), ultimate, potentiality for being.

a. Dasein’s death is thus non-relational, not to be outstripped, certain—all of which are also part of the characterization of Angst at [266]. Anticipation individualizes Dasein through Angst.

b. Perhaps this is what cannot be represented—but it is not a mental state or private conscious event in the Cartesian sense.

c. Only I can finally (either inauthentically or authentically) determine my possibilities if they are not determined by others. Therefore, Heidegger seems to conclude, they will not be able
to represent what is possible for me. Do you find this argument convincing?

C. “Freedom” is the understanding of authentic existence: Freedom from the one, but this is a terrifying freedom because possibility is indeterminate.

1. Freedom attaches to the discussion of guilt (#58): avoiding guilt is avoiding self-awareness. Not to want a conscience is inauthentic (an aspect of Kantian morality). Freedom entails the possibility of dignity, of being authentic which, for Heidegger, is to be ontological, to realize the nature of Dasein.

D. But this understanding is not contemplative. Potential for being is constituted by action. A life changes by projecting, anticipating, and freeing oneself from the one.

E. Return to the three characteristics of this understanding of death:

1. Nonrelational: must be Dasein’s “ownmost” if it is authentic.
2. Cannot be outstripped: there is no larger context within which to understand death and its effect on Dasein.
   a. Freedom for possibility against the understanding of the end as finite: one sees that possibilities are not infinite [264].
   b. Freedom thus leads to motivation. To be in-the-world means to make choices. Choosing leads to the possibility of unity (being-a-whole).
3. Certain: it is not known as an occurrent object or state of affairs but formative of existence as finite possibility for Dasein.
   a. More certain than that which relates to entities encountered in the world. Why? (Perhaps the concept of Motivation explains why.)
   b. The realization of the significance of death and the resulting transformation of Dasein’s understanding will be connected later to resoluteness (see #62).
   c. Indefiniteness in certainty characterizes this particular kind of metaphysical Angst.
      i. The threat of death: being face to face with nothingness as the possibility of nonexistence. The limit of understanding (no larger context that explains it).
      ii. Anxiety for potentiality, the unknown, the future: being-towards-death is essentially Angst.
      iii. Anticipation of death provides individuality, personal identity, for Dasein.

F. Summary [266.5–267]. “The existential projection in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell [i.e., an individual’s actual] being-towards-death which is authentic.” “Existential,” remember, means the ontologically fundamental aspects of existing (process-word: being-in-the-world). In this case it is Angst which delimits’ anticipation: a very general form of Angst about possibility.

1. The ontological significance of death as connected with authenticity for being-a-whole. Unless this connection is made the whole idea of existential projection is just a fantasy for the individual. The point is that all this has to make a difference to life, it has to produce authentic existence.
2. Initially, the result is freedom from the one. The next chapter deals more directly with the concept of Authenticity.
I. Authenticity and resoluteness are the way Dasein projects and actualizes its potentiality for being a whole, for having an identity within the one. Authenticity involves wanting to have a conscience, which in turn is seen as readiness or capacity for Angst. Freedom is absence of external domination by the one, and authenticity is the recognition of finitude and acceptance of guilt and responsibility for one’s choices (also finite and limited). This chapter is about the connections between these concepts.

A. #58 contains a discussion of the empirical self and the way it feels when it is guilty, what guilt is in its ordinary phenomenology. The main issue concerns the ontological significance of guilt. What kind of being can have guilt in the first place? Heidegger tries to go behind the ordinary phenomenal senses of “guilt,” “conscience,” and “resoluteness” to their transcendental conditions. He does not analyze the ethical aspects of guilt and conscience, it is about what makes such concepts possible. Heidegger never thought ethics was of philosophical interest since any normative system presupposes “ontological” decisions, which of course he saw as more basic. He apparently had no conception at all of meta-ethics. See his “Letter on Humanism” (translated by Edgar Lohner, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 3. Edited by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962)) for his few comments on ethics as a subject. See below for his discussion of Kant’s ethics. Heidegger’s *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translation, introduction and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter, Revised Edition (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982 and 1988), unpublished until 1975, does contain discussion of value-theoretical concepts.

B. There are also brief discussions of traditional philosophical conceptions of the self (Cartesian subjectivity (#55) and Kantian morality (#59)) but these are found to be superficial and inadequate in their treatment of guilt and the way it lies at the heart of selfhood. The var-
ious modalities of guilt and the ways we deal with it are the source of unity in the self.

C. Freedom and authenticity: how does freedom arise? The answer is that through the “call of conscience” Dasein is confronted with its lack of authenticity—but it may respond inauthentically. How does the metaphor of calling work? Here is an outline of the dramatic flow of this chapter from the point of view of the relation between conscience and authenticity.

1. There must be a caller (this is conscience): #55–6.
2. There must be a callee, one who is called: #57. The argument about how Dasein receives the call through Angst and uncanniness. Here the call is seen as a form of care. When conscience calls, Dasein is inauthentic.
3. There must be something called about: #58. The callee is in dread, homeless, lost in the mores and attitudes of the one [268–9]. But the goal is not to eliminate guilt, it is to accept responsibility (#60).

D. The model of conscience is discursive. Like talking to oneself on two different levels—e.g., the level of everyday interests and desires and the level of general potentiality-for-being (“Why don’t you make something of yourself?”). Conscience calls in the sense of drawing attention away from the everyday to the ontological.

1. Conscience as a little person (Jimminy Cricket? The cartoons with the little devil and angel sitting on the character’s shoulder). There is no trouble with this analogy as long as we don’t take it too literally. The little person inside the big person will have narrower interests, will not be as complicated as the big person. This can be a perfectly adequate and even helpful form of explanation. The question about the nature of the maxims and principles appealed to in the discourse of conscience and guilt is perhaps best construed as a kind of internal Platonic dialogue. In the context of this construct, we see how these concepts operate. But even though Heidegger’s language has a kind of home-spun character, this is not ordinary language analysis. It is a theory without the language of traditional philosophy.

II. #54: introduction. Conscience and authentic existentiell possibility. (“Existentiell,” again, has to do with actual beings in actual societies—the possibility of acting authentically in our own society for example.) Heidegger wants to distinguish his ontological inquiry from a purely practical one (what to do here and now about this particular problem) but he doesn’t want there to be NO connection between them, as he points out at [295] and [300], last ¶.

A. Conscience and guilt are the two existentials (ontological primitives) for the analysis of Dasein as existing (as acting). This is one major way in which Heidegger’s Dasein is distinguished from Descartes’ thinking substance: “I think, therefore I am” does not contain guilt or conscience. But Cartesian pure inquiry into consciousness and the innate idea of extension gives us a very different world (as we have seen in Division I Ch. 3). Guignon and Dreyfus have a good deal to say about Heidegger’s characterization of Descartes.

B. The three existentials (state of mind, understanding, falling) applied to the disclosure of conscience—with the addition of discourse [269]. Discourse is really part of falleness, not a pipeline to the truth in the form of representations of the world. In the account of guilt, falleness cannot be a part of authentic Dasein (for in accepting guilt, one is no longer running away or hiding in the one). Hence, somewhat artificially, Heidegger associates calling with discourse. Is the call of conscience “discursive”? In Division I, Heidegger wanted to get behind discourse in his account of understanding as activity.

1. The state of mind is dread. Conscience is individualized to me—I am responsible. This is another way in which Dasein is not a Cartesian subject, or a logical subject. I am responsible for doing something, for acting—there is no mind/body distinction in Dasein. This is more like Aristotle’s sense of “cause” in ascribing responsibility: a is responsible for F. In being so individualized, I am no longer at home with the one and confront this uncanniness through the realization of possibilities of being and not-being. See the discussion in #57 [277].
2. The form of understanding is guilt-ridden. Guilt is disclosed when I see that Dasein is not related to the world as a merely occur-
rent thing. Dasein is not entirely in the social world either if it realizes this (thus the connection between “existence” and “ec-stasis”).

3. The form of falleness is the call of conscience: care is not merely about occurrent objects. Being called to one’s own potentiality is the summoning to one’s being-guilty. Dasein is responsible for selecting future courses of action from the possibilities projected through care.

C. Choosing being-oneself, accepting guilt, is resoluteness and leads to authenticity.

A. Disclosure of possibility: one either projects possibilities, trying to actualize them, or is absorbed in the one, which determines what is possible for individual Dasein.

B. Seeing this disjunction, Dasein has a choice: listen to others or decide for oneself (although the latter is not done in complete isolation from the one since the one provides Dasein with its basic involvement contexts).

C. How do we decide what to do? This is the call of conscience. But its origin is in Dasein itself and the question is whether one should listen away from oneself to others. In doing so, one gives up freedom to be determined by the one. Through this distinction, one understands, what is disclosed in authentic guilt. Thus one is confronted with a Hamlet-like question of being: how shall I be—absorbed in the one or, by pursuing the line of reasoning that gives rise to this question, achieve some individuality?

D. Heidegger emphatically opposes the judicial model of conscience one finds in Kant. “The Commandment,” the categorical imperative, the universal standard against which one is always in the wrong (to use Kierkegaard’s phrase). The issue is not one of trying to measure up to an external standard but of raising the question of possibility: am I responsible, I accept the consequences, for what I do or believe, or not?

E. For Heidegger, Dasein is not put on trial but called forth from the one, from the public world, to address the question of being for oneself.

IV. #56: conscience as call. Who is being called? One’s own self, but what is that—especially considering the unavoidableness of the public, social world? If the self is not a private Cartesian subject but a public being and actor, how are selves individuated authentically? One has to be or act in the public world whatever else one does.
A. Conscience is directed at the individual self. It is a question like: “what am I doing here and why am I doing this?” Such is the origin of uncanniness, of feeling not at home.

B. What does conscience say? It is about possibilities: is the one, e.g., the only source of values for me? To ask this question is to ask whether there is another way to settle questions about values and self-identity. This is to raise the issue of responsibility: if it is not the one, am I the source of responsibility? How can I be if I am not a radically autonomous Cartesian subject, ontologically distinct from the one and the material world? How can I be responsible, choose my actions, if I must be a member of the social world, which controls individuality? Responsible Dasein is a different way of being in that world from Dasein that does not respond to its guilt. Conscience is critical of the everyday world in that it is a call to assume responsibility, to act in response to the question: “who are you?” The only answer to this question can be an action (or a resolution to act). It may be that the question of the relation between individual Dasein and the one has no answer but only temporizing adjustments that maintain the status quo. Doesn’t it have to be this way if there can be no complete Dasein, no absolute conception of the self—which seems to be what Heidegger says?
C. The term “self” on [273] indicates membership in the one. If the self is Dasein characterized through the public context of discourse, a necessary feature of the one, it would seem that this is a largely inauthentic process. Yet only within this public context can responsibility occur.

V. #57: conscience as the call of care.
A. So far in this chapter we have gone through the creation of a care-context giving sense to the question of being as it centers on possibilities and responsibility as ways of being-in-the-world.

B. But Heidegger’s point is not about existentiell particulars, it is about the constitutive (existential) structure of the care-context. The call comes from beyond the one and bypasses me as a participant in universal discourse. The call undercuts the influence of the one. But where does this call come from (if we reject God, as Heidegger does, thinking these to be but metaphores for Dasein)?
1. In conscience Dasein calls itself to take responsibility.
2. But the sense in which the call comes from “above and beyond me” is not theological or even biological (an instinct, for example). These end up as forms of occurrentness (the God/Man relation, the internalization of social mores, etc.).
3. See last ¶ of [275].
   a. Dasein’s facticity is different from the factuality of occurrent things.
   b. We may not know why, but that Dasein is capable of these thoughts is the disclosure of Dasein’s special kind of being—a kind of being-in which is not that of the one while it is nevertheless part of that world.
   c. This is the discovery of thrownness: Dasein is not quite at home in the one when it has experience of conscience.

C. Anxiety: dread is the state of mind resulting from the disclosure of thrownness. The form of discourse involved associated with Angst is keeping silent (against the chatter and uniformity of the one).
1. One becomes reticent about participating in the social world because one does not feel part of it. See also the discussion on [296].
2. Uncanniness pursues Dasein: it is the basic form of Angst through which Dasein is in the world.
3. This uncanniness is part of the call of care: what is possible for me if it is not completely determined by the one?
4. But the one is a powerful influence: how can one be sure that one has not elevated Dasein into something more than it is (false individualism)? See [278]. But rejecting Dasein (closing off one’s possibilities) is still a choice: inauthenticity is also a possibility.
5. The fifth complete ¶ after [278] begins to establish the connection between conscience and guilt. Isn’t conscience always a warning or a reproval? But if Dasein calls itself in conscience, if conscience is not another being, or the one, what am I warning myself about? Heidegger’s goal is to make conscience Dasein’s “own-most” (authentic, eigentlich) potentiality for being. This prevents purely inauthentic Dasein: even if unheeded, conscience is always there.

VI. #58: guilt. What one is called about. I call myself to take responsibility. This is one of the denser sections in Being and Time. I will try to organize its structure around the concepts of Responsibility, Nullity, and Finitude.
A. Responsibility.
1. What does one understand in being guilty? For Heidegger there is nothing. The call “points forward to Dasein’s potentiality for being” in uncanniness [¶ three, #58].
   a. Where does the criterion for guilt lie? In the fact that guilt is a predicate of “I am,” it discloses an essential aspect of Dasein’s activities.
   b. Common sense: being guilty means to owe, to be a particular kind of care or concern involved in equalizing a deficiency. Heidegger mentions depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking, stealing as examples [281, last ¶].
   c. To avoid the significance of guilt is to avoid awareness of oneself: avoiding guilt is inauthenticity, to be a non-self.
2. Guilt as being responsible [282].
a. Responsibility as owing something to others.
b. Guilt expresses or acknowledges a lack of something, a failure to satisfy a requirement that applies to being with others [282, ¶ two].
c. Thus guilt attaches to Dasein not as a thing or a property, but as a relation of caring or concern.
d. I am capable of responsibility; I want responsibility, I am guilty, but am I my brother’s keeper?

3. Guilt not essentially moral: indeed, morality depends on guilt in an ontological sense [283–6]. What must be presupposed about humans in order for there to be a desire to do what is right, to see deficiencies in need of improvement? What conceptual conditions underlie that desire?
a. Guilt not essentially related to debt or law for Heidegger—that is the external, judicial sense of guilt he claims to be derived from another more basic sense he is trying to identify.
b. “Guilt” in German is “Schuld” which means fault, guilt, debt. The sense in German is that something is owed, but if it is not owed to someone outside (or to society), it must be owed to oneself. So potentiality for being is what one owes oneself. Through care this becomes apparent.

B. These conditions establish guilt. Guilt has its basis in the character of “the not,” but this is not an identifiable gap or deficiency.
1. The concepts of privation, lack, owing, etc. depend on this “not,” but are already an interpretation of something more deeply ontological. How best to explain this?
2. The discussion from [284–6] connects the perception of the not to:
a. Thrownness: Dasein lags behind its possibilities. As Dasein lies beyond the one, so being and the nothing lie beyond Dasein. As one experiences lack, moral failure, the difference between good and evil, one senses this ontological gap. Nothing grounds values and actions. But this does not eliminate responsibility. You are what you do.
b. Projection: nullity is an experience of finitude. Dasein projects itself into the future through its possible ways of being-in the world, but these ways are limited.
c. In “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger says “It is in the being of what-is that the nihilation of nothing occurs.” “Nihilation” (“nichten”) is attached to the recognition of finitude. One projects into nothingness with being-in relations; Dasein creates the world of its being through its care where there was nothing before. Dasein desires responsibility in its activities. It is the originator of actions, even in the context of the one. The tension between Dasein and the one centers on this quest for responsibility and authenticity.
3. Care is understood as thrown projection into the limited world of limited possibilities. Dasein is always guilty, always responsible.
4. Nullity is not privation [285, last ¶]. Gelven makes the point that nullity is the understanding of possibility as including what is not possible for one. This constitutes the recognition of finitude through being towards death. Thus typically asserted conceptual distinctions (such as good/bad, true/false, right/wrong, honest/dishonest) are forms of projection: one does what is right against the possibility of doing wrong.
a. It is not necessary that guilt entails knowledge. The call of conscience is the call of the self to be responsible, but this is possible for Dasein only if it is also possible for it to fail. So even success in doing what is right carries guilt along with it. Acting within these conceptual pairs entails guilt but not knowledge of guilt.
b. Nullity is not a privation (or not just a privation) because it is a projection of both the possible and the not-possible.
5. [287] to end of section: care and the one.
a. The call of conscience is care: guilt is the character of that state-of-mind.
b. Care calls Dasein forth to take responsibility, to bring itself back from its fallen state in the one that means being guilty.
   i. But that does not mean that falleness is evil. It is just a fact that one is not facing up to potentiality for being.
   ii. Guilt arises through the uncanniness of existence in the
one. Dasein is not at home there in recognizing its own desire for responsibility.

iii. Notice how Heidegger connects potentiality for being to projection. Understanding oneself as potentiality for being is tantamount “to projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty.”

c. “Being free” means to be free from the one, and that means to have a conscience.

i. Having a conscience is the origin of the presupposition for the possibility of coming to owe something, and therefore is the basis for Dasein taking action—Hamlet’s “To Be or not to Be?” is perfectly Heideggerian in its ambivalence between authenticity and inauthenticity, in its perception of throwness. For Hamlet to “be” authentically, he must take arms against his own sea of troubles, and thereby accept responsibility. The entire play can be given a thorough Heideggerian ‘deconstruction’ in terms of the relation between conscience and identity.

ii. What does the third ¶ from the end of this section mean? How is taking action “conscienceless” if one has already become guilty in being with others?

1. Notice that wanting to have a conscience is connected with being answerable. To whom is one answerable if it is not the one?

2. If one is already guilty towards others, then conscience is taken away. It does not exist. So wanting to have a conscience is to want to seize responsibility—being good seems to be attached to the determination of guilt from outside of Dasein (“What will others think?”). Only if it is determined from outside is one conscienceless: existentiell possibilities would seem to be the actual possibilities open to one as a member of a society and which determines the sense in which one can be good.

6. As Heidegger says at [298], an authentic Dasein can become the conscience of others. (But isn’t their conscience then determined extraneously?) As with dread, so with guilt one can never be the absolute origin of one’s own being. Dasein has to recognize what is possible for it as a member of the one; it does not create these possibilities ex nihilo. The question of guilt is a question about bringing possibilities to full realization. Dasein is not cut off from social responsibility in its authenticity, it is in that context that Dasein must seek authenticity.

VII. #59: conscience. Although he has denied that his ontological inquiry has to meet the test of ordinary conceptions of conscience, guilt, and responsibility, Heidegger does draw some connections in this section. See Schmitt on the problematic relation between ontological and preontological understanding in Being and Time (p. 223 f.). For Heidegger, ontological understanding does not depend on preontological existentiell contexts of particular beliefs about conscience and guilt. But every such context will have ontological presuppositions. Nevertheless, Heidegger wants to convert his reader to accepting the inauthenticity of the one relative to the ontological potential of authentic Dasein (although he claims that he does not want to moralize about this distinction, his language has an evangelical zeal). One should also remember that he states his ontological inquiry in a peculiarly non-philosophical language that appeals to rather puzzling and cumbersome metaphores based on ordinary beliefs. Hegel’s strange language in the Phenomenology of Spirit, for example (which some have likened to the adolescent discovery of sex) rewrites the history of philosophy from the point of view of the subject thus showing that there is no purely objective point of view. But in so doing he also shows that there is no uniquely subjective point of view, no subject without an object. We have seen in Division I that Heidegger also tries to avoid the subject/object orientation of traditional metaphysical language. He seems to think that the metaphores of common sense are both the source of truth and the means by which the truth is hidden in the technical vocabularies that have historically emerged from the particular Western desire for control that has turned the world into pure occurrentness.
A. Ordinary guilt and conscience: everyday Dasein is identified through its involvements, its Zuhandenheit, and something to be managed. Life is a business. The one is the totality of all Daseins but the existential character of attaching to individual Dasein is universalized in the one. It attaches to no Dasein in particular because the central medium of exchange is social and not individual. This is true even of being towards death—as we saw with Tolstoy’s story in the previous chapter.

B. How do these pre-ontological forms of Dasein connect with Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience as the summons of care to be guilty? Four objections (taken in reverse, which seems a more natural order of the questions):

1. Look here Heidegger, what about evil and good consciences? What has your interpretation to say about that distinction?
   a. Is conscience possible only against a given standard, or is conscience prior to the intelligibility of standards? The phenomenological “fact” that conscience seems to happen after the fact is irrelevant to the structure of existing [291].
   b. The call of conscience belongs to care, it is not part of the character of occurrent moments. It is a lived process held together by projection and guilt.
   c. The horizon (context) of the experience of conscience is the balancing of guilt an innocence. But the image of conscience warning against evil or imbalance is an illusion [292]. What is ontologically prior is Dasein’s potentiality for being. Not until that potentiality is understood can our “acts of will” be shattered, can they undergo moral or ontological crises.
   d. The sense of conscience as warning is the one. Don’t confuse that with the deeper point about potentiality for being. Good and bad conscience (in Sartre’s sense) depend on a more fundamental phenomenon: the discovery of possibility. From a Heideggerian point of view, however, Sartre is a mere sociologist of the “existentielle” of French academic and literary life.

2. Why then, Heidegger, is the voice of conscience never experienced as the call of being for Dasein? Why is it always about this or that existentiell problem? How can you say that the ordinary sense of conscience as a warning is an illusion?
   a. Kant’s representation of conscience in his characterization of the moral law, relying on his metaphor of the court of law, suggests that morality is law in some universal sense administered and overseen by conscience. Conscience as a judge, one’s actions as the plaintiffs.
   b. This makes conscience a form of occurrentness. Conscience is an arbiter, a lawyer, or a judge before whose one pleads their case. What makes this possible as an interpretation of care is the one which provides the metaphor of the court of law. Individual Dasein applies the public institution to itself, a point that Foucault makes over and over again, apparently influenced by Heidegger’s account of internalization. But the real question is about how Dasein develops these interpretations of its guilt in the first place. Kant was building on a metaphor already in place. The real question is about the authentic accessibility of conscience, about how these public, institutional mechanisms got started.

3. Conscience always appears relative to some actual deed. So, confound it Heidegger, how can you talk about ontological grounds and all that stuff you claim to be logically prior to conscience? Isn’t conscience just a fact of human life, irreducible to anything else that explains it?
   a. Guilt is really about choice and responsibility: Kierkegaard argued that one chooses whether or not one chooses. This realization of responsibility is the core of conscience. There is a fact of life here that points deeper than the particular pangs of conscience.
   b. So taking conscience as a fact does little to disclose its range or effect on the rest of life.
   c. Jesus’ example of the publican or tax collector and the Pharisee in Luke, Chapter 18 is illuminating in this regard. Because it is the difference between a life of obedience to the law, taking pride in the strict observance of rites and ceremonies, on the one hand, and a life grasping for meaning and significance in the face
of its own insufficiency, on the other. However, the publican’s ‘guilt’ occurs within the public world; his status as a tax-collector has driven him to despair within that world. Why?

4. Why is conscience always so critical, Heidegger? And why, in your account, do I always come out such a looser?
   a. It isn’t and you don’t. This is part of the illusion of conscience as it has been interpreted through the great religions of the West (Islam, Judaism, Christianity). But these are interpretations of a deeper phenomenon: the sense of responsibility.
   b. The root-metaphor is the regulation of Dasein through assessment of actions by standards imposed rather than chosen (a “business procedure” [294]). The form of this assessment appears critical and negative: we never seem to measure up. Against God, as Kierkegaard put it, we are always in the wrong.
   c. But conscience discloses nothingness, which can be either positive or negative as an object of concern. A sense of uselessness versus the open sea of possibility (to use Nietzsche’s metaphor). This contrast focuses attention on existence (and that through the realization that existence is possibility). This is the positive content of the discussion of guilt.

C. The deepest, most original interpretation of conscience is that of the disclosure of possibility within the existentiell (actual) world.

VIII. #60: resoluteness and authenticity as the results of conscience. (The first ¶ of this section is a good summary of where Heidegger has gotten to so far in this chapter.)

A. The existential analysis of wanting to have a conscience [296].
   1. Understanding: to project oneself in the factual possibilities open in the world for being-in that world. Ontological potentiality for being (for being-in, for acting) is understood through those actual possibilities. Guilt is the acceptance of responsibility within these. Are they one’s own or are they determined by the one?
   2. The state of mind or mood is uncanniness: being ready for Angst.
   3. Discourse: silence and “reticence” in the sense of standing back from the one and what it makes possible for Dasein within that world.
      a. The one cannot understand this silence because it is dominated by the occurrent. The call of conscience is to involvement in the world. Dasein becomes conscious of the in-order-to and for-the-sake-of-which relations that lie behind the world.

B. Reticent self-projection upon guilt, readiness for anxiety, is resoluteness. (Again, note the similarities in the German between Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) and Erschlossenheit (disclosure)).
   1. Only in resoluteness is Dasein disclosed. And it is always indefinite because of the dependence of resoluteness on possibility. This is the connection with the not-yetness of Dasein.
   2. The truth disclosed is not a kind of judgment, or a recommended way of behaving, but an understanding constitutive of being-in-the-world [297].
   3. The second ¶ of [297] summarizes how authenticity is connected to resoluteness by the special kind of concern that discloses: (a) the nature of ready-to-hand interaction with the world and (b) the nature of being with others.
   4. Understanding does not detach Dasein from its world or discover the pure subject on which the world is founded (in this Heidegger is not an idealist).
   5. Authentic Dasein can become the conscience for others [298]. It engages in genuine dialogue with others.

C. Resoluteness as acting. Being is acting, being-in.
   1. Concernful solicitude: what one understands through the disclosure of possibility for being. So resoluteness is letting oneself be summoned “out of one’s lostness in the ‘they’.”
   2. Heidegger uses Kierkegaard’s word “appropriation” to describe authentic, resolute care. This seems clearly to be a form of action, and Heidegger seems in the ¶ at the end of [298] and the first ¶ of [299] to be talking about authenticity as action. Perhaps this should be linked with the previous comment about becoming the conscience of others—the role Heidegger sees himself as destined
to play (this should be connected to the discussion of destiny (das Geschick) and culture in #74).

3. At the end of [300] Heidegger says that he avoids the term “take action” since resoluteness is not a special way of behaving, as contrasted with contemplation. But isn’t it both?

4. There is a striking similarity between Heidegger’s account of authenticity and resoluteness and Aristotle’s account of virtue. (If Heidegger criticizes Aristotle for narrowing down the meaning of aletheia to sight (not necessarily a bad thing), he is nevertheless positively influenced, perhaps, by the Nichomachean Ethics: if happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, authenticity is activity which responds to guilt through resolution. Both Aristotle and Heidegger center their views of personal identity on the concept of Activity—Heidegger’s discussion of the temporality of Dasein, that Dasein is stretched out between past and future through its projection, is like Aristotle’s view that only through some kind of public activity can Dasein be good, happy, or know anything.

D. Irresoluteness: surrendering to the one, refusing to be summoned out of lostness. This must be the refusal to act authentically, since resoluteness occurs in the social world too: resoluteness and irresoluteness must be distinguished as different forms of action as well as different states of mind.

1. Resolute Dasein sees itself as guilty (responsible) and wants a conscience.
2. Irresolute Dasein is guilty but doesn’t or refuses to see it—it hides in the one.

E. Situation: a context of care, solicitude, possibility of action.

1. The one exists in a situation wherein uniqueness is essentially closed off (verschlossen: linked to the other Schluss words). To be the conscience of the one is to assume responsibility, to actualize a unique possibility.
2. Resoluteness always ends in care. This is the existential of resoluteness.

F. Last ¶: resoluteness depends on being guilty. Guilt involves a reticent self-projection and readiness for anxiety. Dasein’s authenticity is its being a whole. Authenticity is being towards death as a recognition of finitude, and this brings us back to resoluteness and guilt. But what does this circle disclose about Dasein’s potentiality for being-in the world? Guilt has a generative function in creating responsibility. It is therefore liberating: freedom does not just mean negative freedom (from the one), but also has a positive sense connected with the discussion of fate and destiny in Chapter 5.
I. In this chapter Heidegger turns to the relation between Dasein and time. His conclusion will be that Dasein exists temporally, that is the reason all of the action-related metaphors, the anticipation of death, and resolution are similarly temporal orientations of Dasein. Heidegger now looks at the ontological significance of time in all of those metaphors. But be patient! He doesn’t get to time until the last two sections of this chapter and then the published version omits the discussion of time He was working on, but never published. This leaves Being and Time as we have it rather lopsided. Looking back on Being and Time up to this point, however, you can see how deeply temporality has been ingrained throughout Heidegger’s analysis. #61 serves as an introduction bringing together the previous discussion of resoluteness with anticipation as being-towards-death.

A. What do death and concrete existence have in common?
1. Existing is either authentic or inauthentic. As soon as Dasein sees itself suspended between these alternatives as inescapable parts of its being, it is anticipatory in the sense of wanting to know the difference between authentic being-with, being-in, etc. and inauthentic being-with, being-in, etc.
2. Anticipation determines Dasein’s existence, its being-in, being-with, etc., and is thus temporal, especially futural.
3. Temporality is thus part of experience as part of Dasein’s being a whole, i.e., having an identity. Like Aristotle on the connection between virtue and action, the unity of Dasein is activity taking time.
   a. Being a whole, having unity, involves anticipatory resoluteness, and resoluteness, as we have seen, is an aspect of care. Care involves projection. Projection is futural (as Heidegger argues in this chapter). Dasein’s being depends on time-oriented projection.
   b. Dasein’s unity over time depends on care through the realization of the finitude of its existence limited by death.
c. See Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote about self-constancy on p. 351. The point is not to think of the self as a substance, or as an empty logical subject, but as an active being in a world where it uses tools and does things that characterize its being. One of the things Dasein does is to wonder about its own existence.

II. #62: anticipatory resoluteness as authentic being.
A. The distinction, again, between “existential” and “existentiell.”
   1. Existentiell awareness: awareness of the ontic, existence as entities, the actual details of the world.
   2. Existential awareness: comprehension of the structure of existence. This form of awareness concerns the characterization of Dasein’s being-in its world: here is where care, resoluteness, conscience, anticipation-projection, and concern for death emerge as temporal activities.

B. Anticipation and resoluteness. What is the care-structure connecting these activities?
   1. Resoluteness connects with guilt and the acceptance of responsibility. Wanting to have a conscience.
   2. But projecting resolutely is to be guilty (responsible) for as long as Dasein is. Wanting to be responsible characterizes Dasein (a source of its unity).
   3. Anticipation as wanting to be responsible up to the end of Dasein. Thus resoluteness connects with being towards death through the anticipation of Dasein’s futurity.

C. Death: “the utter nullity of Dasein” [306, last ¶]. Recognition of this nullity constitutes the realization of finitude. So conscience connects with the limited choices available for resolute existence.
   1. Anticipation and resoluteness have brought the possibility of death into the potentiality for being of Dasein. This limit cannot be outstripped or eliminated [307] ¶ two.
      a. Resoluteness entails certainty, but certainty of what? That death cannot be outstripped, but also (in the long ¶ overlapping

[307–308]) the constancy of Dasein. Dasein is unified over time through its resoluteness, the certainty of its end is drawn into its potentiality for being.

2. The last ¶ of [308] is a relatively clear summary which brings together some of these points resting on anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipation always implies resoluteness, and vice versa (whether or not it is actually achieved). This structure is implicit in the existentiell awareness of everyday existence.

D. Summary: guilt is “wanting a conscience” and, depending on Dasein’s response, is the source of resoluteness. Being guilty is actually an aspect of authentic existence. But guilt also involves wanting to be responsible, which implies awareness of death. One cannot be responsible unless one realizes that one might lack responsibility. The recognition of that gap eventually leads to death itself as the ultimate limit of being for Dasein, the ending of all its activity and the nullity (the ceasing) of its identity. Resoluteness is the basis for that anticipation; it is futural (it is the disclosure of Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself) and the absolute limit of this anticipation is being towards death—the disclosure to Dasein of its finitude. All this is constitutive of authentic being-in-the-world and is the basis of self constancy or identity (see [303] about Dasein losing its character as an “arbitrary construction” to see the radical contingency of authenticity and identity).

The connection with the world is that the world is characterized by the projection of Dasein, the sense in which Dasein is ‘in’ that world. The mood or Stimmung of Dasein reveals the character of the world as seen by Dasein, but more than that, it is Dasein’s world. This supplies the sense in which Dasein is in the world differently than current things. (Macquarrie and Robinson’s note in their Glossary of German Expressions that the world is in a certain tonality through Dasein’s being-in it through its care and projections. For example, one might use music to characterize the world from someone’s point of view: is it C-major, or is it C sharp-minor, as it is in the opening fugue of Beethoven’s op. 131 string quartet: a world in which not one hope will be fulfilled, not one (as Wagner said in his characterization
of the quartet, quoting from \textit{Faust}, line 1557)? Thus the relation between Dasein and the world does not differentiate between two kinds of thing, such as the mental and the physical. It is rather a mutually constitutive relation.

III. #63: hermeneutics and method: the ontological-conceptual connections between care, death, conscience, guilt, and anticipation—are they circularity interdefined? Yes, but so what? The basic principle of hermeneutics is that there are only circles, so to speak. There are no foundations, no stopping points in irreducible references, ostensive definitions, or rigid designators in the sense in which some philosophers have then these to connect language to the world. See Dreyfus’ discussions of Heidegger \textit{versus} Searle.

A. Dasein is the farthest ontological “entity” (the most difficult to understand, to grasp) because we are not just entities, we are processes (ultimately the processes of understanding, being towards death, anticipatory resoluteness, caring). There is a similarity between this characterization of Dasein and Aristotle’s view of Man as the highest animal because he can reflect about Being?

1. Care as the “wresting” of Dasein’s being from the tendency towards falleness in the interpretation of Being as occurrent beings, in ontico-ontology.
2. Ontology requires a kind of being (a form of activity) that allows one to see that something is covered up. This is what anticipation, guilt, and death ultimately disclose something about Dasein. This analysis also captures Dasein’s tendency to cover things up ([311], last ¶). If Dasein is lost, it needs to find out why. It does so by finding the structure of its inauthenticity. It seems necessary to Heidegger’s analysis that Dasein can never be inauthentic without \textit{knowing} that it is at some point. This would tie in with the self-questioning nature of Dasein, the point that being (being-in) will always be an issue for it.

B. Understanding has the structure of a projection [312].
1. If Dasein’s original position is inauthenticity, being lost, etc., how is this revealed? We pretty much know the answer to that question by now: look at the analysis of care and see how it leads to resoluteness and authenticity.
2. Ontological interpretation projects entities onto the being which characterizes them so as to conceptualize its structure.
3. This interpretation must be “guided by the understanding of being which lies in Dasein itself” ([313], last ¶).
   a. If the being of Dasein is essentially potentiality for being (connecting it with freedom in the sense of being free from the control of the one), this is the primary condition for ontological interpretation.
   b. Gelven uses the fore-structure analysis to explicate this: what does it mean to be? This is Heidegger’s account of what it means to be ‘alive’ in the sense of finding a being-in relation (something worth doing perhaps).
      i. Fore-having (possessed in advance): the fact that it can be a whole, be unified in its activity of anticipatory resoluteness.
      ii. Fore-sight (seen in advance): the point of view from freedom to-be. Thus foresight is to see what is possible independently of the one determinateness of existence: e.g., knowing what to look for.
      iii. Fore-conception (conceived in advance): that the major question is the question of being. “Does Being-in-the-world have a higher instance for its potentiality-for-being than its own death?” [313]. Existentiality: not looking at entities but at the being of those entities, i.e., the scientific characterization of humanity as what can be explained by psychology, physiology, sociology, and so on.
   c. The point is to find a way of getting from ontic description and analysis to the basis for that particular ontic characterization of the world. How did it arise?
   d. Through this particular discussion, Heidegger can be construed as explaining the naturally inquisitive character of human life. We think that there is always more to be discovered. Heidegger gives us an account of why inquiry characterizes Dasein.
C. Where does interpretation get its clue, how does it get started, where did Heidegger get his information?

1. Not from a Cartesian analysis of the isolated self but from the investigation of the act of realizing the possibility of not-being while being part of the social world. What happens to Dasein when this is realized? Dasein is already in a world when this happens.

2. This is the “understanding of being which lies in Dasein itself” ([313], last ¶). Understanding inquiry as being-in-the-world, what happens to Dasein when it understands itself as not an occurrence thing?

3. The analytic of care emerges as the characterization of Dasein’s being-in-the-world (this point is pursued in more detail in the next section).

D. Circularity: analysing the whole by its parts, but the parts can be identified only by their systematic roles within the whole.

1. Circularity unavoidable: the only important question is whether the circle is large enough to connect all the things one wants to explain.

2. Common sense misunderstands understanding. The concern of the everyday is a kind of care for entities without asking about their significance: existentiell awareness only.

3. Anticipatory resoluteness explains authenticity, which explains in turn explains which in turn explains the difference between ontic and ontological. But the ontological significance of Dasein lies in anticipatory resoluteness—hence the circle.

4. Discussion of truth and understanding, last ¶. Being is connected to truth; the understanding of being varies with the kind of truth (i.e., truth will be correspondence when we are talking about propositions, judgments, representations, or “language” in the narrower, more technical sense; truth will be disclosure when we are talking about the background of communication as a form of Dasein’s involvement contexts). So truth must be involved in the understanding of being. In its most basic sense, Heidegger argues, truth is disclosure of the meaning of care to being. I.e., understanding the structure of care is to understand the nature of being-in, being-with, being-towards-death, etc.

IV. #64: care and selfhood. The nature of the I. The self as a construct (similarity to Hegel’s account of the self as evolving out of a particular social interpretation of truth). Criticism of Kant’s view of the self as the logical subject of transcendental activity.

A. Care leads to Dasein being-ahead of itself, which leads to the existential nature of death. Being ahead of itself, Dasein comes to an end.

1. The point of the existential analysis is to see Dasein in the world rather than as isolated from it (as is Descartes’ conscious subject) or simply an occurrence thing (as Kant’s transcendental subject must be distinguished from the objects constituted through its intuitions and described by its judgments—and from the empirical subject interdefined with those objects).

2. Since caring is an activity in the world, Dasein must be in the world to care, and caring characterizes Dasein.

B. Unity. What is the connection between selfhood and care?

1. Self as substance. [317] the self as ground, as substance or subject: “the I seems to ‘hold together’ the totality of the structural whole.”

   a. Kant was right to attack the theory of the self as a substance, but he slips back into the same old ontology in his theory of the empirical and transcendental egos [319].

   b. See Kant’s “paralogisms of pure reason” in the Critique of Pure Reason: how can a substance be inferred from its properties? Don’t confuse the unity of experience with the experience of a unity—to paraphrase Strawson’s summary of Kant.

   c. Kant is right to identify the transcendental-ego as “practical activity” but slips back into the inappropriate ontology by looking for a source of the unity of the self lying beyond the synthesis of the phenomenal self. There must be a “source” of data organized into the self which appears to itself to be a unity [321]. Kant reverts to substance talk in referring to that source.

2. Self as logical subject.
a. The I as the logical behavior (the grammatical subject) that “binds together” experiences.
b. Kant was right: the “I think” is not a representation but the formal structure of representing as such.
c. This is still an account in terms of occurrent things [320]. This I is still a subject, still something different from what it does. It underlies its actions. Heidegger’s footnote xix adds some historical examples.
d. Kant does not say anything about the relation between the I and its empirical representations except that it “accompanies” them. What does this mean? Is that a contingent relation? Kant’s positing of the transcendental ego seems to be another instance of the very mistake he himself criticizes in the paralogisms.
e. Heidegger seems to be saying that we don’t need a transcendental ego, something “posited” behind and responsible for the empirical self. There is only the empirical self, held together by its being-in relations. It doesn’t need something nonempirical to hold it together. Thus:

C. Dasein and world.
   1. The being of the I is codetermined with its world, including the one. It must be possible for the I to be something for it to think something. But there is no Kantian priority of the subject as constituto, as the origin of objectivity. The self is constituted along with the world by mutually interconnecting social activities (Dilthey’s influence; also similar to Hegel and even to Marx).
      a. For Kant the world was either constituted by intuitions (the world of objective experience plus the subjective experiences contrasting to it—the phenomenal world) or transcended them—the noumenal. The trouble with the self in transcendental idealism is that it lies at the limit of the phenomenal while being unknown noumenally. Heidegger wants to see the self as part of the world in which it acts but in which its acts characterize it along with its world.
      b. Everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of the world with which it is concerned rather than the way it exists in it: the world takes priority and not Dasein’s constitutive activity. It fails to see itself in relation to Dasein, to the kind of being it is. This is because everyday selves are fallen [322].
         a. The substantive “I” is elusive, ontologically indeterminant. Its modes of existence are determined by the one. It is not an isolated, occurrent being.
         b. The third ¶ of [322] is important. Unity is related to care (through the constancy of Dasein’s concerns—which are more constant the more ontological they are, and less determined by the one).
            i. Self constancy depends on anticipatory resoluteness over time.
            ii. If self-constancy cannot be explained by means of a primitive substance, the constitutive activity must have something to do with the way Dasein is in its world.
            iii. If Dasein can disclose its identity by describing the way it is in its world, it ‘transcends’ that world (to use the language of #69) by seeing itself differently from the entities within the world. E.g., in describing the public world as in-authentic Dasein has transcended the social, public world, has described it in a vocabulary not part of that world. The analytic of care, the fore-structure, and so on are transcendental limits of the public world and are not describable through the scientific terminology developed to deal with occurrent things.
      c. The self as a condition of existence rather than a thing (this is the good, constitutive, part of Kant’s account of the transcendental ego). If Dasein is an entity, it is an entity defined in terms of its projects and is therefore temporally spread out, ahead of itself.
         i. Selfhood determined by concerns: if these are determined by the one, there is no self in the subjective sense. See the last ¶ of #64: care does not need to be founded in a self (in the substantial sense). The context of Dasein’s identity is its activity in the one.
ii. The existential meaning of “self.”

1. Selfhood depends on Dasein, on the forms of care and understanding. It is through these existentials that particular images of the self arise.
2. Selfhood is dependent on world. Dasein’s dependence has the quality of being either authentic or inauthentic.

iii. The ontological meaning of “self.”

1. If authentic Dasein understands the relation between caring and resoluteness, selfhood would be a particular kind of care. What it means to be a self is a particular kind of Dasein. Dasein is the ontological foundation for selfhood.
2. Everyday selfhood is simply a persona, a place-holder filled in by the conditions of society: husband, wife, student, professor. And, of course, there can be conflicting roles that threaten Dasein’s unity, thus Dasein’s guilt.
3. But introspecting the nature of selfhood does not bring us to a subject. The real condition of selfhood is action. Heidegger said in Division I Ch. 4 that the I is really the one.
4. Dasein is essentially the nexus of socially constituted relations. The self is simply its meaningful expressions in the social context. There is nothing independently, or ontologically subjective to be expressed (as Dilthey unfortunately continued to think there was in his Cartesian view of the self). Dasein’s identity is a function of the being-in relation and the in-order-to relation that defines selfhood and gives it its particular Dasein. No substance underlies the complex of socially constitutive relations in Dasein.

3. Ontologically, the care-structure determines Dasein and its unity. This includes the phenomenon of selfhood. To be a particular self is to be in a particular kind of world. One cannot be a professor if she does not have a university faculty. Authentic Dasein, on the other hand, is not wedded to a particular world in its concern for being. Individual selves are concerned about other selves in worrying about themselves. Dasein is concerned about itself only in the ontological sense that it cares about what it is to be.

4. Review the long ¶ beginning on [87] and see how the concept of Significance is connected to involvement. Dasein is the “ontical condition” for the possible involvements in the world. If Dasein is in the world through its involvements, it is also characterized by means of those involvements. So if the self is a substance, that characterization depends on certain being-in relations that “thematize” the world. As the world is characterized through Dasein’s involvements, so is Dasein.

V. #65: temporality as the meaning of care. Care has been linked to anticipatory resoluteness which is a kind of being-toward possibilities. But what is it to “be toward” something? This requires time, so Heidegger finally gets to the point of this chapter.

A. Meaning signifies the “upon which” of projection through which possibilities are disclosed [324]. The section begins with a discussion of meaning as determined by the projections of Dasein. These projections disclose what is possible in the world. Meaning is the ontological ground for the world, the possible things in it and the possible ways Dasein can be involved with them through care.

1. What makes care possible? Answering this transcendental question will answer the question about the ontological foundation of Dasein’s unity.
2. The future as that toward which one exists as the object of care lies at the basis of authenticity (and hence unity).
3. Entities have meaning only through that towards which (or upon which) they are projected as useful, meaningful, and significant.
4. A restatement of the “What does it mean to be?” question that distinguishes Dasein from being merely occurring. What does mean to be a particular kind of Dasein, such as an airline pilot, a professor, etc. It is to do what one does in that role, do the actions implicit in or constitutive of the role. (Once again, the influence of
Kant’s practical philosophy and Aristotle’s account of virtue is clearly evident in this section.

5. The last two full ¶’s of [325] introduce the future. Dasein sees the future as coming towards it (this is inauthentic), or Dasein projects toward the future (authentic). The limiting case of this is death. Anticipatory resoluteness is directed towards the future as the limit of Dasein’s being-activities.

B. Temporality is the meaning of care.

1. The three ecstases of time. Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on [329] explains some of Heidegger’s German and also points out (again) that “ecstasis” means “standing outside” in particular, the way Dasein stands outside of the world (of the present) by its future orientation. As we have seen already, “ecstasis” is also related to “existence” and in the next chapter to “transcendence.”
   a. Future: that which one anticipates.
   b. Past: the German is “Ich bin gewesen” which means literally “I am as I was.” The past is meaningful, it is still with us as memory, however selective.
   c. The present is determined by the future. The present is a making present of what one anticipates. The present is what I am doing now as directed into the future and in the light of the past.
2. Because of the futurity of care, Dasein is “not yet.” We now know what that expression means, and why Dasein cannot be simply an occurrent entity.

C. Anticipatory resoluteness: ¶ 3–5. Here authentic Dasein action is seen as unified with respect to the past (“I am now as having been”) and the future. Everything Dasein does is temporal and pointed toward the future but Dasein unifies itself by remembering the past (this point is expanded in the next chapter).
   1. The future is the ground for responsibility: what I am going to do?
   2. The present makes action possible: what I am doing.
   3. The past locates the significance of my thrownness. What has brought it about that I am acting as I am is not simply the future (what I want to do) but the past (what I have done).

D. Temporality of care. The rest of this section, from [327] to the end, applies these ecstases of time to the existential of care (the ontological foundation of Dasein is thus seen to lie necessarily in time).

1. Care and time: the last ¶ [327].
   a. Dasein is ahead of itself, it is not occurrent.
   b. It is along side entities in the world in the present.
      i. By solicitude for others.
      ii. By curcumspective concern for entities.
   c. Temporality is essential the meaning of care (end of [328]).

2. Falling: in being resolute Dasein brings itself back from falleness by seeing that the future is limited. Inauthentic Dasein, fallen Dasein, sees time as infinite [331] (IN-authentic = IN-finite).
   a. The philosophical problems of time discussed at the end of [326] and first ¶ of [327] are seen to derive from inauthenticity: time is seen as something in itself and not the character of Dasein and its activities.
   b. As Heidegger says at the end of [328], temporality is not an entity—indeed we should talk about temporality temporalizing itself through Dasein’s care and action.

3. Authentic care is a being towards death [330].
   a. Dasein does not just stop or cease to be. Existence is revealed as finite—there are only a certain number of things Dasein can do. It is limited.
   b. Time goes on after death, but Heidegger’s point is that Dasein’s life is oriented temporally—being authentic means being oriented towards death—towards the possibility of nullity. Death is the ecstasis of life, the point from which Dasein is seen for what it is, although it is not an occupiable point.

VI. #66 introduces and summarizes the last three chapters of Being and Time. In the next chapter he repeats the existential analysis of Dasein focusing on its temporality. So we have a review of Division I from the point of view of time, including the distinction between au-
I. #67: in this chapter Heidegger returns to the existentials of care, understanding, state of mind, falleness, and discourse showing how they are all temporal. The second and third ¶s of this section clearly summarizes of the general argument. #69 is an especially important part of Being and Time. Here Heidegger shows how Vorhandenheit is derived from Zuhandenheit. Without this step, Heidegger’s criticisms of Descartes and Kant won’t succeed. The theory of substance and the rise of science are seen as parts of this derivation, as indeed is the entire history of philosophy up to Hegel and Nietzsche, who finally began to suspect that metaphysics was simply ‘grammar’ writ large.

II. #68: time and disclosure. The re-analysis of understanding, state of mind, falleness, and discourse as temporal. What Heidegger hopes to establish is an answer to the question: what is it to be-in time? This will fill out the meaning of “resoluteness.”

A. Understanding [336]. Central ecstasis is the future.
   1. Gelven has another useful chart showing the six modes of projection (understanding is the projection of possibilities):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authentic</th>
<th>Inauthentic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td>Waiting/Expecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vorlaufen)</td>
<td>(Erwarten)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moment-of-Vision</td>
<td>Making-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Augenblick)</td>
<td>(Gegenwärtigen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repitition</td>
<td>Forgetting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wiederholen)</td>
<td>(Vergessenheit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Understanding and projection.
   a. Projection is futural and authentic in anticipation if Dasein throws itself into its possibilities, or inauthentic by simply waiting for something to happen.
   b. Referring to Gelven’s chart while reading through this discussion in Heidegger should help to keep things straight.
      i. Heidegger’s footnote iii on [338] is about Kierkegaard.
   c. “Making present”: preoccupation with the present. The “moment of vision” (Augenblick) is making specific use of the present to accomplish something (“seize the moment”).
   d. “Forgetting”: failure to see Dasein’s temporal orientation. To think that one simply exists in the present. “Repetition” is discussed more completely on [385]; see also Macquarrie and Robinson’s note about the word “Wiederholen”: for Heidegger, to retrieve former possibilities from the past. He discusses tradition and historical consciousness in Chapter 5.

B. State of mind [340]. The central ecstatic is the past. This point is rather difficult to understand—is Heidegger just looking for symmetry at the expense of simplicity? He clearly sees Dasein as a future-oriented being, but the past is clearly important too in the subsequent discussion.

1. Dread and fear (authentic and inauthentic states of mind).
   a. Fear is inauthentic and related to the past because it is a retreat from either the present or the future [341]. Because it seems fixed and permanent, the past offers a false sense of security. Dasein forgets the question of its being. Fear also waits (rather than takes action) and makes-present by forgetting the futural significance of things (a “jumble of possibilities” [342]).
   b. Dread, by contrast, is authentic and related to the past because it is directed at repetition: one should not forget the past. Dread includes awareness of nothingness (#51–53); the past is continually present in dread through the unification of Dasein over time. Dread is not cognitive awareness however, not the knowledge of something in particular. In inauthenticity, the world loses its significance [343] so occurrent things have no involvement; the world is empty. We find nothing there of importance. But this is the beginning of authenticity: the insignificance of the world is disclosed and Dasein is brought back to its fundamental thrownness. The present-tense of dread is a moment of vision (Augenblick) taking one back to uncanniness. But in being taken away from worldly possibility, authentic potentiality for being is created [344].
   c. Fear and forgetting: repressing the tension and contingency of acting. One simply “drifts” between possibilities, unable to act with purpose. Living for the moment.
   d. Anxiety is related to the nothingness of the world. With Angst, however, we don’t experience this as anything definite, or definitely indefinite, like ‘emptiness’. We encounter entities in such a way that it we no involvement with them whatsoever. Anxiety “clutches at the ‘nothing’ of the world” [343].
   e. Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world: it brings Dasein back to its thrownness.

2. Anxiety differs from fear.
   a. Dread springs from the future and the desire for resoluteness while fear springs from the lost present [345].
   b. Dread:
      i. Necessarily temporal.
      ii. Clutches at nothingness in the sense that dread is futural and prospective but undeveloped, having no purpose or course of action. The present is nothing unless we connect it to the future.
      iii. Involves projection on the basis of homelessness, uncanniness, (a past-oriented concept in the sense that Dasein tries to overcome such radical uprootedness). This appears to refer to the need to establish continuity and identity in the face of contingency and Murphy’s Law.
   c. Fear “forgets” by being lost in the present, unable to envisage future actions that will solve the problem confronting one.
   d. Anxiety holds onto the present: it is the mood for possible resolution.
1. Even hope is related to the past: to relieving the burdens we have brought with us, inherited from the past. But hope can also be detached from involvement and action: one can hope for a miracle, of for the impossible.

C. Fallenness [346].
1. No authentic ecstasy at all.
2. The present is the most important.
   a. The past is forgotten, no longer actual.
   b. Centered on the actual rather than the possible.
      i. The authentic present is a moment of vision: oriented towards possibilities.
      ii. The inauthentic present is preoccupied with the actual, but what is the actual without the possible?
      iii. The authentic past is repetition, a continual reunification of Dasein from past to the not-yet of the future. A very important and informative paper topic would be to compare Heidegger and Kierkegaard on Repitition.
      iv. The inauthentic past forgets the significance of the past. It is simply what is no longer. Either it has no influence or one is preoccupied with it to the exclusion of the present and future.
   v. Authentic futurity is anticipation and possible projection.
      vi. Inauthentic futurity is simply waiting around in the present for something to happen, or hoping for something out of the blue—such as winning the lottery.

3. Curiosity [347].
   a. The inauthentic present: seeing things from an “objective,” detached point of view, again taking actuality to be the only reality (whereas for Heidegger possibility preceeds actuality).
   b. Curiosity is not directed towards understanding but simply at seeing as being along side (as opposed to availability for involvement).
4. From [348] to the end of the section Heidegger discusses modes of falleness: temptation, tranquilization, alienation, self-entangle-ment. The point about them is that they are all located in the present. Dasein flees from its future (death) and from the past (its thrownness) and thus loses its unity.

D. Discourse [349]. This is pretty easy: language has tenses and is itself temporal. The first ¶ of [350] is a brief summary of this section.

III. #69: transcendence and being-in-the-world are both temporal. This is one of the most important sections in the entire work and connects with the discussion of the correspondence theory of truth and realism # 43 and 44. The first three ¶s introduce the basic problem of linking being-there to being-in-the-world to care. This argument should be familiar by now but you should still be worried about the connection between occurrence and availability for involvement. Heidegger has claimed that the latter is more ontologically primitive than the former and has used this as a criticism of the philosophy of presence (substance/attribute, selfhood, theoretical knowledge as derived from Plato and Aristotle, and especially rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism). But what exactly is the argument that shows how Vorhandenheit depends on Zuhandenheit? The discussion is broken into three parts:

A. The temporality of circumspective concern. Subsection (a).
1. Zuhandenheit: how do we use tools? What is “usefulness”? How is Dasein characterized by this mode of being-in?
2. These questions are answered in terms of involvement. [353–4] discuss contexts of use in relation to time. Tools are used in “do x in order to F” contexts, where x is an action and F is a state of affairs that stands as the goal or formal object of x. E.g., to become wise, take a philosophy class; to prepare a dessert for tonight, bake a cake. It is through these relations that we are in the world in the most original sense, and that sense is temporally oriented.
   i. The discussion of “retaining” and “awaiting” at [353–4] is rather opaque but the point seems to rest on the ideal of “letting something be involved.” Dasein’s involvement unifies the world cognitively and pragmatically (existentially). This unification is achieved through the use of tools and takes time. They
are used to do things, to accomplish goals, finish jobs, etc., all of which are temporal activities. But we do not await the goal or the end of the job by standing back from our activities. Involvement in the world consists of an absorption in the world, living for the job.

ii. Awaiting and retaining make present: operating “zuhanden” requires both a present-tense involvement and a future-oriented goal.

3. Temporality of involvement with the world through tools.
   a. Involvement is open to the kinds of authenticity and inauthenticity discussed in the previous section.
   b. About half of sub-section (a) is devoted to the failure and breakdown of tools and to how the temporality of concern asserts itself at those moments. When care fails to cope, we can no longer make future possibilities present [356].
   c. “Concern” is not experiential but implicitly directed towards the future. Failure of a tool suddenly forces one to wait in the present: the goal cannot be achieved. It should be pretty clear how this discussion connects to the three *ecstases* of time.

4. Involvement depends on care, the content and directionality of care depends on tool contexts. The availability of involvement is temporal because there is always a “towards which” involved, a future-directed end or purpose.

B. The origin of theory and occurrentness [357]. Subsection (b): this is Heidegger’s “existential” philosophy of science.

1. Not a distinction between *praxis* and theory.
   a. Theoretical knowledge is the basis for practice: it determines what kinds of things ought to be done (experimentally, technically).
   b. But *praxis* also involves theory (about what kinds of things there are in the world, what kinds of activities are available, etc.) [358].

2. Discussion of Kant (end of [358]). The point is the shift, typical of Heidegger, from the cognitive to the existential, from which there can be no transcendent perspective from which to judge the truth of a theory. Kant partly sees this but still concentrates on the philosophical ideal of knowledge as a form of seeing, with a sense of theoretical completeness, Newtonian absoluteness, derived from Plato and Aristotle. He holds onto the noumenal as the unknown, the source of what is seen. Science describes the phenomenal and rests on the concepts of the understanding rigidly controlling the structure of experience. Thus theory comes first for Kant (the concepts of the understanding are *a priori* and their content and structure are the subject of philosophical inquiry).
   a. In giving priority to availability and involvement, Heidegger attacks the predominant character of Western philosophy, its search for the presence of substance, and its dependence on the rigidity or absoluteness of truth. Kant partly eliminates the dominance of substance through his emphasis on the constitutive nature of thought and experience but he still holds onto subject/object metaphysics generally by arguing that, in order to avoid subjective idealism, there must be noumenal reality behind phenomena. His “Copernican Revolution” puts the stabilization of phenomena into the mind by moving Plato’s forms into the pure concepts of the understanding that underwrite, give a foundation for, both the structure of science and the nature of experience. The noumenal then becomes the source of phenomena, and of freedom, value, and the soul. The latter “ideals of reason” sit uneasily beside the determinism of science and the utilitarianism of psychology and sociology (hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives).
   b. Kantian “intuitions” are immediately related to objects but the model remains sight (concepts + percepts = intuitions). For Heidegger this is a form of circumspection, a “making-closer,” by conceptualization, of something we envisage as having a determinate structure (*theoria*). But this is also a form of deliberation, a kind of *praxis* (“If I do x, then y will happen”). Indeed, the concepts of the understanding function as a tool for the creation of knowledge that allows scientific understanding to be the primary means for the of manipulation of the world. We justify this by claiming that experience would not be “objec-
tive” if it did not have the structure attributed to phenomena by science.

3. But science is itself a tool (not an absolute representation of reality) and it is therefore temporal, as Heidegger argues on [360]. Science makes present by bringing the world closer to our sight (extended through instruments, etc.). But, of course, bringing something closer is a form of praxis: to bring the world “closer” we understand in order to stabilize it just as Kant says. But for Heidegger, the “as-structures” implicit in scientific activity (experimentation, theorization) are grounded in the temporality of understanding. Science is a “practical” activity in Kant’s sense (not theoretical versus practical). Heidegger then launches into his very important discussion of how “theory” always involves practice.

a. Theory does not involve itself with the “x in order to F” of praxis but sees the world as entities with properties.
   i. Heaviness is connected with the concept of Mass, and appears to be completely neutral to praxis—questions like “Is the hammer too heavy?” Too heavy to do this particular job (driving in finishing nails rather than big ones).
   ii. The world is seen differently when characterized from the neutral point of view of science in that it eliminates Dasein and its involvements from the world. “Purely objective” = the world with no Dasein.
   iii. But tool-oriented involvement can be an object of science: e.g., economics can describe the tool-use context of making shoes in such a way that it explains what happens to cobblers as a result of the laws of supply and demand, the lower cost of foreign labor, etc. Here the lot of cobblers has both a zuhanden description (from the point of view of the cobbler making shoes) and a vorhanden description from the point of view of the economist the social-economic results of lots of cobblers making shoes [361].

b. “The aggregate of the occurrent becomes the theme” [362, and see 363] and the world is “thematized” as entities at spatio-temporal points. All mathematical points are the same, as opposed to the zuhanden contextualization of the world: there is a specific place for a tool in order for it to do the job. The world of our involvement’s simply vanishes from the scientific understanding of the universe. Dasein vanishes too, except as the transcendental condition of the view of the world as objective occurrentness. Heidegger wants to explain how we get to that view of the world.

c. Matter is simply occurrent and its nature is disclosed a priori by mathematical physics—just as Kant and Newton hoped. But as Kant also showed, this is achieved through an activity of making-present and this is an aspect of projection, which involves thematization.

d. In order to thematize, Dasein must transcend. It cannot be a part of what is thematized [364]. “A world must have been disclosed to [Dasein].” Dasein is a being that thematizes. In doing so it must, however implicitly, understand being through some interpretation or other. If being is grounded in temporality, then time is the basis for Dasein’s being-in-the-world and its transcendence (which is a concernful being-alongside entities in the world “whether this being is theoretical or practical”) [364].

e. Thematizing the world as occurrent objects requires “transcendence”: the world of objects is not simply given to Dasein, it is the result of interpretation (hence Zuhandenheit and involvement). The interpretation ‘transcends’ the world of objects as a characterization of the entire class.

f. The major point on [362], that there are no bare facts, is discussed by Guignon (p. 159) and Dreyfus intermittently in his Chapter 15. The objective, scientific point of view is the result of Dasein taking knowledge as a form of looking at objects. But this leaves out Dasein as the originator of that interpretation, that view of knowledge.

C. Transcendence and time. Subsection (c).
1. Transcendence in the Kantian sense of the conditions for possible objective knowledge—transcendental understanding.
2. Science requires transcendence at least in the form of transcendent arguments that show how objective knowledge is possible.
Claims like, “all physical entities are spatio-temporal,” and so on, are not inductively justified but are “maxims” or “inference rules” against which scientific judgments are possible.

3. For Heidegger, the question becomes one about how this transcendental stance is achieved. For him, it is a form of involvement and is therefore temporal.
   a. Transcendence must take place through a process; it must be an activity: one example would be the realization of inauthenticity of the one. Dasein is already not a part of that world when it sees itself as “homeless.”
      i. Science itself is transcended by seeing that Dasein is not included in the scientific description of the world. It is a view from no point of view, from nowhere. Dasein’s teleological orientation is specifically left out of that description.
      ii. There is a similarity here between Heidegger and Donald Davidson who, in “Mental Events” (in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1970)) argued that there cannot be psychophysical laws of the same form as the laws of physics. The former will always be “heteronomic” in their use of different vocabularies. There is an implicit incommensurability between Dasein-descriptions and science. Hence the inclusiveness of the scientific point of view can never be established, it will always employ heteronomic laws when it describes the relation between science and scientists. See also Dreyfus’ “hermeneutic realist” view of science in his Chapter 13. See also J. Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 1992). The last chapter contains a comparison of Davidson and Heidegger.
   b. Heidegger can explain the origin of science through his theory of how substance came to be the object of knowledge (when Aristotle began to take sight as the primary source of information about the world), and through his account of how the world is characterized as presence or absolute occurrence. However, the reverse will not work. Dasein uses concepts that do not appear in the vocabulary of science and to say that a reduction of those concepts to scientific or physicalistic concepts is possible simply begs the question for the well-known reasons that Quine so forcefully stated in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Dreyfus’ various comments about Davidson should also be consulted.

4. Involvement takes the form of understanding. Application of the analytic of Dasein to science:
   a. Understanding is an “in-order-to,” “towards-which,” “for-the-sake-of” relation between Dasein and the world.
   b. How is Dasein’s being-in the world possible?
   c. As a form of care, i.e., through involvement: the three ecstases of time applied to understanding [365].
      i. For-the-sake-of-itself: future horizon. I am in the world through the use of it equipmentally as directed at future possibilities.
      ii. In the face of being thrown into the world: past horizon. My moods and state-of-mind is established.
      iii. In-order-to: present horizon. Involvement is through the availability of involvement contexts to fulfill a purpose.

5. What it means to be in a world through involvement with it lies in the unity of the three ecstases.

6. A world is presupposed in these activities. Indeed, the world is transcendent in the sense that it is defined through the conditions of possible ways of being through these forms of care. “The world” (also “reality” in #43) is understood as that within which these forms of activity are possible. In the case of science, the activities are those of objectification, of removing Dasein’s involvement from the characterization of occurrent entities. This yields the scientific point of view.

7. The basic argument (modified from Gelven):
   a. To transcend means to go beyond.
   b. There must be a place that counts as that place from which the whole world can be viewed or characterized (objectified occurrence).
c. The ecstatics of care have horizons which are temporal in character.

d. To transcend is possible because Dasein is temporal and finite. Temporality, future as past, makes transcendence possible in the sense of going beyond the present.

e. The laws of science, Newton’s and Galileo’s e.g., describe the ‘behavior’ of the transcendent world, the world as it transcends Dasein.

f. But, as we saw in #44, Dasein is the source of those laws. There is no ‘independence’, occurrence, without Dasein.

g. Once we so characterize the world, it seems to be a world that pre-exists Dasein in its independence.

8. The view of the world as occurrent entities (“the aggregate of the occurrent”), spatio-temporal objects, is achieved through a care-relation of transcendence. We can ask of this act (the activity of “being scientific”) what its purpose is, what it is in-order-to, and so on. The activity of understanding the world as occurrence is the result of a certain involvement with the world made possible by Plato and Aristotle’s invention of subject/object metaphysics!

9. Understanding, even scientific understanding, always incorporates an as-structure. The as-structures in question yield the view of the world as occurrent entities.

10. The question of transcendence is therefore not about the relation of subject to object (this is why Kant failed to complete his Copernican Revolution) [366], it is about how objects are encounterable within the world and objectified (this part of the Revolution was right, but it got off the track in Kant’s conception of the Noumenon). If the subject is an ontological limit, as it is for Kant, then the subjective world becomes a kind of object within the objective world. This is ultimately the problem of the relation between Kant’s phenomenal and noumenal worlds, an insoluble problem.

11. “The world is transcendent” (top of [366]) is an expression that shows the relation between Dasein and world as mutually determined by the being-in relations of care, understanding, state of mind. To see the world as simply occurrent things is to thematize it, to interpret it—but interpreting requires care and involvement. Hence the world can’t consist entirely of occurrent things because it also contains the activity of thematizing it that way. So the world transcends itself.

a. “World” on [365–6] thus appears to have two senses:
   i. The world of occurrent things and involvement contexts.
   ii. The transcendence of that world through Dasein. But Dasein does not step outside of the world, it does not achieve an absolute viewpoint since Dasein is that part of the world that transcends, that creates transcendence in the form of objectivity. This is the crucial step of the basic argument.

1. This is as close as Heidegger comes to Hegel’s claim that the world is simply “spirit knowing itself as spirit.” Dasein is activity knowing itself as activity. Heidegger does not claim that Dasein can separate itself from its world. Transcendence is not metaphysical, it is the way Dasein treats the world: by going beyond its occurrence in care, through classification, and other availability contexts.

2. In the case of science, science is a transcendent viewpoint in the sense that it transcends Dasein’s involvements. But that transcendent viewpoint results from a specific involvement.

b. “If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either” clearly refers to Heidegger’s point about the dependence of the world on our involvements in it. “The world” here would be equivalent to “reality” in #44.

12. Transcendence and finitude.

a. Particular interpretations of the world are possible only because Dasein is limited by its own temporality (ultimately death).

b. All interpretation is temporal, so the future, past, and present make up the significance of Dasein (both authentically and inauthentically, because both forms of Dasein’s being are understood temporally).
c. The universal principles of science are made possible for us through a transcendence of our particularity and finitude; but those principles are created through involvements with the world and through which we interpret the world scientifically. Although Heidegger does not define truth in terms of epistemic or involvement conditions, he implies that external realism is not very important in the sense that everything we want to say or believe about the world falls under involvement contexts. In #44 he minimally accepts the “content” of true statements as nonpropositional, so that beliefs and statements are true of the Real and not just true in the sense of meeting warranting conditions. There is no “analysis” of truth, not even as maximally coherent assertability. He does not explain truth in terms of rationality. But Heidegger is not a “robust” realist in the sense that he does not believe there to be any “bare facts” [362]. Facts determine the truth and falsity of statements and belief independent of cognitive activity, but like Davidson he does not believe that facts are “truth makers” since he has no account of the metaphysics of facts.

B. But the world itself is not occurs in space: spatiality applies only within a world. (“Where is the universe?” is a nonsensical question.)

1. Heidegger does not try to deduce space from time, as Kant tried to do (all spatial judgments are synthetic, judgment is always judgment in time, spatial events, as changes of state e.g., exist over time). Heidegger rather tries to find out how spatial experience depends on temporality.

C. Dasein is spatial through care [368].

1. The conception of things arranged in space is a kind of falling because Dasein does not really fill up space. To see Dasein as spatial, as an occursent thing, is inappropriate or at least highly constrained (O.K. for some purposes, such as medicine (although Heidegger might think modern medicine overly technologucial and might have sympathy with holist healers)).

2. Dasein’s “spirituality” comes down to being-in-the-world in a way spatial entities are not.

   a. The mind/body distinction rests on the confusion that two things must somehow be linked together. This makes consciousness spatially problematic for Descartes. On the one hand the mind is a thinking thing, yet he scornfully dismisses the question: “Where is the mind?”

   b. Heidegger transforms Dasein into actions, complexes of activities that determine the “who” and “where” of Dasein, not as a thing but as a composite of actions and results for which it is responsible.

3. Dasein’s involvement with the world includes spatiality, but temporality is the being of care. I.e., the involvement of Dasein in the world projects the particular interests of those involvement’s onto the world as interpretations. Dasein’s involvements are temporal, in the ways we have seen, and so spatiality is seen by Heidegger...
ger not as Newtonian-Euclidian points but as they are attached to what we want to do with things.

V. #71: summary. Heidegger says that he started his analysis from the everyday conception of temporality and then tried to find the ontological foundations. He now returns to the everyday to make some final observations in the light of his ontological inquiry.

A. Everydayness is a kind of falleness, the public existence of Every-man, behaving according to the rules, the sameness of time: each day is like every other.

B. But it is against this background that authenticity is possible. This is the world that Dasein transcends. The actor transcends her activity; yet the actor is defined in relation to all of its actions and activities. Since the class of all an actor’s actions isn’t complete until her death, Dasein is incomplete as long as it is in time, is active.

The last two chapters of Being and Time are about history. How does the analytic of Dasein connect to the history of its society? For Heidegger that connection is important because it allows him to attack what he sees as the dominant trends of modern thought: materialism, relativism, and subjectivism—all of which Heidegger characterizes as “nihilism.” These last two chapters are far more clearly written than the rest of Being and Time. If you have made it this far, the rest of the book will be pretty clear sailing so far as its initial intelligibility is concerned. The view of history it suggests is, however, another matter. Gelven’s discussion of the last two chapters is concise and clear but has no criticism. The appendix to Dreyfus’ book makes several critical points and Schmitt’s concluding chapter is especially important for a discussion of Heidegger’s theory of society, which Schmitt describes as a form of anarchism. There is also an excellent essay by David Hoy entitled “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time” in Murray. Guignon’s Chapter 5 also has a good discussion of these chapters.

1. #72: the ontology of history. What is history about? The general argument centers on Dasein’s unity or identity (its “connectedness”), which is seen to be historical. But history is based on “life” in the sense of the span of Dasein between birth and death, its orientation in terms of past, present, future. This view of life consists of more than organic or biological processes because Dasein’s identity originates in (or fails to be established) through its motivation and intentional activity and so requires Dasein’s ability to be conscious of what it does or fails to do. Again the dominant Heideggerian motif is action: Dasein is in-the-world historically.

A. Dasein not a subject [374]. Subject of what? “Dasein does not exist “as the sum of the momentary actualities of Experience which come along successively and disappear.”

1. Dasein does exist in history as a match is in a box or a log on a river. It is always something more than its experience; but it is “un-
thinglike.” This is Heidegger’s deepest objection against the Cartesian view of the mind as a separate substance. Similarly, he sees history not as a sum of moments but an active process dependent on or resulting from being-in-the-world. As Hoy suggests, history resembles a Kantian category for Heidegger. Since everything about Dasein involves activity, activity takes time, and Dasein’s activities are characterized temporally. Hegel’s historicism must also be an influence here, although without Hegel’s absolutism, his view that the sum total of human activity itself can be seen as an agent. We can characterize an epoch (“the Age of Exploration”) but we cannot turn that characterization around, hypostatizing it as a cause (there can’t be any exploration without explorers).

2. Dasein being in the world through care: this is the basis of its historicity. Dasein “stretches itself along” through its life. The constitutive totality of care is the basis for Dasein’s unity. This activity takes time and will be authentic and inauthentic. Dasein’s consciousness of this process constitutes the basis for history. No consciousness, no history.

B. Dasein’s process-orientation is the origin of fate and destiny in #74. History effects the nature of Dasein. Dasein as the potential for unity, can become actual only through the process of resoluteness, acceptance of guilt, and Angst.

C. History for Dasein consists of significant events, not discrete moments. History is developmental: narrative rather than chronicle.

D. Authenticity relies on the presence of narrative structure in Dasein’s characterization of itself and the world.

E. Outline of the chapter: phenomenology of ordinary history (#73); the relation of history to care and the temporal analytic of Dasein (#74); Dasein’s essential historicality and world-history (#75); Dasein’s historicality and the nature of history: history directed at the future, not subjective, attack on historicism: there is no purely objective history (#76); discussion of Dilthey and Count Yorck: if history is about life what is life (#77)?

II. #73: the ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein’s historicizing.

A. Four senses of “history” [378–9]:
   1. The past was an earlier time, but it can still be present-at-hand, occurrent: a Greek temple (or Gelven’s example of Lincoln’s pipe).
   2. Something that has a history, develops and decays, comes into existence (for a reason) and passes out of existence (for a reason). An event that determines the future is epoch-making. An event may draw on the past but the past has no special priority except as background and narrative context.
   3. History distinguished from nature in the manner of the history of the Roman Empire or Ancient Greece. A grouping of entities and events together to form a temporal period not evidently a natural process.
   4. Historical things: that which gets handed down to us; our heritage. But often these are not just things but the stories that attach to them.

B. Questions [379.5]: in what way does history “belong” to Dasein?
   1. What makes an object historical? The world as the context of which it was a part. No Dasein, no history. No Dasein, no “world” (but Heidegger does not mean this idealistically). He means that nothing unifies occurrent events into a context of being-in relations and possibilities.
   2. An object may have been available in a previous time because it was used by Dasein in what was its concernful being-in-the-world. Dasein can never be past because it can never be present-at-hand. As long as Dasein is, it acts. So Heidegger, in distinguishing Dasein from entities, says that Dasein is not past in an ontologically strict sense. It is rather a having done something [380–1].
   3. But Dasein is also futural in the sense that Dasein’s primary concern is the future, but it can be constituted as a unified process only over time, thus making its past relatively important. This is Heidegger’s sense of Gewesenheit, of the “has been” that conditions the present (see Hoy, p. 339).
III. #74: what is it to “be” (exist) historically?
A. Summary of Dasein’s being-in connected to time.
1. Care is grounded in temporality.
2. Resoluteness as projection upon guilt: the act of accepting responsibility.
3. Resoluteness gains its authenticity, its identity establishing potential by anticipation (future orientation). It is only in being towards death that totality and authenticity are possible.
4. But whether or not Dasein draws its authentic possibilities from its thrownness, the primary condition of care is thrownness.
   a. As thrown, Dasein is in a world and is lost in the one.
   b. How Dasein responds to this realization determines the state of its authenticity.

B. Types of authentically historical Dasein [384].
1. Heritage: Heidegger connects resoluteness and thrownness through the incorporation of the past of society, family, university—anything that can provide something of the means by which one encounters the world: as a graduate of Oxford, as a male, as an Englishman, etc.
2. Fate (Schicksal): awareness of finitude, of the limited possibilities open to one and the subsequent significance of choice. Having a fate is to be resolute, to accept how one is in the world. An irresolute person can have no fate. Fates are guided in advance by being with others and by resolution for certain possibilities over others. The emphasis is on the determination of the individual by the state of their resolution.
3. Destiny (Geschick): communities, peoples, races, nations have destinies and they are more than the sum of the fates of its individual members. Destiny is grounded in being with others. Only through the processes of communication does destiny “become free,” become explicitly accepted or rejected. Only then does it become apparent to those participating. As one can see, fate and destiny are etymologically related in German, and as Hoy points out (p. 340), both are related to Geschehen in the sense of “happening” or “coming to pass.”

C. Fate (both Geschick and Schicksal) as a “powerless superior power.” Powerless in the sense that Dasein’s finitude is unalterable but superior in the sense that Dasein can be resolute and free towards death and guilt by allowing finitude to influence choice and hence establishing a fate or destiny as part of a group (being-with-others). As Hoy points out (p. 341), the sense of freedom is not Sartrean, however, in the sense of the complete openness of possibility. It involves the unifying of life towards the future by incorporating what is possible into existence.

D. The temporality of Dasein: see italics, [385] ¶ two.
1. Here Heidegger connects the three temporal ecstases to history:
   a. Future: Dasein is aware of itself as thrown by encountering death ontologically.
   b. Past: as having been, Dasein is aware of its heritage.
   c. Present: Dasein’s “moment of vision” as its characterization of itself and what is happening in terms of its future and past, its achievements and goals.
2. The most meaningful ecstasis is the future. But “wiederholen” is the activity of unifying Dasein from the past to the future. (See Hoy’s discussion of Wiederholung on p. 343 and Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on p. 437.) As Heidegger puts it: “resoluteness implies handing oneself down by anticipation to the ‘there’ of the moment of vision; and this handing down we call ‘fate.’” The point is that the continuity of Dasein takes place over time, and this is resolutely and authentically accomplished by making the past part of one’s future projection.
3. Accepting a fate (e.g., in the form of a self-characterization) counters inauthenticity and the nihilism of the self lost in its society, out of its own control. (“Whatever happens, I’m going to be optimistic.”)
4. But how does one “choose a hero”? Isn’t choice in part controlled by heritage? See Hoy p. 342: “fate is predetermined and not freely chosen” but the significance of an event depends on the “repetition” of the past, on seeing the present as having evolved out of
it. This is what is involved in choosing a hero. The idea of repetition or Wiederholung is from the Old German meaning “to fetch again” or “to bring back” so the idea of choosing a hero is directed at the past, apparently, and not the present. See Dreyfus’ discussion of this passage on p. 330.

5. Dasein’s care is the basis for its disclosing the nature of its heritage, and that is one’s choice: whether one wants to be a part of it or whether one will just go along.

a. This entire discussion can (perhaps should) be applied to Heidegger’s “choosing” Nazism during his rectorship at Freiburg University. He clearly saw the Nazis as a destiny, in his sense, connected, he seems to have thought, with the salvation of Germany and its return to its past self-determination and glory. Equally possible, however, Heidegger wanted to use the Nazis as a way of advancing quickly through the university administration to a position of power. Perhaps he saw himself as fated to redeem German philosophy by allowing himself to be used by the Nazis in university politics. See Thomas Sheehan’s “Heidegger and the Nazis,” The New York Review of Books, XXXV, No. 10, pp. 38–47 and Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana, 1990), esp. Chapter 3. See also Victor Ferias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

b. The way out of nihilism is Angst (oddly but significantly). Through dread one discloses the nature of Dasein. The encounter with nothingness is the rejection of nihilism because it is the recognition of possibility as connected with Dasein’s fate.

E. The section ends with questions leading up to the next section leading to a consideration of inauthentic historicity: what if the idea of the connectedness of life is an illusion, what if the only real history concerns events rather than their “meaning” for Dasein? A Dasein-free conception of history would not involve the activity of historical being. These questions are directed at the kind of historicism that tries to describe only the facts, events, objects of the past. “The world” in each historical period is simply relative to the arrangement of its facts, and history reports what these were. This kind of historicism can also be called “positivism” in the sense that historical reality consists of temporal facts alone, usually the events of past politics. Heidegger, trying to counter the relativism implicit in positivism, introduces the concepts of Fate and Destiny in to history. History is about the worlds in which Daseins have interpreted and acted for or against the fates and destinations of their times. This, of course, just is the structure of Dasein. Fate and destiny are intrinsic to temporal existence for Dasein in relation to Das Man. However, this structure is not relative: Dasein exists both authentically or inauthentically as a historical being. The problem with historicism (as practiced by Troeltsch and Mannheim, e.g.) stems from its commitment to the relativity of values to particular Weltanschauungen, or world views, by seeing them as worlds completely independent from each other. This kind of historicism lacks narrative structure: see Guignon, p. 79. To be historically objective is simply to describe those worlds, not to connect them to ours. Heidegger disagrees with this.

IV: #75: Dasein’s historicality and world-history. The critique of classical historicism and inauthentic history.

A. Historicizing is an activity.

1. The section begins with a discussion of the subject as a free-floating observer imparting continuity to events by virtue of its temporal nature and its meaning-constituting activities.

a. Such claims of the priority of the subject still have to explain how objects are organized or unified. The Kantian view of the conceptual organization of intuitions would be an example.

b. Heidegger argues that this view presupposes a world: what is occurrent and what involvement contexts there are, are already determined in the sense of Dasein’s thrownness. One is never just ‘in’ a world but always in it in a specific way, through a specific context. It must be, therefore impossible to build up the world out of the experiences of the isolated subject: worldhood, as described in Division I, is a priori to any particular
meaning. Worldhood is the context for the occurrence of meaning and truth.
c. This takes Kant’s argument in the analogies of experience even farther: where does the completeness of the world of objective experience come from? It is presupposed in the definition of “objectivity” for Kant but Heidegger puts it in practical activity rather than in conceptual necessity.
d. The fundamental relation to be explained is being-in-the-world. This cannot be built up out of simple parts.
e. Discussion of subject/object relation [388–9]. History can’t be explained by “the connectedness of motions in the alterations of objects, nor a free-floating sequence of experience which ‘subjects’ have had.” Heideggerian history depends on being-in-the-world, Dasein is already historical and doesn’t consist of a subjective part (consciousness, the mind, experience) somehow related to the objective events of the world.
2. World-history: double signification [389].
a. The unity of the world and Dasein: Dasein is already in a world. History is about being-in-a-world.
b. The world as the background for the discovery of things in the world. Things don’t exist independently of the world they are part of. They are not just given. There are no bare facts—including bare historical facts.
3. Being-in-a-world is not a subject/object relation, nor is it the consciousness one has within a culture. (This is part of what is wrong with Dilthey’s view of the Geisteswissenschaften for Heidegger. For Dilthey, the “human sciences” study “inner” objects analogous to the “outer” objects of the natural sciences.)
4. For Heidegger things are in the world historically as they are related to Dasein’s involvements, care, projection, and understanding. These are the basic features of being-in-the-world; they can’t be broken down into simpler units.

B. Inauthentic history.
1. The ordinary understanding of being (at least in Western civilization) is simple occurrentness.

2. Historically, things happen and then disappear. Nothing has significance, things just happen and no responsibility is taken.
3. Even our experiences, insofar as they are part of the observer of independent events, are also simply occurring; we simply react to them.
4. Fate is hidden when the present is the most important; the character of the world is “undisclosed."
5. How are these events connected? The homelessness of Dasein in the one has to be disclosed. Disclosing its throwness shows that inauthentic Dasein lives only in the present. It has no future orientation, no resoluteness.

C. Authentic history [390].
1. The historicizing of resoluteness: the transcendence of the world occurs in time. Transcendence “has a temporal foundation” (by “transcendence” in this context Heidegger means the disclosure of the world’s contingent structure, its fate relative to Dasein’s parallel being towards death). Can Heidegger establish this parallel between a personal encounter with death and time and the entire world’s confrontation with nothingness? As Hoy points out (p. 339), Dasein is not a personal private subject to begin with but part of the world, socially involved with Das Man. The parallel lies not between the psychological and the historical but between Dasein as finite and limited (and coming to understand that) and the world (“reality”) as limited in its structure of possibilities for Dasein.
2. Resoluteness as the disclosure of fate: Dasein accepts the finiteness of its possibilities as its destiny.
3. Significance arises through the disclosure of possibility—which possibilities are significant are open as real alternatives. And, of course, it is significant that others are closed. This, once again, seems directly opposite Sartre’s view of freedom.
4. “The task of destroying the history of philosophy historiologically” (last sentence [390]). Heidegger takes history to be essential to Dasein rather than just one of many areas of a philosophical analysis of historical concepts. His ontological turn places history at the root of being. This argument is directed at the Neo-Kantians
who saw history as dependent on categories of analysis (like the concepts of the understanding) that could be structurally analyzed in an objective way (by philosophers, of course). As Hoy points out, Heidegger turns the tables on the Neo-Kantians by making philosophy dependent on history (See Hoy, p. 334).

V. #76: the origin of the study of history in Dasein’s historicity.

A. Historiology: the science of historical research. What do historians do, what do they look for, and why?

B. Bearing in mind that historiology has Dasein’s historicity at its root, the function of historiology is the disclosure of the objects it identifies.

1. Thematizing: looking at history through a specific set of themes or concepts; history as past politics; history as the dialectic of social classes; history as the subjects of the paintings on the walls of the homes of the wealthy.
   a. Can a study of the laws and patterns of events so described be exhaustive? Or does history depend on interpretation (rather than the discovery of objective facts)?
   b. If Dasein’s factuality (as opposed to its facticity) lies in its projection, historiology reflects on a specific potentiality for being, but not on its source [394–5]. Historical facts are projections from care in relation to having been. But what is care concerned with? The world and the world depends on projection into the future.
   c. The choice is already made by Dasein’s world: If Dasein’s world is conceived materialistically, that is what we will look for in history. We will follow up the themes implicit in the world so conceived.
   d. In the orientation of historiology to “the facts” one looses the origin of those facts in Dasein’s orientative involvements in the world [395, last ¶].

2. Gelven suggests that the key to this section lies in the distinction between the actual as knowable and the possible as significant. We have seen how Heidegger emphasizes the possible over the actual, so historiology is going to rest on ontological presuppositions disclosed through Dasein’s being-in relations. This is where narrative comes in: historicity is the disclosure of the being-in relations of the past; historiology depends on historicity on the temporal orientation of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. I.e., history traditionally understood studies the objects of the past (including events, heroes, etc.) as if they were events in a play that has ended. But Dasein is in the world through possibility (hence orientation towards the future)—the next act of the play is about to begin. Authentic history, for Heidegger, studies neither single events or things, nor universal laws, but what was possible for past Dasein. We study the fate of past Dasein, however, with a view to understanding our own fate. As Heidegger says, “The ‘selection’ of what is to become a possible object for historiology has already been met with in the factical existentiell [the actual] choice of Dasein’s historicity, in which historiology first of all arises, and in which alone it is.” We concentrate on what actually happened, but our interest is in projection, involvement, in the way past Dasein was in its world.

3. Dasein not subjective [395.5]. It guarantees objectivity within the sphere of its involvements.
   a. See Hoy’s discussion of this page (p. 348). He asks whether this means that no historical account will be true for ever, or that historical accounts are true for specific ages only. But what about Heidegger’s own account: is his account of the origins of philosophy in Ancient Greece “true”? Heidegger uncovers (entdecken) the entities that have dominated the philosophical history of Western civilization (the subject/object distinction, the dominance of the substance/attribute view of presence, the correspondence theory of truth, knowledge as representation, etc.) but in so doing he also discloses (erschliessen) the whole system in which those objects have their being, their origins in Plato and Aristotle.

B. Nietzsche [396–7].

1. How to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic history.
What is the use of history? Why are we interested in the past, in that particular past?

a. How self-reflective can history be about its origins? Can we really see what makes us what we are (is there a historical predicament analogous to the egocentric predicament)?

b. For Heidegger Dasein uncovers but also covers up; there will always be something hidden of itself. But this is itself a key disclosure of Dasein’s nature.

c. There can never be a complete history of anything because Dasein can never be completely uncovered for itself even in its past involvements. But knowing this is to know something essential about Dasein. We can know that in the past we covered up or forgot about the poetic appeal to nature in Greek tragedy when we became rationalistic about it (Plato and Aristotle). But we can never really retrieve that original poetic insight, despite Heidegger’s nostalgia for it, especially in his later works. You can’t be young again, you can’t go home again, as Thomas Wolfe said.

2. Nietzsche’s “monumental, antiquarian, and critical” historiologies.

a. In its concern with the possible, Dasein is not concerned with past events but with what is significant in the present and the future relative to fate.

b. Monumental history: great men (usually), great events, but what makes them great is the seizing of possibility in the establishment of a new interpretation, a new world (as Nietzsche was fond of saying).

c. The future is the real object of historical interest. Authentic history is concerned about the future.

d. Nietzsche’s question was about how history is used and abused. How it disclosed our nature as organisms driven by the will to power, or how it was used to defend and entrench a particular view of truth and value. How are comparisons to be made, antiquarian interest in past events and things is uncritical (what is significant in the past?). Monuments reveal possibilities of the future implicit in the present and inherited from the past but what do we do about it—are monuments permanent? This is why monumental history is antiquarian too.

VI. #77: Dilthey and York.
A. Discussion of Dilthey: the thrust of the argument is anti-relativistic, and anti-subjectivist (both of which are strong tendencies in Dilthey). But Heidegger agrees with Dilthey that history is unique to humanity as a special mode of existence.

B. Yorck: as Hoy points out, Yorck criticized the “ocularists” who stress the factual, ontical approach to history. Yet in speaking of life holistically, Yorck and Dilthey are not clear about what life is and why it cannot be reduced to facts or mechanisms. This is where Heidegger clearly has an advantage in his analysis of Dasein. Rorty has a brief and interesting discussion of Heidegger on History in “Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism” in Essays on Heidegger and Others (Philosophical Papers: Volume II) (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

C. Last two ¶’s: a philosophy of life requires history (“be optimistic” don’t expect too much out of life,” “make friends and influence people”) but in an original sense.

1. Historicity is an ontological feature of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

2. The ontical, factual question is about what is objectively present. But that is not history.

3. The ontical is only one domain of entities: the idea of Being includes both the ontical and the historical. The historical also includes the availability of involvement contexts as part of the way in which Dasein is in the world; this must be part of historicity too.
I. #78: the goal in this last chapter is to show how deeply time is part of Dasein’s nature. Dasein isn’t in time, rather Dasein is time. Thus for Heidegger, the being of Dasein is becoming. The other great philosopher who said this was Hegel, so Heidegger looks at what he said but finds it inadequate in various ways, although it certainly shares an affinity with Hegel’s organic, process approach. One major dissimilarity is that Hegel contextualizes individuals by explaining their consciousness through the culture of which they are a part: individuals manifest as particular, personalized versions or images of the larger conceptual structure of their culture. Although Hegel doesn’t think these concepts are abstract (he places great emphasis on action, as does Heidegger), the ultimate medium of explanation is “the Concept,” the culture, the entire historical movement that comprises the development of civilization. For Heidegger, on the other hand, all of these things develop out of Dasein; but we should remember that Dasein is not an isolated individual for Heidegger either (by now, how can we forget?). As we have seen, Dasein occurs in a public world, surrounded by its tool-contexts, das Man, fate and destiny, and so on. Nevertheless, for Heidegger Dasein is the basis for the explanation of culture because it can transcend, i.e., it can stand outside of its particularity and characterize itself and its world.

In this first section we have the usual helpful review and presentation of the next stage of the inquiry. In this case it is public time. What makes clocks possible?

A. Subjectivity/objectivity and temporality [405].
   1. Heidegger argues that time is neither the one nor the other. Public time is not derived from inner, subjective time (this is Bergson’s view, for example).
   2. Dasein is in the world through its actions, care, authenticity/inauthenticity, etc. and it is through these that Dasein is temporal.
   3. The goal is to show that the many senses of time depend on Dasein’s fundamental temporality.
B. Outline of the chapter: Dasein’s fundamental temporality and a discussion of datability (#79), public time (#80), inauthentic temporality: the ordinary concept of time (#81), Hegel’s analysis of time (#82), questions about time, Dasein, and being in general (#83).

II. #79: Dasein’s temporality.
A. First ¶: how the previous aspects of Dasein’s existentiality are temporal. As we know, Dasein is essentially ahead of itself, and not yet. Dasein’s concern is tied up in its planning ahead, preventing, taking precautions, and so on.
   1. Datability: temporal moments are determined relative to concern. Temporal concern is a relational structure.
      a. Awaiting: I wait for x, then I will do y.
      b. Retaining: I did y on a former occasion and it didn’t work.
      c. Acting now: I make x present by doing y.
      d. Forgetting: taking the present as prior. Now is all there is.
   2. Datability comes from the ways in which Dasein acts.
   3. On what is datability grounded? See [408], first complete ¶: “the making-present which awaits and retains, interprets itself.” Notice the self reflexivity of the quotation. Dasein does not get time from somewhere else, it is part of Dasein’s being. What does it indicate? “Interprets itself” as what?

B. There follows a long, tedious discussion of how datability—acting temporally in the world—infuses all kinds of ordinary discourse about time. This discussion won’t be presented here since the point is always the same in each case.

C. Authenticity and inauthenticity [410].
   1. Irresoluteness and inauthenticity exaggerate the present. One is lost in the object of concern (in the present) and so loses his time in it.
      a. Heidegger appears to say that absorption in a project, and the sense of timelessness, are inauthentic (we are sometimes surprised at how much time has passed when we set the project aside).

b. If one cannot become authentically absorbed in the project when it involves this loss of the sense of time, then what is authentic involvement like? What would the authentic counterpart be like? Perhaps the realization that the present project may be connected with a future project.

2. Resoluteness and authenticity involves the moment of vision as the present: the significance of the present lies in the future. Concern defines a situation or a context of concern and action. These are involvement contexts.
   a. Authenticity discloses the present in Dasein’s concern. Dasein “stretches itself along” temporally. Dasein is unified by its concern and action directed at a goal. Once again, the connection with Aristotle’s ethics is striking. The practical syllogism, for example, is supposed to be a form of acting in such a way that purposiveness guides identification (“this is good for humans”) as it is involved in action (“I’m a human in need of this sort of stuff, so I’ll get some for myself”). It would seem that Heidegger’s metaphysics reverses the order of Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance as the foundation of Being (using a capital letter to differentiate from Heidegger): metaphysics as first philosophy. For Heidegger, praxis precedes theoria. But perhaps this is unfair to Aristotle who does emphasize practical interests even in metaphysical inquiry. If so, Aristotle and Heidegger have even more in common. See Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Chapter 8 (“Saving Aristotle’s Appearances”) for an elegant and powerful discussion of Aristotle’s metaphysics.

D. Being-with others, last ¶. This is a preface to the next section.
   1. Time is shared with others by their all being in the same world, sharing concerns about it, and so on.
   2. The time through which Dasein interprets and projects is already public. Time is not only the nature of Dasein, but of the world as well. We have seen how Dasein is in the world temporally. Dasein is in-the-world differently from occurrent entities because
Dasein changes through its existence as a result of its involvements with the world. Insofar as it is in control of its involvements, Dasein controls how it changes. Occurrent entities do not.

II. #80: public time. How is public measurement of time possible?
A. Public time comes from the daily activities of being-in-the-world.
   1. Public time in relation to involvements in the world.
      a. Day/night: light/dark.
         i. Dasein is in-the-world through care: involvement is relative to seeing: light and day are conditions for seeing or not seeing.
         ii. The sun is the means for disclosing the entities of the world. The sun may be an occurrent object, but in the involvement of seeing, it is a tool.
      b. Dating: things happen under the same sky for everyone. Dating, clock measurement, the movements of the sun, moon, and stars all partake in the same system of availability involvements for Dasein.
   2. What does the expression “things are in time” mean? Both the occurrent and the available are encountered in time and this is related to the fact of Dasein’s thrownness as the reason for public time. Dasein’s projection into the future. Public time depends on Dasein’s temporality, on its ability to see the world in terms of systems of measurement.
      a. The time in which things exist is the particular kind of involvement constituting the public temporality of the world.
      b. Dasein stands aside, as it were, and lets objective measurement supersede. But this device of treating everything as occurrent is also a tool, as we saw in #69.
B. Clocks. [414–417]. How is the temporality of Dasein related to the systems of measurement that make up public time? Clocks are inventions based on more primitive temporal concepts connected to Dasein.
   1. Time and significance. Time seen through involvement is time for doing something. If we are concerned about planting crops, our system of measurement will be the seasons, rain/dry, cold/hot, and so on. If our concern is subatomic physics, our clocks will be correspondingly more accurate and, unlike the seasons, every moment will be like every other.
   2. World-time.
      a. Clocks are tools for co-ordinating action in the world. Clocks belong to the world but temporality (as Dasein’s way of being-in the world) is the reason for clocks.
      b. Time is tied up with the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which relations that constitute our involvements. These relations are the foundation for datability.
      c. Datable, spanned, and public.
         i. The features of time as they characterize the world of Dasein’s concerns.
         ii. “Dasein is itself the clock” [416]. Dasein’s activities are the origin of temporal measurement by using or creating occurrent objects such as clocks, sundials, tide tables, etc. (This is not Bergsonian subjectivity.)
         iii. Time does not consist of moments but of relations. It is available through involvement and not simply given or occurrent.
      d. Sundial.
         i. A way of measuring the movements of the sun, which is the daytime, the time for work (sundials don’t work at night, but then Dasein doesn’t work at night either (until recently anyway)). Heidegger’s primitive agrarian nostalgia shows through here.
         ii. Sundials as public tools. The way the townfolk tell time through its relations to each other—the sundial in the town square is part of the being-with relation. So, of course, the idea of the town square and the background of Gertrud Stein’s remark about Oakland, California: “there’s no there there.”
C. “Now” [417]: how do we come to see time as discrete moments?
   1. Universally accessible time: clocks seem to measure a multiplicity of occurrent “nows” thus leading to “the problem of time”: what is the metaphysical nature of a moment of time?
a. Gelven discusses Zeno’s paradoxes as an example of this problem: how can we explain the movement of time if it consists of discrete moments? Where is the ‘movement’? Through the beginning and ending of an activity.

b. But if time is something used, it does not consist of moments, it is part of our involvement in the world.

2. Thus time is not what is designated by the motion of a pointer moving across the dots on the face of a clock (“how are they connected to one another?”), it is a public system of measurement. When we ask what time it is, the location of the pointers at 3 and 6 mean something to the questioner: that a task is finished, or cannot be finished in time, that the workday has ended, and so on. It is part of the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which complex.

3. Time is the way in which entities within the world are encountered [419]. When time is measured it is made public [416], and it makes the disclosure of space possible (space takes time to traverse).

D. Subjective/objective.

1. Time as occurrent is not objective, it does not have the attribute of objectivity. It is simply part of the nature of things independent of Dasein. Objectivity requires Dasein’s establishment of public measures and tests. But it is still part of “reality” (i.e., occurrent time is still dependent on Dasein for its “independence”). Heidegger uses Hegel’s point about “the negation of the negation” (which he takes up explicitly at the end of this chapter).

a. World time is objective in its disclosure of the possibility of entities within-the-world. But this connects time to the world through Dasein’s care, thrownness, involvement, etc. Time is a priori to what is knowable and how it is known (Kant’s point). World time is the way entities within the world are encountered: they are dated in a way which locates them publicly in time.

2. But neither is time originally subjective, as Kant argued, preceding even the “I think” as part of the structure of the mind.

a. Time makes both subjectivity and objectivity possible.

b. Bergson’s problem (which is the real time: objective or subjective?) doesn’t arise if we see time founded on the activity of Dasein and being-in-the-world.

c. Dasein is not subjective but interactive. Dasein’s concerns and involvements “cause” time in the sense of measurement (an activity).

3. Conceiving of time theoretically narrows time down to fit a specific purpose. Reifying time as discrete, objectively identical moments will lead to the abstract problem of time (how are the moments connected?) if we lose sight of the fundamental activity of temporalizing, of understanding activity temporally.

4. The abstract problem is not fundamental, therefore, but derived, dependent on the more “original” activities of Dasein.

IV: #81: ordinary time, inauthenticity.

A. The ordinary concept of time is inauthentic because it:

1. Lacks datability: all moments are like all others.

a. Aristotle thinks that time is the counting of moments.

i. Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s Physics (219 b1) should be compared with Ross: “time is just this: number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’. Hence time is not movement but only movement insofar as it admits of enumeration.”

ii. The tendency is to think of time as the counting of discrete units. Does the movement lie in the activity of counting?

b. Datability requires interpretation of world-time relative to our concerns. It is not determined by counting units of time. “How long ago did it happen?” requires the identification of what happened relative to our interests. The measurements—a day, a year, five minutes ago—are functions of interest. For a physicist, the question will involve a system of extremely minute measurement (nanoseconds, etc.); for the ancient historian, it will involve a system fitting larger-scale measurement (years, decades, centuries); for the farmer, another (the seasons for planting/harvesting). The measurement of units of time
takes place against the concepts of past/present/future. Those concepts are not determined by measuring units, rather the measuring of units takes place against the background of those concepts implicit in Dasein’s activities. These temporal “concepts” depend on those activities, they are not prior to them (as Kant would argue they are).

2. Lacks significance [422].
   a. Inauthenticity avoids fate, death, guilt, responsibility concerned with time limits, constraints, deadlines, etc. All moments are like all other moments temporally.
   b. What is significant about the future is Dasein’s death.
   c. These concerns make up the “ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality” in which dataility gets its significance. Time is spanned by Dasein’s being-in-the-world, it is “stretched along” through life from the past into the future as Dasein.
   d. Ordinary time levels off these relations: “nows” are all alike, all occurrent moments. The special importance of the future drops out.

3. Infinite [423–6].
   a. In speaking of time as “the moving image of eternity” (as Plato did) all moments of time are alike, discrete and unconnected with Dasein (things are in time, time is not in things).
   b. Time has no end and hence no meaning. Or vice versa? A life that goes on and on, never ending, would be vastly different from one that occurs within finite temporal limits. The short essay by Nagel on death is relevant here.
   c. As long as Dasein sees time this way, it will not encounter Death, its own finitude will be covered up.
   d. Inauthentic temporality looks away from finitude.
      i. The one never dies because only I die (only I die my death) [425].
      ii. To be in time and whatever is authentic must be finite. It would seem that God could not be authentic in Heidegger’s sense.

B. Analysis of inauthenticity [425 to end of section].
   1. Inauthentic waiting: wanting time to stand still; not understanding Dasein’s futural orientation, waiting has no direction: time simply passes. But authentic Dasein awaits its death through resoluteness, by taking action in its finite possibilities.
   2. Time cannot be reversed because Dasein is directional (future-oriented) [426 ¶s one and two]. Dasein lives in one direction: towards the future. Its interest in the past is still part of that orientation towards the future. If now-time (the abstraction of time into moments strung together forwards or backwards) is derived from temporality, then the former must be an abstraction from the latter. This abstract conception of time is reversible (at the level of physical theory, e.g.), but this abstractness is precisely what makes the actual reversibility of time so difficult for us to comprehend: we live towards the future and it is impossible to change that directionality.

3. Future orientation of temporality [427].
   a. The future is when something important happens: the goal I am working for is achieved. The future cannot be a pure now under this view.
   b. St. Augustine: if there is no soul to act as a counter, there is no time. If time is extendedness, what is extended? The soul itself. For Heidegger, the soul is simply Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

V. #82: Hegel. If history is the fall of spirit into time, what is spirit before it falls? Spirit is Geist and should not be thought of as individual consciousness. In speaking of Geist, Hegel is using it in the sense of the “spirit of the times,” “team spirit,” and so on. See Robert Solomon’s article, “Hegel’s Concept of ‘Geist’” in Alasdair McIntyre, ed., Hegel (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972).
A. Hegel’s conception of time.
   1. Ontology preceeds temporality
      a. For Aristotle time was the counting of moments in relation to things in space.
      b. For Hegel and Heidegger, space is time: for Hegel, space is
thought dialectically, developmentally; for Heidegger, space is part of Dasein’s involvement and is automatically temporal.

2. Thinking grasps Being, and thinking is temporal: it must go through a dialectical process. Thus thinking is a subject/object struggle (as in the master/slave analogy in section B of The Phenomenology of Spirit).

3. Space is “nature’s being outside of itself.” If the subject thinks of itself as non-spatial, space is the “negation” of the subject. The “negation of the negation” is the subject seeing itself as spatial after all: perhaps as the origin of space as in Kant. The phrase “the negation of the negation” usually indicates an increase in self-consciousness for Hegel. If space gets represented it is no longer space in a purely objective sense (Kant’s point) even though it is represented as non-subjective. For Kant, the transcendental ideality of space and time establish the universal framework of representation. Heidegger does not claim time to be transcendentally ideal and a priori.

   a. Punctuality transfers the self-identity of the subject to the identity of the object (the moments of time). But the subject has no identity except through activities picking it out from whatever else is happening. No self-identity without activity.
   b. Thus subject and object are united (time consists of self-identical moments having the same property of self-identity as the subject). Nature is “outside of itself” in the sense that these moments of time are that against which things are measured. So if nature consists of occurrent things, but the measurement of things requires what is outside of nature, what measures the things. But is that a thing?

4. Time as intuited becoming. Pure becoming has no directionality: becoming is abstract, it is simply passage. But passage of what? The metaphor for time appears to be spatial in Hegel, but space can’t be prior to time if space can’t be measured independently of time. (To say that it can, e.g., in geometrical conceptions of space, is thus either implicitly temporal or else a kind of measurement not analogous to spatial measurement as in the analytic geometrical (Cartesian) translation of geometry into algebra.)

5. The discussion of punctuality seems to rest on a quasi-spatial location of temporal moments that somehow flow. The metaphor of the river of time, or time flowing, is based on space: but how is the river divided up? Is that division part of “the nature of things”? As we have seen, Heidegger wants to reverse the relation: spatiality is the way Dasein temporalizes being-in-the-world. Gelven points out that Heidegger sees Hegel as anticipating his own action-theory of time and space, but he also rejects Hegel’s conception of time as too abstract. Spirit has its own dialectical structure, reflected in individuals. Heidegger does not absolutise the structure of Dasein to the equivalent of Geist. His ontology concerns only historical phenomena, not “history” itself.

B. Hegel’s conception of the connection between time and spirit.

1. “The essence of spirit is the Concept (Begriff)”: Begriff is related to “begreifen”: to conceive, to grasp; also “greifen”: to lay hold of, to seize, to grasp. (As Macquarrie and Robinson point out, “begreifen” also means “in the process of doing something” and this is relevant to the translation of the first sentence of the second ¶ of this subsection.) So “the Concept” is ‘the grasp’, the comprehension, of everything, and because it is a concept, it is the natural domain of Geist. Geist is by its nature spiritual. Again, this is too “absolute” for Heidegger. He doesn’t think everything can be “grasped” by Dasein, even as an historical process. Indeed, in #44 and #69 he is at pains to be anti-absolute.

2. Subject/object: self-consciousness involves the grasping of the not-I. The grasping of the differentiation between myself and the world, or another person.

   a. Pure I: as in the Phenomenology, there can be no pure I relating itself to itself immediately (a là Descartes). Everything is mediated for Hegel and mediation takes place through action; conceptualization is a form of activity (Hegel agrees).
   b. The distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness (self and not-self) is a form of thinking and acting (in this Heidegger would also presumably agree).
   c. Again the negating of the negation (¶ three) is the self-conscious realization that I divide the world between self and not-
self but in so doing I unify the world through my conceptualization: the not-self is understood by me as so divided and so is in that higher more conceptual, second-order sense like me (since I am spiritual or geistlich in my ability to negate the negation to show how self-and not-self are part of the same universe).

3. The “restless spirit” thus spiritualizes everything as it actualizes itself it falls into time. How would you describe this restless spirit?
   a. Freedom for Hegel means self determination: to be organized by the principles of Being through understanding. More thought means more overcoming of the differences between oneself and the rest of the world.
   b. By its very essence spirit appears in time as world history.
   c. History is simply the working out of these higher and higher processes of self-conceptualization/realization.

4. The problem, however, is that Hegel still treats time as something related to the actualization of spirit, as somehow distinguished and, in unhegelian terms, “outside” of or independent of individuals. Can spirit exist outside of time? One would think not for Hegel. Spirit can exist without this individual or that one, but does it exist if there are none? As we saw in #44 and 69, Heidegger thinks of “the world without Dasein” as indeterminant.

5. For Hegel, despite his insights about time, the fundamental analytical primitive remains the subject/object relation. This is transcended through the “arduous struggle” involved in the concretion of spirit. Everything has to be explained by the conflict implicit in the opposition of subject/object, and so time is derivative, explained in terms of that conflict, whereas for Heidegger time is intrinsically part of Dasein’s nature. He does not begin from subject/object metaphysics but tries to show how it originated.

6. The “in itself” of spirit is the subject/object form of consciousness, which then manifests itself in time. Heidegger puts Dasein in a world with temporality in the form of throwness, futural orientation, concern: thus “temporality temporalizes world-time” as part of Dasein’s ‘nature’ and spirit does not ‘fall into’ time: falling is an aspect of being-in-the-world.

C. #83: Heidegger concludes (really just stops since the published version of Being and Time is a fragment of a larger unpublished work) with a good summary of his entire position concerning absolutist metaphysics: “What positive structure does the Being of ‘consciousness’ have, if reification remains inappropriate to it? Is the ‘distinction’ between ‘consciousness’ and ‘Thing’ sufficient for taking the ontological problematic in a primordial manner?” His critique of Hegel, as Richard Rorty puts it, recapitulates “…Nietzsche’s criticism of Hegel’s attempt to escape finitude by losing himself in the dramas of history. Hegel hoped to find in history the evidence and certainty that Plato hoped to find in a sort of super-mathematics called ‘dialectic’, and that positivism hoped to find in a unified science” (Richard Rorty, “Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism,” p. 33). Heidegger emphasizes the contingency of temporizing where Hegel argues that time has a structure in the form of the dialectic. For Hegel, there is a essential developmental aspect to history: conflict. For Heidegger, what Dasein is depends on what it does, and that entails temporality. He seems to say in the last ¶ that Being, or Time, can be understood only through disclosive understanding. Disclosure, as we have seen, is itself temporal. So “something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-of-Being which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands.” Hence it seems that one cannot, for Heidegger, get to a point of complete disclosure (because it always covers up as well) because Dasein cannot get outside of time, even ‘conceptually.’
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